Staff Ride Handbook for
the Battle of Shiloh,
6-7 April 1862
LTC Jeffrey J. Gudmens
and the Staff Ride Team
Combat Studies Institute
Combat Studies Institute Press
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
Cover photo: “Pittsburg Landing After the Battle of Shiloh,” #68448, Naval
Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, DC.
Staff Ride Handbook for
the Battle of Shiloh,
6-7 April 1862
LTC Jeffrey J. Gudmens
and the Staff Ride Team
Combat Studies Institute
Combat Studies Institute Press
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Gudmens, Jeffrey J., 1960-
Staff ride handbook for the Battle of Shiloh, 6-7 April 1862 / Jeffrey J.
Gudmens and the Staff Ride Team, Combat Studies Institute.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Shiloh, Battle of, Tenn., 1862. 2. Shiloh National Military Park
(Tenn.)—Guidebooks. 3. Staff rides—Tennessee—Shiloh National Mili-
tary Park. I. U.S.Army Command and General Staff College. Combat
Studies Institute. Staff Ride Team. II. Title.
E473.54.G84 2005
973.7’31—dc22
2004026445
i
Contents
Page
Illustrations .. ...........................................................................................iii
Foreword ................................................................................................. v
Introduction ...................................................................................vii
I. Civil War Armies
.........................................................................1
Organization ...................................................................................... 1
The US Army in 1861 ................................................................. 1
Raising the Armies ...................................................................... 2
The Leaders ................................................................................. 6
Civil War Staffs ........................................................................... 7
The Armies at Shiloh................................................................... 8
Weapons .......................................................................................... 10
Infantry ..................................................................................... 10
Cavalry ...................................................................................... 13
Field Artillery ............................................................................ 14
Heavy Artillery—Siege and Seacoast ....................................... 15
Weapons at Shiloh ..................................................................... 16
Tactics ........................................................................................... 18
Tactical Doctrine in 1861 .......................................................... 18
Early War Tactics ...................................................................... 20
Later War Tactics....................................................................... 22
Summary ................................................................................... 24
Tactics at Shiloh ........................................................................ 25
Logistics Support............................................................................. 27
Logistics at Shiloh..................................................................... 31
Engineer Support............................................................................. 32
Engineers at Shiloh ................................................................... 34
Communications Support ................................................................ 34
Communications at Shiloh ........................................................ 36
Medical Support .............................................................................. 38
Medical Support at the Battle of Shiloh .................................... 39
II. Shiloh Campaign Overview ............................................................ 43
III. Suggested Routes and Vignettes...................................................... 59
Introduction ..................................................................................... 59
Stand 1, Fraley Field ....................................................................... 61
Stand 2, Peabody’s Camps .............................................................. 64
Stand 3, Rea Field ........................................................................... 67
Stand 4, Shiloh Church.................................................................... 71
Stand 5, Sherman’s Second Line..................................................... 75
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iii
Page
Stand 6, Jones Field......................................................................... 80
Stand 7, Lew Wallace’s Division .................................................... 83
Stand 8, Spain Field ........................................................................ 87
Stand 9, Stuart’s Brigade................................................................. 91
Stand 10, The Peach Orchard.......................................................... 96
Stand 11, Johnston’s Death ............................................................. 99
Stand 12, The Hornet’s Nest ......................................................... 103
Stand 13, Ruggles’ Line ................................................................ 107
Stand 14, Hell’s Hollow ................................................................ 110
Stand 15, Grant’s Last Line .......................................................... 113
Stand 16, The Night ...................................................................... 116
Stand 17, Buell’s Attack................................................................ 121
Stand 18, Grant’s Attack ............................................................... 126
Stand 19, The Cost ........................................................................ 129
Stand 20, The War is Won............................................................. 131
IV. Integration Phase for the Battle of Shiloh ..................................... 133
V. Support for a Staff Ride to Shiloh ................................................. 135
Appendix A. Order of Battle, Union Forces ....................................... 137
Appendix B. Order of Battle, Confederate Forces.............................. 141
Appendix C. Biographical Sketches ................................................... 143
Appendix D. Medal of Honor Conferrals for the Battle of Shiloh ..... 151
Bibliography ........................................................................................ 153
About the Author.................................................................................. 159
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iii
Illustrations
Tables
Page
1. Federal and Confederate Organized Forces ........................................ 6
2. Typical Staffs ......................................................................................7
3. Common Types of Artillery Available at the Battle of Shiloh .......... 17
4. Sample of Federal Logistics Data ..................................................... 30
Maps
1. Operational Movement .....................................................................42
2. Army of the Tennessee Camps..........................................................52
3. The Confederate Plan........................................................................54
4. Shiloh Battleeld, Tour Route...........................................................56
5. Shiloh Battleeld, Compressed Tour Route......................................57
6. Fraley Field .......................................................................................60
7. Peabody’s Camp................................................................................63
8. Rea Field ...........................................................................................66
9. Shiloh Church ...................................................................................70
10. Sherman’s Second Line.....................................................................74
11. Jones Field, 1130-1400 .....................................................................78
12. Jones Field, 1400-1700 .....................................................................79
13. Wallace’s March................................................................................82
14. Spain Field ........................................................................................86
15. Stuart’s Brigade.................................................................................90
16. Peach Orchard, 0800-1300................................................................94
17. Peach Orchard, 1300-1600................................................................95
18. Hornet’s Nest, 1000-1200 ...............................................................101
19. Hornet’s Nest, 1200-1530 ...............................................................102
20. Ruggles’ Line ..................................................................................106
21. Hell’s Hollow ..................................................................................109
22. Grant’s Last Line.............................................................................112
23. The Night ........................................................................................115
24. Buell’s Attack, 0500-1200...............................................................119
25. Buell’s Attack, 1200-1400...............................................................120
26. Grant’s Attack, 0600-1100 ..............................................................124
27.
Grant’s Attack, 1100-1400 ..............................................................125
v
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Foreword
Since the early 20th century the US Army has used Civil War and oth-
er battleelds as “outdoor classrooms” in which to educate and train its of-
cers. Employing a methodology developed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
in 1906, both the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and US
Army War College conducted numerous battleeld staff rides to prepare
ofcers for duties in both war and peace. Often interrupted by the exigen-
cies of the nation’s wars, the tradition was renewed and reinvigorated at
Fort Leavenworth in the early 1980s. Since 1983 the Leavenworth Staff
Ride Team has guided military students on battleelds around the world.
For those unable to avail themselves directly of the team’s services the
Combat Studies Institute has begun to produce a series of staff ride guides
to serve in lieu of a Fort Leavenworth instructor. The newest volume in
that series, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Gudmens’ Staff Ride Handbook for
the Battle of Shiloh, 6-7 April 1862 is a valuable study that examines the
key considerations in planning and executing the campaign and battle.
Modern tacticians and operational planners will nd themes that still reso-
nate. Gudmens demonstrates that leaders in Blue and Gray, in facing the
daunting tasks of this, the bloodiest battle to this point on the continent,
rose to the challenge. They were able to meet this challenge through plan-
ning, discipline, ingenuity, leadership, and persistence—themes worthy of
reection by today’s leaders.
Thomas T. Smith
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry
Director of Combat Studies
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vii
Introduction
A staff ride to a major battleeld is an excellent tool for the historical
education of members of the Armed Forces. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
has been conducting staff rides since the 1900s. Captain Arthur L. Wagner
was an instructor at Fort Leavenworth in the 1890s, and he believed an
ofcer’s education had become too far removed from the reality of war.
He pondered how to get the experience of combat to ofcers who had only
experienced peace. His answer was the staff ride, a program in which stu-
dents studied a major battle and then went to the actual eld to complete
the study. Wagner did not live to see staff rides added to the curriculum
at Fort Leavenworth, but in 1906, the rst staff ride was added to the Fort
Leavenworth “experience.” Major Eben Swift led 12 students on a study
of the Atlanta Campaign of 1864. On and off, staff rides have been a part
of the curriculum ever since.
Staff rides are not just limited to schoolhouse education. For years,
unit commanders have conducted numerous staff rides to varied battle-
elds as part of their ofcers’ and soldiers’ professional development. In
support of these eld commanders, the Combat Studies Institute at Fort
Leavenworth published staff ride guides to assist personnel planning and
conducting staff rides worldwide.
In 2002, General John Abrams, US Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) commanding general, recognized the impact and
importance of staff rides and revamped the Staff Ride Team. TRADOC
assigned personnel full time to Fort Leavenworth to lead staff rides for the
Army. As part of this initiative, the Staff Ride Team is also dedicated to
publishing staff ride handbooks in support of the Army.
The Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Shiloh, 6-7 April 1862 pro-
vides a systematic approach to the analysis of this early battle in the west-
ern theater of the American Civil War. Part I describes the organization of
both armies, detailing their weapons, tactics, logistics, engineering, com-
munications, and medical support. Part II consists of a campaign overview
that allows students to understand how the armies met on the battleeld.
Part III is a suggested route for conducting a staff ride at Shiloh. For each
stop, or “stand,” there is a set of travel directions, a description of the ac-
tion that occurred there, vignettes by battle participants, a list of discussion
or teaching points that a staff ride leader can explore at the stand, and a
map of the battle actions.
Part IV provides information on conducting the integration phase of
a staff ride. Suggested areas of discussion for use during the integration
viii
phase are included. Part V provides information on conducting a staff ride
at Shiloh, including sources of assistance and logistics considerations. Ap-
pendix A provides the order of battle, including numbers engaged and ca-
sualties. Appendix B provides key participants’ biographical information.
Appendix C is a list of Medal of Honor recipients for actions at Shiloh. An
annotated bibliography gives sources for preliminary study.
1
I. Civil War Armies
Organization
The US Army in 1861
On the eve of the Civil War the Regular Army of the United States
was essentially a frontier constabulary whose 16,000 ofcers and men
were organized into 198 companies scattered across the nation at 79 dif-
ferent posts. At the start of the war, 183 of these companies were either
on frontier duty or in transit while the remaining 15, mostly coastal artil-
lery batteries, guarded the Canadian border and Atlantic coast or one of
23 arsenals. In 1861, this Army was under the command of Lieutenant
General Wineld Scott, the 75-year-old hero of the Mexican-American
War. His position as general in chief was traditional, not statutory, because
Secretaries of War since 1821 had designated a general to be in charge of
the eld forces without formal congressional approval. The eld forces
were controlled through a series of geographic departments whose com-
manders reported directly to the general in chief. Both sides would use
this frequently modied department system throughout the Civil War for
administering regions under Army control.
Army administration was handled by a system of bureaus whose
senior ofcers were, by 1860, in the twilight of long careers in their
technical elds. Six of the 10 bureau chiefs were more than 70 years old.
Modeled after the British system, these bureaus answered directly to the
War Department and were not subject to the general in chief’s orders.
Predecessors of many of today’s combat support and combat service sup-
port branches, the following bureaus had been established by 1861:
Quartermaster Medical
Ordnance Adjutant General
Subsistence Paymaster
Engineer Inspector General
Topographic Engineer* Judge Advocate General
*Merged with the Engineer Bureau in 1863.
During the war Congress elevated the Ofce of the Provost Marshal and
the Signal Corps to bureau status and created a Cavalry Bureau. Note that
no operational planning or intelligence staff existed. American command-
ers before the Civil War had never required such a structure.
This system provided suitable civilian control and administrative
support to the small field army before 1861. Ultimately the bureau
2
3
system would respond effectively, if not always efciently, to the mass
mobilization required over the next four years. Indeed, it would remain es-
sentially intact until the early 20th century. The Confederate government,
forced to create an army and support organization from scratch, estab-
lished a parallel structure to that of the US Army. In fact, many important
gures in Confederate bureaus had served in one of the prewar bureaus.
Raising the Armies
With the outbreak of war in April 1861, both sides faced the monu-
mental task of organizing and equipping armies that far exceeded the pre-
war structure in size and complexity. The Federals maintained control of
the Regular Army, and the Confederates initially created a Regular force,
mostly on paper. Almost immediately the North lost many of its ofcers to
the South, including some of exceptional quality. Of 1,108 Regular Army
ofcers serving as of 1 January 1861, 270 ultimately resigned to join the
South. Only a few hundred of the 15,135 enlisted men, however, left the
ranks because the private soldiers did not have the option of resigning.
The federal government had two basic options for using the Regular
Army. It could be divided into training and leadership cadre for newly
formed volunteer regiments or be retained in units to provide a reliable
nucleus for the Federal Army in coming battles. At the start, Scott envi-
sioned a relatively small force to defeat the rebellion and therefore insisted
that the Regulars ght as units. Although some Regular units fought well
at the First Battle of Bull Run and in other battles, Scott’s decision ulti-
mately limited Regular units’ impact on the war. Battle losses and disease
soon thinned the ranks of Regulars, and ofcials could never recruit suf-
cient replacements in the face of stiff competition from the states that were
forming volunteer regiments. By November 1864, many Regular units had
been so depleted that they were withdrawn from front-line service. The
war, therefore, was fought primarily with volunteer ofcers and men, the
vast majority of whom had no previous military training or experience.
Neither side had difculty in recruiting the numbers initially required
to ll the expanding ranks. In April 1861, President Abraham Lincoln
called up 75,000 men from the states’ militias for three months. This
gure probably represented Lincoln’s informed guess as to how many
troops would be needed to quell the rebellion quickly. Almost 92,000 men
responded because most Northern states recruited their “organized” but
untrained militia companies. At the First Battle of Bull Run in July 1861,
these ill-trained, poorly equipped soldiers generally fought much better
than they were led. Later, as the war began to require more manpower,
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3
the federal government set enlisted quotas through various “calls,” which
local districts struggled to ll. Similarly, the Confederate Congress autho-
rized the acceptance of 100,000 one-year volunteers in March 1861. One-
third of these men were under arms within a month. The southern spirit
of voluntarism was so strong that possibly twice that number could have
been enlisted, but sufcient arms and equipment were not then available.
As the war continued and casualty lists grew, the glory of volunteer-
ing faded, and both sides ultimately resorted to conscription to help ll the
ranks. The Confederates enacted the rst conscription law in American
history in April 1862, followed by the federal government’s own law in
March 1863. Throughout these rst experiments in American conscription,
both sides administered the programs in less than a fair and efcient way.
Conscription laws tended to exempt wealthier citizens, and initially, draft-
ees could hire substitutes or pay commutation fees. As a result, the average
conscript’s health, capability, and morale were poor. Many eligible men,
particularly in the South, enlisted to avoid the onus of being considered a
conscript. Still, conscription or the threat of conscription ultimately helped
provide a sufcient quantity of soldiers for both sides.
Conscription was never a popular program, and the North, in particu-
lar, tried several approaches to limit conscription requirements. These ef-
forts included offering lucrative bounties, or fees paid to induce volunteers
to ll required quotas. In addition, the Federals offered a series of reenlist-
ment bonuses—money, 30-day furloughs, and an opportunity for veteran
regiments to maintain their colors and be designated as “veteran” volun-
teer infantry regiments. The Federals also created an Invalid Corps (later
renamed the Veteran Reserve Corps) of men unt for front-line service
who performed essential rear area duties. The Union also recruited almost
179,000 blacks, mostly in federally organized volunteer regiments. By
February 1864, blacks were being conscripted in the North. In the South,
recruiting or conscripting slaves was so politically sensitive that it was not
attempted until March 1865, far too late to inuence the war.
Whatever the faults of the manpower mobilization, it was an impres-
sive achievement, particularly as a rst effort on such a scale. Various
enlistment gures exist, but the best estimates are that approximately 2
million men served in the Federal Army during 1861-1865. Of that num-
ber, 1 million were under arms at the end of the war. Because Confederate
records are incomplete or were lost, estimates of their enlistments vary
from 600,000 to more than 1.5 million. Most likely, between 750,000
and 800,000 men served in the Confederacy during the war, with a peak
strength never exceeding 460,000. Perhaps the greatest legacy of the
4
5
manpower mobilization efforts of both sides was the improved Selective
Service System that created the American armies of World War I and
World War II.
The unit structure into which the expanding armies were organized was
generally the same for Federals and Confederates, reecting the common
roots for both armies. The Federals began the war with a Regular Army or-
ganized into an essentially Napoleonic, musket-equipped structure. Each
of the 10 prewar infantry regiments consisted of 10 87-man companies
with a maximum authorized strength of 878. At the beginning of the war,
the Federals added nine Regular infantry regiments with a newer “French
model” organizational structure. The new regiments contained three bat-
talions, with a maximum authorized strength of 2,452. The new Regular
battalion, with eight 100-man companies, was, in effect, equivalent to the
prewar regiment. Essentially an effort to reduce staff ofcer slots, the new
structure was unfamiliar to most leaders, and both sides used a variant
of the old structure for newly formed volunteer regiments. The Federal
War Department established a volunteer infantry regimental organization
with a strength that could range from 866 to 1,046, varying in authorized
strength by up to 180 infantry privates. The Confederate Congress xed
its 10-company infantry regiment at 1,045 men. Combat strength in battle,
however, was always much lower because of casualties, sickness, leaves,
details, desertions, and stragglers.
The battery remained the basic artillery unit, although battalion and
larger formal groupings of artillery emerged later in the war in the eastern
theater. Four understrength Regular regiments existed in the US Army
at the start of the war, and one Regular regiment was added in 1861,
for a total of 60 batteries. Nevertheless, most batteries were volunteer
organizations. A Federal battery usually consisted of six guns and had
an authorized strength of 80 to 156 men. A battery of six 12-pounder
Napoleons could include 130 horses. If organized as “horse” or ying
artillery, cannoneers were provided individual mounts, and more horses
than men could be assigned to the battery. Their Confederate counterparts,
plagued by limited ordnance and available manpower, usually operated
with a four-gun battery, often with guns of mixed types and calibers.
Confederate batteries seldom reached their initially authorized manning
level of 80 soldiers.
Prewar Federal mounted units were organized into ve Regular
regiments (two dragoon, two cavalry, and one mounted rie), and one
Regular cavalry regiment was added in May 1861. Originally, 10 com-
panies comprised a regiment, but congressional legislation in July 1862
4
5
ofcially reorganized the Regular mounted units into standard regiments
of 12 “companies or troops” of 79 to 95 men each. Although the term
“troop” was ofcially introduced, most cavalrymen continued to use the
more familiar term “company” to describe their units throughout the war.
The Federals grouped two companies or troops into squadrons, with four
to six squadrons making a regiment. Confederate cavalry units, organized
in the prewar model, authorized 10 76-man companies per regiment. Some
volunteer cavalry units on both sides also formed into smaller cavalry bat-
talions. Later in the war, both sides began to merge their cavalry regiments
and brigades into division and corps organizations.
For both sides, unit structure above regimental level was similar to
today’s structure, with a brigade controlling three to ve regiments and
a division controlling two or more brigades. Federal brigades generally
contained regiments from more than one state, while Confederate brigades
often had several regiments from the same state. In the Confederate Army,
a brigadier general usually commanded a brigade, and a major general
commanded a division. The Federal Army, with no rank higher than major
general until 1864, often had colonels commanding brigades and brigadier
generals commanding divisions.
The large numbers of organizations formed, as shown in table 1,
reect the politics of the time. The War Department in 1861 considered
making recruiting a federal responsibility, but this proposal seemed to be
an unnecessary expense for the short war initially envisioned. Therefore,
responsibility for recruiting remained with the states, and on both sides,
state governors continually encouraged local constituents to form new
volunteer regiments. This practice strengthened support for local, state,
and national politicians and provided an opportunity for glory and high
rank for ambitious men. Although such local recruiting created regiments
with strong bonds among the men, it hindered lling the ranks of existing
regiments with new replacements. As the war progressed, the Confederates
attempted to funnel replacements into units from their same state or
region, but the Federals continued to create new regiments. Existing
Federal regiments detailed men back home to recruit replacements, but
these efforts could never successfully compete for men joining new local
regiments. The newly formed regiments thus had no seasoned veterans to
train the recruits, and the battle-tested regiments lost men faster than they
could recruit replacements. Many regiments on both sides were reduced
to combat ineffectiveness as the war progressed. Seasoned regiments were
often disbanded or consolidated, usually against the wishes of the men
assigned.
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Table 1. Federal and Confederate Organized Forces
Federal Confederate
Infantry 19 regular regiments 642 regiments
2,125 volunteer regiments 9 legions*
60 volunteer battalions 163 separate battalions
351 separate companies 62 separate companies
Artillery 5 regular regiments 16 regiments
61 volunteer regiments 25 battalions
17 volunteer battalions 227 batteries
408 separate batteries
Cavalry 6 regular regiments 137 regiments
266 volunteer regiments 1 legion*
45 battalions 143 separate battalions
78 separate companies 101 separate companies
*Legions were a form of combined arms team with artillery, cavalry, and infantry units.
They were approximately the strength of a large regiment. Long before the end of the war,
legions lost their combined arms organization.
The Leaders
Because the Confederate and Federal Armies’ organization, equipment,
tactics, and training were similar, units’ performance in battle often de-
pended on the quality and performance of their individual leaders. General
ofcers were appointed by their respective central governments. At the
start of the war, most, but certainly not all, of the more senior ofcers had
West Point or other military school experience. In 1861, Lincoln appointed
126 general ofcers, of which 82 were or had been professional ofcers.
Jefferson Davis appointed 89, of which 44 had received professional train-
ing. The remaining ofcers were political appointees, but of those only 16
Federal and seven Confederate generals had no military experience.
Of the volunteer ofcers who composed most of the leadership for
both armies, colonels (regimental commanders) were normally appointed
by state governors. Other eld grade ofcers were appointed by their
states, although many were initially elected within their units. The men
usually elected their company grade ofcers. This long-established militia
tradition, which seldom made military leadership and capability a primary
consideration, was largely an extension of the states’ rights philosophy and
sustained political patronage in both the Union and the Confederacy.
Much has been made of the West Point backgrounds of the men who
ultimately dominated the senior leadership positions of both armies, but
the graduates of military colleges were not prepared by such institutions
6
7
to command divisions, corps, or armies. Moreover, although many lead-
ers had some combat experience from the Mexican War era, very few had
experience above the company or battery level in the peacetime years
before 1861. As a result, the war was not initially conducted at any level
by “professional ofcers” in today’s terminology. Leaders became more
professional through experience and at the cost of thousands of lives.
General William T. Sherman would later note that the war did not enter its
“professional stage” until 1863.
Civil War Staffs
In the Civil War, as today, large military organizations’ success often
depended on the effectiveness of the commanders’ staffs. Modern staff
procedures have evolved only gradually with the increasing complexity
of military operations. This evolution was far from complete in 1861, and
throughout the war, commanders personally handled many vital staff func-
tions, most notably operations and intelligence. The nature of American
warfare up to the mid-19th century had not yet clearly overwhelmed single
commanders’ capabilities.
Civil War staffs were divided into a “general staff” and a “staff corps.”
This terminology, dened by Scott in 1855, differs from modern deni-
tions of the terms. Table 2 lists typical staff positions at army level, al-
though key functions are represented down to regimental level. Except for
the chief of staff and aides-de-camp, who were considered personal staff
and would often depart when a commander was reassigned, staffs mainly
Table 2. Typical Staffs
General Staff Chief of Staff
Aides
Assistant Adjutant General
Assistant Inspector General
Staff Corps Engineer
Ordnance
Quartermaster
Subsistence
Medical
Pay
Signal
Provost Marshal
Chief of Artillery
8
9
contained representatives of the various bureaus, with logistical areas be-
ing best represented. Later in the war, some truly effective staffs began to
emerge, but this was a result of the increased experience of the ofcers
serving in those positions rather than a comprehensive development of
standard staff procedures or guidelines.
George B. McClellan, when he appointed his father-in-law as his chief
of staff, was the rst American to use this title ofcially. Even though
many senior commanders had a chief of staff, the position was not used in
any uniform way and seldom did the man in this role achieve the central
coordinating authority of the chief of staff in modern headquarters. This
position, along with most other staff positions, was used as an individual
commander saw t, making staff responsibilities somewhat different
under each commander. This inadequate use of the chief of staff was
among the most important shortcomings of staffs during the Civil War.
An equally important weakness was the lack of any formal operations or
intelligence staff. Liaison procedures were also ill dened, and various
staff ofcers or soldiers performed this function with little formal guid-
ance. Miscommunication or lack of knowledge of friendly units proved
disastrous time after time.
The Armies at Shiloh
MG Henry Halleck assumed command of the newly created US De-
partment of the Mississippi on 11 March 1862. He was responsible for the
territory from the Mississippi River east to the Appalachian Mountains.
With headquarters in St. Louis, Halleck had three eld armies in his de-
partment: the Army of the Tennessee under the command of Major Gen-
eral (MG) Ulysses S. Grant, the Army of the Ohio under MG Don Carlos
Buell, and the Army of the Mississippi under MG John Pope. Only Grant
and Buell would see action at Shiloh; Pope would campaign against Island
No. 10.
Grant’s Army of the Tennessee was organized into six divisions with
a strength of 48,000 troops. The army was a mixed bag of veteran units
and “green” units. The experienced troops were veterans of the battles of
Fort Donelson and Fort Henry. MG John A. McClernand, a general who
had been a Democratic Congressman before the war, commanded the 1st
Division. By April 1862, McClernand was the ranking division command-
er in the Army of the Tennessee, and Grant had concerns about his abili-
ties and did not want him in command in his absence. The 1st Division
contained 7,000 Illinois and Iowa veteran troops in three brigades.
Brigadier General (BG) William Harvey Lamb Wallace commanded the
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2d Division. Wallace had been a brigade commander under McClernand
at Fort Donelson and had only assumed command of the 2d Division on
22 March 1862 when MG Charles F. Smith was injured. The 2d Division
contained 8,500 veterans also from Illinois and Iowa in three brigades.
MG Lewis Wallace commanded the 3d Division. Wallace had fought
in the Mexican War and had seen action in western Virginia and at Fort
Donelson. The 3d Division contained 7,500 veterans in three brigades
from mainly Ohio and Indiana. BG Stephen A. Hurlbut commanded the
4th Division. Hurlbut was an Illinois politician known for hard drinking
and questionable business deals. The 4th Division, a mix of veterans and
inexperienced troops, contained 6,500 men in three brigades from Illinois,
Iowa, Indiana, and Kentucky. BG William T. Sherman commanded the 5th
Division. Sherman was the only West Point graduate division commander
in Grant’s army. Sherman had fought at 1st Bull Run and had been relieved
of command earlier in the war when many considered him crazy. The 5th
Division was a new division that had 8,500 green troops, mostly Ohio men
in four brigades. BG Benjamin Prentiss commanded Grant’s nal division,
the 6th. Prentiss was an Illinois lawyer with little military experience. He
had feuded with Grant in 1861 over his date of rank, and their relationship
was strained. The 6th Division was organized on 22 March 1862 and con-
tained 4,000 inexperienced troops in two brigades.
Buell brought four divisions of 18,000 men of the Army of the Ohio to
Shiloh. BG Alexander McCook, of the famous Ohio “Fighting McCooks,”
commanded the 7,500-man 2d Division. BG William “Bull” Nelson had
4,500 men in his 4th Division. The 5th Division was commanded by BG
Thomas Crittenden and had 4,000 troops. BG T.J. Wood had 2,000 men in
the 6th Division.
General Albert Sidney Johnston was the commander of the Confederate
Army of the Mississippi, and General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard
was his second in command. The two enjoyed a professional relationship,
but their command system can best be described as “co-command.” When
the Confederacy abandoned its cordon defense scheme in the west and
decided to mass at Corinth, the Army of the Mississippi grew with the ad-
dition of troops from all over the South. Beauregard had 11,000 men in the
vicinity of Corinth, and Johnston brought 17,000 from Murfreesboro. MG
Braxton Bragg brought 10,000 men from the defenses of Pensacola and
Mobile. BG Daniel Ruggles brought 5,000 men from New Orleans. When
concentrated, the Army of the Mississippi had 46,000 men, the vast major-
ity of whom were untested in battle. In March, Johnston and Beauregard
organized the army into four corps.
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MG Leonidas Polk commanded the I Corps. Polk was known as the
“Bishop General” because he had resigned his commission 6 months af-
ter graduating from West Point to enter the ministry, eventually rising to
Missionary Bishop of the Southwest. The I Corps had 9,100 men in two
divisions. The II Corps fell under the command of MG Braxton Bragg.
Bragg was a West Point graduate who thus far had spent the war in charge
of defending Pensacola and Mobile. His corps was the largest in the army,
14,000 men in two divisions. Interestingly, Bragg was also appointed the
army’s chief of staff in addition to being one of its corps commanders. MG
William J. Hardee commanded the III Corps. Hardee had graduated from
West Point, and soldiers on both sides were using the manual on infantry
tactics he had written for the US Army in the 1850s. The III Corps con-
sisted of 6,700 troops in three brigades; there was no divisional structure.
BG John C. Breckinridge commanded the Reserve Corps. Breckenridge
had been a very successful politician, having served in both houses of the
US Congress and as President James Buchanan’s vice president. Like the
III Corps, the Reserve Corps’ 6,700 men were in three brigades with no
divisional structure.
Weapons
Infantry
During the 1850s, in a technological revolution of major proportions,
the rie musket began to replace the relatively inaccurate smoothbore
musket in ever-increasing numbers, both in Europe and America. This
process, accelerated by the American Civil War, ensured that the ried
shoulder weapon would be the basic weapon infantrymen used in both the
Federal and Confederate armies.
The standard and most common shoulder weapon used in the American
Civil War was the Springeld .58-caliber rie musket, models 1855, 1861,
and 1863. In 1855, the US Army adopted this weapon to replace the .69-
caliber smoothbore musket and the .54-caliber rie. In appearance, the
rie musket was similar to the smoothbore musket. Both were single-shot
muzzle loaders, but the new weapon’s ried bore substantially increased
its range and accuracy. Claude Minié, a French Army ofcer, designed the
riing system the United States chose. Whereas earlier ries red a round,
nonexpanding ball, the Minié system used a hollow-based cylindro-conoi-
dal projectile slightly smaller than the bore that could be dropped easily
into the barrel. When a fulminate of mercury percussion cap ignited the
powder charge, the released propellent gases expanded the base of the bul-
let into the ried grooves, giving the projectile a ballistic spin.
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The model 1855 Springeld rie musket was the rst regulation arm
to use the hollow-base .58-caliber Minié bullet. The slightly modied
model 1861 was the principal infantry weapon of the Civil War, although
two subsequent models were produced in almost equal quantities. The
model 1861 was 56 inches long overall, had a 40-inch barrel, and weighed
8.75 pounds. It could be tted with a 21-inch socket bayonet (with an 18-
inch blade, 3- inch socket) and had a rear sight graduated to 500 yards.
The maximum effective range of the Springeld rie musket was approxi-
mately 500 yards, although it could kill at 1,000 yards. The round could
penetrate 11 inches of white pine board at 200 yards and 3 inches at
1,000 yards, with penetration of 1 inch being considered the equivalent
of disabling a human being. Range and accuracy were increased by using
the new weapon, but the soldiers’ vision was still obscured by the dense
clouds of smoke its black powder propellant produced.
To load a muzzleloading rie, a soldier took a paper cartridge in hand
and tore the end of the paper with his teeth. Next he poured the powder
down the barrel and placed the bullet in the muzzle. Then, using a metal
ramrod, he pushed the bullet rmly down the barrel until seated. He then
cocked the hammer and placed the percussion cap on the cone or nipple
that when struck by the hammer ignited the gunpowder. The average rate
of re was three rounds per minute. A well-trained soldier could possibly
load and re four times per minute, but in the confusion of battle, the rate
of re was probably slower, perhaps two to three rounds per minute.
In addition to the Springelds, more than 100 types of muskets, ries,
rie muskets, and ried muskets—ranging up to .79 caliber—were used
during the American Civil War. The numerous American-made weapons
were supplemented early in the conict by a variety of imported models.
The best, most popular, and most numerous of the foreign weapons was
the British .577-caliber Eneld rie, model 1853, that was 54 inches long
(with a 39-inch barrel), weighed 8.7 pounds (9.2 with the bayonet), could
be tted with a socket bayonet with an 18-inch blade, and had a rear sight
graduated to a range of 800 yards. The Eneld design was produced in a
variety of forms, both long and short barreled, by several British manu-
facturers and at least one American company. Of all the foreign designs,
the Eneld most closely resembled the Springeld in characteristics and
capabilities. The United States purchased more than 436,000 Eneld
pattern weapons during the war. Statistics on Confederate purchases are
more difcult to ascertain, but a report dated February 1863 indicates that
70,980 long Enelds and 9,715 short Enelds had been delivered by that
time, with another 23,000 awaiting delivery.
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While the quality of imported weapons varied, experts considered
the Enelds and the Austrian Lorenz rie muskets to be very good. Some
foreign governments and manufacturers took advantage of the huge initial
demand for weapons by dumping their obsolete weapons on the American
market. This practice was especially prevalent with some of the older
smoothbore muskets and converted intlocks. The greatest challenge,
however, lay in maintaining these weapons and supplying ammunition
and replacement parts for calibers ranging from .44 to .79. The quality of
the imported weapons eventually improved as the procedures, standards,
and purchasers’ astuteness improved. For the most part the European sup-
pliers provided needed weapons, and the newer foreign weapons were
highly regarded.
All told, the United States purchased about 1,165,000 European
ries and muskets during the war, nearly all within the rst two years.
Of these, 110,853 were smoothbores. The remainder were primarily the
French Minié ries (44,250), Austrian model 1854s (266,294), Prussian
ries (59,918), Austrian Jagers (29,850), and Austrian Bokers (187,533).
Estimates of total Confederate purchases ranged from 340,000 to 400,000.
In addition to the Enelds delivered to the Confederacy (mentioned be-
fore), 27,000 Austrian ries, 21,040 British muskets, and 2,020 Brunswick
ries were also purchased, with 30,000 Austrian ries awaiting shipment.
Breechloaders and repeating ries were available by 1861 and were
initially purchased in limited quantities, often by individual soldiers.
Generally, however, they were not issued to troops in large numbers be-
cause of technical problems (poor breech seals, faulty ammunition), fear
by the Ordnance Department that the troops would waste ammunition,
and the cost of production. The most famous of the breechloaders was the
single-shot Sharps, produced in both carbine and rie models. The model
1859 rie was .52 caliber, 47 inches long, weighing 8 pounds, while
the carbine was .52 caliber, 39 inches long, weighing 7 pounds. Both
weapons used a linen cartridge and a pellet primer feed mechanism. Most
Sharps carbines were issued to Federal cavalry units.
The best known of the repeaters was probably the seven-shot, .52-cali-
ber Spencer that also came in both rie and carbine models. The rie was
47 inches long and weighed 10 pounds, while the carbine was 39 inches
long and weighed 8 pounds. The rst mounted infantry unit to use
Spencer repeating ries in combat was Colonel (COL) John T. Wilder’s
“Lightning Brigade” on 24 June 1863 at Hoover’s Gap, Tennessee. The
Spencer was also the rst weapon the US Army adopted that red a metal-
lic rim-re, self-contained cartridge. Soldiers loaded rounds through an
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opening in the butt of the stock that fed into the chamber through a tubular
magazine by the action of the trigger guard. The hammer still had to be
cocked manually before each shot.
Better than either the Sharps or the Spencer was the Henry rie. Never
adopted by the US Army in large quantity, soldiers privately purchased
them during the war. The Henry was a 16-shot, .44-caliber rimre car-
tridge repeater. It was 43 inches long and weighed 9 pounds. The
tubular magazine located directly beneath the barrel had a 15-round capac-
ity with an additional round in the chamber. Of the approximate 13,500
Henrys produced, probably 10,000 saw limited service. The government
purchased only 1,731.
The Colt repeating rie (or revolving carbine), model 1855, also was
available to Civil War soldiers in limited numbers. The weapon was pro-
duced in several lengths and calibers. The lengths varied from 32 to 42
inches, while the calibers were .36, .44, and .56. The .36 and .44 calibers
were made to chamber six shots, while the .56-caliber had ve chambers.
The Colt Firearms Company was also the primary supplier of revolvers.
The .44-caliber Army revolver and the .36-caliber Navy revolver were the
most popular (more than 146,000 purchased) because they were simple,
sturdy, and reliable.
Cavalry
Initially armed with sabers and pistols (and in one case, lances),
Federal cavalry troops quickly added the breechloading carbine to their in-
ventory of weapons. However, one Federal regiment, the 6th Pennsylvania
Cavalry, carried lances until 1863. Troopers preferred the easier-handling
carbines to ries and the breechloaders to awkward muzzleloaders. Of the
single-shot breechloading carbines that saw extensive use during the Civil
War, the Hall .52-caliber accounted for approximately 20,000 in 1861. The
Hall was quickly replaced by a variety of carbines, including the Merrill
.54 caliber (14,495), Maynard .52 caliber (20,002), Gallager .53 caliber
(22,728), Smith .52 caliber (30,062), Burnside .56 caliber (55,567), and
Sharps .54 caliber (80,512).
The next step in the evolutionary process was the repeating carbine.
The favorite by 1865 was the Spencer .52-caliber, seven-shot repeater
(94,194). Because of the South’s limited industrial capacity, Confederate
cavalrymen had a more difcult time arming themselves. Nevertheless,
they too embraced the repower revolution, choosing shotguns, muzzle-
loading carbines, and numerous revolvers as their primary weapons. In ad-
dition, Confederate cavalrymen made extensive use of battleeld salvage
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by recovering Federal weapons. However, the South’s difculties in pro-
ducing the metallic-rimmed cartridges many of these recovered weapons
required limited their usefulness.
Field Artillery
In 1841 the US Army selected bronze as the standard material for
eldpieces and at the same time adopted a new system of eld artillery.
The 1841 eld artillery system consisted entirely of smoothbore muzzle-
loaders: 6- and 12-pound guns; 12-, 24-, and 32-pound howitzers; and
12-pound mountain howitzers. A pre-Civil War battery usually consisted
of six eldpieces—four guns and two howitzers. A 6-pounder battery con-
tained four 6-pound guns and two 12-pound howitzers, while a 12-pound-
er battery had four 12-pound guns and two 24-pound howitzers. The guns
red solid shot, shell, spherical case, grapeshot, and canister rounds, while
howitzers red shell, spherical case, grapeshot, and canister rounds.
The 6-pound gun (effective range of 1,523 yards) was the primary
eldpiece used from the Mexican War until the Civil War. By 1861, how-
ever, the 1841 system based on the 6-pounder was obsolete. In 1857, a
new and more versatile eldpiece, the 12-pound gun-howitzer (Napoleon),
model 1857, appeared on the scene. Designed as a multipurpose piece to
replace existing guns and howitzers, the Napoleon red canisters and
shells like the 12-pound howitzer and solid shot at ranges comparable to
the 12-pound gun. The Napoleon was a bronze, muzzleloading smooth-
bore with an effective range of 1,680 yards using solid shot (see table 3
for a comparison of artillery data). Served by a nine-man crew, the piece
could re at a sustained rate of two aimed shots per minute. With less than
50 Napoleons initially available in 1861, obsolete 6-pounders remained
in the inventories of both armies for some time, especially in the western
theater.
Another new development in eld artillery was the introduction of ri-
ing. Although ried guns provided greater range and accuracy, they were
somewhat less reliable and slower to load than smoothbores. (Ried am-
munition was semixed, so the charge and the projectile had to be loaded
separately.) Moreover, the canister load of the rie did not perform as well
as the smoothbore. Initially, some smoothbores were ried on the James
pattern, but they soon proved unsatisfactory because the bronze riing
eroded too quickly. Therefore, most ried artillery was wrought iron or
cast iron with a wrought iron reinforcing band encircling the breach area.
The most common ried guns were the 10-pound Parrott and the
Rodman, or 3-inch ordnance rie. The Parrott rie was a cast-iron piece,
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easily identied by the wrought-iron band reinforcing the breech. The 10-
pound Parrott was made in two models: the model 1861 had a 2.9-inch
ried bore with three lands and grooves and a slight muzzle swell, while
the model 1863 had a 3-inch bore and no muzzle swell. The Rodman, or
ordnance rie, was a long-tubed, wrought-iron piece that had a 3-inch bore
with seven lands and grooves. Ordnance ries were sturdier than the 10-
pound Parrott and displayed superior accuracy and reliability.
By 1860 the ammunition for eld artillery consisted of four general
types for both smoothbores and ries: solid shot, shell, case, and canister.
Solid shot for smoothbores was a round cast-iron projectile; for ried guns
it was an elongated projectile known as a bolt. Solid shot, with its smash-
ing or battering effect, was used in a counterbattery role or against build-
ings and massed troop formations. The rie’s conical-shaped bolt lacked
the effectiveness of the smoothbore’s cannonball because it tended to bury
itself upon impact instead of bounding along the ground like round shot.
Shell, also known as common or explosive shell, whether spherical or
conical, was a hollow projectile lled with an explosive charge of black
powder detonated by a fuse. Shell was designed to break into jagged
pieces, producing an antipersonnel effect, but the low-order detonation
seldom produced more than three to ve fragments. In addition to its
casualty-producing effects, shell had a psychological impact when it
exploded over troops’ heads. It was also used against eld fortications
and in a counterbattery role. Case or case shot for both smoothbore and
ried guns was a hollow projectile with thinner walls than shell. The
projectile was lled with round lead or iron balls set in a matrix of sulfur
that surrounded a small bursting charge. Case was primarily used in an
antipersonnel role. Henry Shrapnel, a British artillery ofcer, invented this
type of round, hence the term “shrapnel.”
Finally there was canister, probably the most effective round and the
round of choice at close range (400 yards or less) against massed troops.
Canister was essentially a tin can lled with iron balls packed in sawdust
with no internal bursting charge. When red, the can disintegrated, and
the balls followed their own paths to the target. The canister round for
the 12-pound Napoleon consisted of 27 1 -inch iron balls packed inside
an elongated tin cylinder. At extremely close ranges of 200 yards or less,
artillerymen often loaded double charges of canister.
Heavy Artillery—Siege and Seacoast
The 1841 artillery system listed eight types of siege artillery and an-
other six types as seacoast artillery. The 1861 Ordnance Manual included
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11 different kinds of siege ordnance. The principal siege weapons in 1861
were the 4.5-inch rie; 18- and 24-pound guns; a 24-pound howitzer and
two types of 8-inch howitzer; and several types of 8- and 10-inch mortars.
The normal rate of re for siege guns and mortars was about 12 rounds
per hour, but with a well-drilled crew, this could probably be increased to
about 20 rounds per hour. The rate of re for siege howitzers was some-
what lower, being about eight shots per hour.
The carriages for siege guns and howitzers were longer and heavier
than eld artillery carriages but were similar in construction. The model
1839 24-pounder was the heaviest piece that could be moved over the
roads of the day. Alternate means of transport, such as railroad or water-
craft, were required to move larger pieces any great distance.
The rounds that siege artillery red were generally the same as those
eld artillery red except that siege artillery continued to use grapeshot
after it was discontinued in the eld artillery (1841). A “stand of grape”
consisted of nine iron balls ranging from 2 to about 3 inches in diameter,
depending on gun caliber.
The largest and heaviest artillery pieces in the Civil War era belonged
to the seacoast artillery. These large weapons were normally mounted in
xed positions. The 1861 system included ve types of columbiads rang-
ing from 8- to 15-inch; 32- and 42-pound guns; 8- and 10-inch howitzers;
and mortars of 10 and 13 inches.
Wartime additions to the Federal seacoast artillery inventory included
Parrott ries ranging from 6.4-inch to 10-inch (300-pounder). New colum-
biads, developed by ordnance Lieutenant Thomas J. Rodman, included
8-inch, 10-inch, and 15-inch models. The Confederates produced some
new seacoast artillery of their own—Brooke ries in 6.4- and 7-inch ver-
sions. They also imported weapons from England, including 7- and 8-inch
Armstrong ries, 6.3- to 12.5-inch Blakely ries, and 5-inch Whitworth
ries.
Seacoast artillery red the same projectiles as siege artillery, but with
one addition—hot shot. As its name implies, hot shot was solid shot heated
in special ovens until red-hot, then carefully loaded and red as an incen-
diary round.
Weapons at Shiloh
Neither side fought the Battle of Shiloh with its soldiers armed with
the most modern weapons available. In one of the few times during the
American Civil War, the Union did not enjoy an advantage of superior
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Table 3. Common Types of Artillery Available at the Battle of Shiloh
infantry weapons. Most of the Union soldiers were armed with either the
US model 1841 ried musket (.69 caliber) or the US model 1842 smooth-
bore musket (.69 caliber). Some entire regiments were outtted with mod-
ern weapons like the US model 1855 Springeld rie (.58 caliber) or the
imported British Eneld rie (.577 caliber).
The Confederates were armed with an assortment of weapons. Some
regiments had a combination of many different weapons. Most Con-
federate soldiers were armed with obsolete weapons, smoothbores and
intlocks converted to percussion cap. Some units were even armed with
hunting ries. The Army of the Mississippi had approximately 4,000 En-
eld ries that had come through the blockade and were shipped west in
November 1861. Following the assault on the Hornet’s Nest, the Confed-
erates increased the total number of Enelds in the army. Two regiments
immediately swapped their old weapons for Eneld ries that Union
troops surrendered.
The Union and Confederate forces had artillery parity at Shiloh; Grant
had 119 cannon and Johnston had 117. Union forces organized their artil-
lery differently in each division. Some brigades had an artillery battery,
but in four of the six divisions in the Army of the Tennessee, the artillery
was informally consolidated at division level. Each Confederate brigade at
Shiloh had at least one artillery battery assigned; MG Patrick R. Cleburne’s
brigade had an entire battalion of artillery. While artillery weapons had
been modernized in the east, the new pieces had not reached the western
Field Artillery
Tube Range
Bore Length Tube Carriage (yards)/
Diameter Overall Weight Weight degrees
Type Model (inches) (inches) (pounds) (pounds) elevation
Smoothbore
6-pound Gun 3.67 65.6 884 900 1,523/5°
12-pound Gun-
“Napoleon” Howitzer 4.62 72.15 1,227 1,128 1,680/5°
12-pound Howitzer 4.62 58.6 788 900 1,072/5°
24-pound Howitzer 5.82 71.2 1,318 1,128 1,322/5°
Rie
10-pound Parrott
3.0 78 890 900 2,970/10°
3-inch Ordnance 3.0 73.3 820 900 2,788/10°
20-pound Parrott 3.67 89.5 1,750 4,400/15°
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armies at Shiloh. Half of the Union artillery weapons were “leftovers”
from the 1841 system, while more than 80 percent of the Confederate can-
non were out of date. There was no formal artillery command and control
function for either side. The infantry commanders controlled their own ar-
tillery or left its employment up to the battery ofcers. This made massing
artillery res difcult. Massed res of more than 25 cannon only occurred
three times during the battle.
Two of the massed artillery rings proved decisive: Ruggles’ bom-
bardment at the Hornet’s Nest and Grant’s last line at Pittsburg Landing.
The artillery ofcers for each side were inexperienced and attempted to
use antiquated Napoleonic tactics. On occasion, artillery went into battle
within 400 yards of the enemy with the intent of ring canister. As they
unlimbered their pieces, they were cut to pieces by the shoulder weapons
the infantryman carried. Artillerymen suffered heavy casualties at Shiloh.
The Union artillery lost 32 killed, 245 wounded, and four missing. The
Confederates had 40 artillerymen killed, 169 wounded, and ve missing.
The naval gunre support from the USS Tyler and the USS Lexington was
effective and more than likely inuenced Beauregard’s decision to stop the
battle on the rst day. The re from their 32-pound and 8-inch guns caused
some casualties, but the psychological effect was substantially greater.
Tactics
Tactical Doctrine in 1861
The Napoleonic Wars and the Mexican War were the major inu-
ences on American tactical thinking at the beginning of the Civil War. The
campaigns of Napoleon Bonaparte and the Duke of Wellington provided
ample lessons in battle strategy, weapons employment, and logistics,
while American tactical doctrine reected the lessons learned in Mexico
(1846-48). However, these tactical lessons were misleading because in
Mexico relatively small armies fought only seven pitched battles. Because
these battles were so small, almost all the tactical lessons learned during
the war focused at the regiment, battery, and squadron levels. Future Civil
War leaders had learned very little about brigade, division, and corps ma-
neuver in Mexico, yet these units were the basic ghting elements of both
armies in 1861-65.
The US Army’s experience in Mexico validated Napoleonic prin-
ciples—particularly that of the offensive. In Mexico, tactics did not differ
greatly from those of the early 19th century. Infantry marched in columns
and deployed into lines to ght. Once deployed, an infantry regiment might
send one or two companies forward as skirmishers, as security against sur-
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prise, or to soften the enemy’s line. After identifying the enemy’s position,
a regiment advanced in closely ordered lines to within 100 yards. There it
delivered a devastating volley, followed by a charge with bayonets. Both
sides used this basic tactic in the rst battles of the Civil War.
In Mexico, American armies employed artillery and cavalry in both
offensive and defensive battle situations. In the offense, artillery moved as
near to the enemy lines as possible—normally just outside musket range
of about 200 yards—to blow gaps in the enemy’s line that the infantry
might exploit with a determined charge. In the defense, artillery blasted
advancing enemy lines with canister and withdrew if the enemy attack got
within musket range. Cavalry guarded the Army’s anks and rear but held
itself ready to charge if enemy infantry became disorganized or began to
withdraw.
These tactics worked perfectly well with the weapons technology of
the Napoleonic and Mexican wars. The infantry musket was accurate up
to 100 yards but ineffective against even massed targets beyond that range.
Ries were specialized weapons with excellent accuracy and range but
slow to load and therefore not usually issued to line troops. Smoothbore
cannon had a range up to 1 mile with solid shot but were most effective
against infantry when ring canister at ranges under 400 yards. Artillerists
worked their guns without much fear of the infantry muskets’ limited
range. Cavalry continued to use sabers and lances as shock weapons.
American troops took the tactical offensive in most Mexican War bat-
tles with great success, and they suffered fairly light losses. Unfortunately,
similar tactics proved to be obsolete in the Civil War because of a major
technological innovation elded in the 1850s—the cylindro-conoidal rie
musket. This new weapon greatly increased the infantry’s range and accu-
racy and loaded as fast as a musket. The US Army adopted a version of the
rie musket in 1855, and by the beginning of the Civil War, rie muskets
were available in moderate numbers. It was the weapon of choice in both
the Union and Confederate Armies during the war, and by 1862, large
numbers of troops on both sides had good-quality rie muskets.
Ofcial tactical doctrine before the beginning of the Civil War did
not clearly recognize the potential of the new rie musket. Before 1855
the most inuential tactical guide was MG Wineld Scott’s three-vol-
ume work, Infantry Tactics (1835), based on French tactical models of
the Napoleonic Wars. It stressed close-order, linear formations in two or
three ranks advancing at “quick time” of 110 steps (86 yards) per minute.
In 1855, to accompany the introduction of the new rie musket, Major
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William J. Hardee published a two-volume tactical manual, Rie and
Light Infantry Tactics. Hardee’s work contained few signicant revisions
of Scott’s manual. His major innovation was to increase the speed of the
advance to a “double-quick time” of 165 steps (151 yards) per minute. If,
as suggested, Hardee introduced his manual as a response to the rie mus-
ket, then he failed to appreciate the weapon’s impact on combined arms
tactics and the essential shift the rie musket made in favor of the defense.
Hardee’s Tactics was the standard infantry manual both sides used at the
outbreak of war in 1861.
If Scott’s and Hardee’s works lagged behind technological innova-
tions, at least the infantry had manuals to establish a doctrinal basis for
training. Cavalry and artillery fell even farther behind in recognizing
the potential tactical shift in favor of rie-armed infantry. The cavalry’s
manual, published in 1841, was based on French sources that focused
on close-order offensive tactics. It favored the traditional cavalry attack
in two ranks of horsemen armed with sabers or lances. The manual took
no notice of the rie musket’s potential, nor did it give much attention to
dismounted operations. Similarly, the artillery had a basic drill book delin-
eating individual crew actions, but it had no tactical manual. Like cavalry-
men, artillerymen showed no concern for the potential tactical changes the
rie musket implied.
Regular Army infantry, cavalry, and artillery troops practiced and
became procient in the tactics that brought success in Mexico. As the
rst volunteers drilled and readied themselves for the battles of 1861, of-
cers and noncommissioned ofcers taught the lessons learned from the
Napoleonic Wars that were validated in Mexico. Thus, the two armies
entered the Civil War with a good understanding of the tactics that had
worked in the Mexican War but with little understanding of how the rie
musket might upset their carefully practiced lessons.
Early War Tactics
In the battles of 1861 and 1862, both sides employed the tactics
proven in Mexico and found that the tactical offensive could still be suc-
cessful—but only at a great cost in casualties. Men wielding ried weap-
ons in the defense generally ripped frontal assaults to shreds, and if the
attackers paused to exchange re, the slaughter was even greater. Ries
also increased the relative numbers of defenders since anking units now
engaged assaulting troops with a murderous enlading re. Defenders
usually crippled the rst assault line before a second line of attackers
could come forward in support. This caused successive attacking lines to
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intermingle with survivors to their front, thereby destroying formations,
command, and control. Although both sides favored the bayonet through-
out the war, they quickly discovered that rie musket re made successful
bayonet attacks almost impossible.
Just as infantry troops found the bayonet charge to be of little value
against rie muskets, cavalry and artillery troops made troubling discov-
eries of their own. Cavalry troops soon learned that the old-style saber
charge did not work against infantry troops armed with rie muskets.
Cavalry troops, however, retained their traditional intelligence-gathering
and screening roles whenever commanders chose to make the horsemen
the “eyes and ears” of the Army. Artillery troops found that they could not
maneuver freely to canister range as they had in Mexico because the rie
musket was accurate beyond that distance. Worse yet, at ranges where
gunners were safe from rie re, artillery shot, shell, and case were far less
effective than close-range canister. Ironically, ried cannon did not give
the equivalent boost to artillery effectiveness that the rie musket gave to
the infantry. The cannons’ increased range proved to be no real advantage
in the broken and wooded terrain over which so many Civil War battles
were fought.
There are several possible reasons why Civil War commanders con-
tinued to employ the tactical offensive long after it was clear that the
defensive was superior. Most commanders believed the offensive was the
decisive form of battle. This lesson came straight from the Napoleonic
Wars and the Mexican-American War. Commanders who chose the tacti-
cal offensive usually retained the initiative over defenders. Similarly, the
tactical defensive depended heavily on the enemy attacking at a point that
was convenient to the defender and continuing to attack until badly it was
defeated. Although this situation occurred often in the Civil War, a prudent
commander could hardly count on it for victory. Consequently, few com-
manders chose to exploit the defensive form of battle if they had the option
to attack.
The offensive may have been the decisive form of battle, but it was
very hard to coordinate and even harder to control. The better generals
often tried to attack the enemy’s anks and rear but seldom achieved
success because of the difculty involved. Not only did the commander
have to identify the enemy’s ank or rear correctly, he also had to move
his force into position to attack and do so in conjunction with attacks that
other friendly units made. Command and control of the type required to
conduct these attacks was quite beyond most Civil War commanders’ abil-
ity. Therefore, Civil War armies repeatedly attacked each other frontally,
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resulting in high casualties, because that was the easiest way to conduct
offensive operations. When attacking frontally, a commander had to
choose between attacking on a broad front or a narrow front. Attacking on
a broad front rarely succeeded except against weak and scattered defend-
ers. Attacking on a narrow front promised greater success but required im-
mediate reinforcement and continued attack to achieve decisive results. As
the war dragged on, attacking on narrow fronts against specic objectives
became a standard tactic that fed ever-growing casualty lists.
Later War Tactics
Poor training may have contributed to high casualty rates early in the
war, but casualties remained high and even increased long after the armies
became experienced. Continued high casualty rates resulted because
tactical developments failed to adapt to new weapons technology. Few
commanders understood how the rie musket strengthened the tactical de-
fensive. However, some commanders made offensive innovations that met
with varying success. When an increase in the speed of the advance did
not overcome defending repower (as Hardee suggested it would), some
units tried advancing in more open order. But this sort of formation lacked
the appropriate mass to assault and carry prepared positions and created
command and control problems beyond the Civil War leaders’ ability to
resolve. Late in the war, when the difculty of attacking eld fortica-
tions under heavy re became apparent, other tactical expedients were
employed. Attacking solidly entrenched defenders often required whole
brigades and divisions moving in dense masses to rapidly cover interven-
ing ground, seize the objective, and prepare for the inevitable counterat-
tack. Seldom successful against alert and prepared defenses, these attacks
were generally accompanied by tremendous casualties and foreshadowed
the massed infantry assaults of World War I.
Sometimes large formations attempted mass charges over short
distances without halting to re. This tactic enjoyed limited success at
Spotsylvania Court House in May 1864. At Spotsylvania, a Union division
attacked and captured an exposed portion of the Confederate line. The at-
tack succeeded because the Union troops crossed the intervening ground
very quickly without artillery preparation and without stopping to re their
ries. Once inside the Confederate defenses, the Union troops attempted
to exploit their success by continuing their advance, but loss of command
and control rendered them little better than a mob. Counterattacking
Confederate units in conventional formations eventually forced the
Federals to relinquish much of the ground they had gained.
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As the war dragged on, tactical maneuver focused more on larger for-
mations—brigade, division, and corps. In most of the major battles fought
after 1861, brigades were employed as the primary maneuver formations,
but brigade maneuver was at the upper limit of command and control for
most Civil War commanders. Brigades might have been able to retain
coherent formations if the terrain had been suitably open, but most often,
brigade attacks degenerated into a series of poorly coordinated regimental
lunges through broken and wooded terrain. Thus, brigade commanders
were often on the main battle line trying to inuence regimental ghts.
Typically, defending brigades stood in the line of battle and blazed away
at attackers as rapidly as possible. Volley re usually did not continue be-
yond the rst round. Most of the time soldiers red as soon as they were
ready, and it was common for two soldiers to work together, one loading
while the other red. Brigades were generally invulnerable to attacks on
their front and anks if units to the left and right held their ground or if
reinforcements came up to defeat the threat.
Two or more brigades constituted a division. When a division at-
tacked, its brigades often advanced in sequence, from left to right or vice
versa—depending on terrain, suspected enemy location, and number of
brigades available to attack. At times divisions attacked with two or more
brigades leading, followed by one or more brigades ready to reinforce the
lead brigades or maneuver to the anks. Two or more divisions consti-
tuted a corps that might conduct an attack as part of a larger plan the army
commander controlled. More often, groups of divisions attacked under
the control of a corps-level commander. Division and corps commanders
generally took a position to the rear of the main line to control the ow of
reinforcements into the battle, but they often rode forward into the battle
lines to inuence the action personally.
Of the three basic branches, the cavalry made the greatest adaptation
during the war. It learned to use its horses for mobility, then dismount
and ght on foot like the infantry. The cavalry regained a useful battle-
eld role by employing this dragoon tactic, especially after repeating and
breechloading ries gave it the repower and accuracy to contend with
enemy infantry troops. The cavalry also found a role off the battleeld in
long-range raids that interdicted enemy supply lines and diverted enemy
troops in a manner that foreshadowed air interdiction in the 20th century.
The campaign for Vicksburg included two excellent examples of this func-
tion. The rst was a Confederate raid on the Union supply depot at Holly
Springs that MG Earl Van Dorn led in December 1862 that effectively
thwarted Grant’s rst offensive into Mississippi. The second was a Union
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raid from Tennessee to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, that COL Benjamin H.
Grierson led that diverted Confederate attention away from Grant’s main
effort in April 1863.
In contrast to the cavalry, which reasserted itself as an offensive arm,
the artillery found that it could best add its repower to the rie musket
and tip the balance even more in favor of the tactical defensive, but the
artillery never regained the importance to offensive maneuver that it held
in Mexico. If the artillery had developed an indirect ring system, as it
did before World War I, it might have been able to contribute more to of-
fensive tactics. Still, both sides employed artillery decisively in defensive
situations throughout the war.
The most signicant tactical innovation in the Civil War was the
widespread use of eld fortications after armies realized the tactical of-
fensive’s heavy cost. It did not take long for the rie musket’s deadly re-
power to convince soldiers to entrench every time they halted. Eventually,
armies dug complete trenches within an hour of halting in a position.
Within 24 hours, armies could create defensive works that were nearly
impregnable to frontal assaults. In this respect, this development during
the American Civil War was a clear forerunner of the kind of warfare that
came to dominate World War I.
Summary
In the Civil War, the tactical defense dominated the tactical offense
because assault formations proved inferior to the defender’s repower.
The rie musket, in its many forms, provided this repower and caused
the following specic alterations in tactics during the war:
• It required the attacker, in his initial dispositions, to deploy farther
away from the defender, thereby increasing the distance over which the
attacker had to pass.
• It increased the number of defenders who could engage attackers
(with the addition of effective enlading re).
• It reduced the density of both attacking and defending formations.
• It created a shift of emphasis in infantry battles toward reghts
rather than shock attacks.
• It caused battles to last longer because units could not close with
each other for decisive shock action.
• It encouraged the widespread use of eld fortications. Armies’
habitual use of eld fortications by was a major American innovation in
19th-century warfare.
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• It forced the cavalry to the battleeld’s fringes until cavalrymen
acquired equivalent weapons and tactics.
• It forced the artillery to abandon its basic offensive maneuver—
moving forward to within canister range of defending infantry troops.
Tactics at Shiloh
As the units of the Army of the Tennessee arrived in the vicinity of
Shiloh Church and established camps, they cleared areas in large elds so
they could drill. Many of the troops were untrained, and their commanders
wanted to teach them the intricacies of drill on open terrain. Unfortunately,
the Battle of Shiloh would not be fought on open terrain. Rather, it would
be fought in the woods and thickets of western Tennessee.
The Army of the Tennessee intended to establish camps in a tactical
manner. Senior commanders ordered their subordinates to establish camps
that allowed troops’ rapid movement into good, supported battle lines.
The troops and junior leaders did not think the enemy was any closer than
Corinth, so a lot of the camps were established based on good camping
ground and the availability of fresh water. Senior commanders did not
correct this situation.
When Johnston and Beauregard developed their plan of attack, they
made it as simple as possible because they did not think their untried
troops and subordinate commanders could handle intricate maneuvers.
The Confederates attacked with their four corps in successive lines.
Within the rst two lines, the brigade commanders deployed their regi-
ments in accordance with the procedures of Hardee’s manual. All of the
brigade’s regiments were formed in a long line, two ranks deep. The last
two lines attacked in columns of brigades. On paper, this scheme seemed
easy, but the thick terrain and the soldiers’ baptism of re led to adverse
results. Units in the leading corps began to splinter and become inter-
mingled. When units from succeeding corps lines moved up to support,
they added to the confusion and intermingling. Soon, commanders from
brigade to corps lost control of their troops. Troops from different units
became so hopelessly mixed that the corps commanders, on their own,
divided the battleeld into sectors and commanded the troops within the
sectors regardless of parent organization.
The frontal attack was the maneuver of choice during the Battle
of Shiloh. The Confederates employed the frontal attack in assaults on
Sherman and McClernand. Most of Sherman and McClernand’s men were
armed with antiquated weapons that did not have the extended range of
the Springeld or Eneld, and they had no protection. Casualties were still
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very high. When the Confederates faced the men in the Hornet’s Nest, the
frontal attack was unsuccessful. Some of the Union soldiers were armed
with modern weapons that ripped the Confederate frontal attacks apart.
Other Union soldiers had the protection of fences, and the Confederates
sometimes attacked across open ground. Bragg ordered eight frontal at-
tacks against the Hornet’s Nest and was not successful until artillery was
massed and infantry units surrounded the Union troops.
Union soldiers defended in linear formations. The poor tactical em-
placement of camps ensured that many units formed with unsupported
anks. When the Confederates attacked, their local numerical superiority
allowed them to overlap the unprotected Union anks. Once its anks were
turned, the unit usually broke and ran. When one unit broke, it exposed its
neighboring unit’s ank, which was easily anked. The Confederates en-
joyed early success during the battle because of their ability to mass great-
er numbers of men at a particular location rather than their superior tactics
or leadership. During the counterattack on 7April, Union troops formed in
line and conducted their own frontal assaults. For the most part, they were
able to support their anks, and their frontal attacks were able to drive the
Confederates from the eld through superior numbers, not tactics.
The artillery of both sides fought with archaic tactics also. There was
little artillery command structure, so infantry commanders or individual
battery ofcers chose the tactics employed. Batteries that had time to go
into action with infantry support were only dislodged at a horrible price in
casualties by the attackers. Infantrymen quickly learned to shoot the bat-
tery horses to prevent the battery from withdrawing. The combination of
spirited attacks and loss of horses resulted in 24 of 36 cannon being lost
on the Union right on 6 April. Some artillery units attempted to conduct
artillery charges, the tactic of going into battle within 400 yards of the en-
emy and blasting it with canister. Batteries that tried this tactic were shot
to pieces.
Despite a lack of effective artillery command and control, both sides
were able to mass artillery with good results. The Confederates massed 53
cannon and pounded the Hornet’s Nest’s defenders. Grant anchored his
last line at Pittsburg Landing with 52 cannons, which helped persuade the
Confederates to abandon their attack.
The cavalry of both sides played a minor role in the battle due to
its organization within the armies. Grant had nine battalions and eight
companies of cavalry. On 2 April he had ordered the cavalry to reorga-
nize, assigning all of it to infantry divisions. Each division had from four
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companies to two battalions. On 6 April the cavalry had no patrols out
because no one expected an attack. Johnston had approximately ve bat-
talions of cavalry. There was no standard organization of cavalry in the
Army of the Mississippi. Some brigades had cavalry troops, while oth-
ers did not. A small cavalry force remained under the Army’s command.
When the action was joined, the Union cavalry spent most of the battle in
the rear serving as escorts and couriers. The Confederate cavalry did little
more. Most of the cavalry spent the battle supporting artillery batteries.
The Confederates did try mounted charges, but these attacks were usually
easily repulsed and suffered high casualties. However, during the retreat
from the Hornet’s Nest, the 1st Mississippi Cavalry captured the entire 2d
Michigan Battery as it tried to run to the Pittsburg Landing. During the
night of 6 April, COL Nathan Bedford Forrest’s cavalry conducted exten-
sive reconnaissance of Pittsburg Landing. Forrest reported that the Army
of the Ohio had arrived, but none of the Army’s leaders would listen to his
reports.
On 7 April, as the Army of the Mississippi withdrew, a small legion
of infantry, artillery, and cavalry covered the retreat. Grant did not pursue
in earnest until 8 April. The 4th Illinois Cavalry of Sherman’s Division
led a token pursuit. The Union horsemen encountered Forrest’s cavalry,
and Forrest sent them retreating, ensuring that the Confederate army could
successfully withdraw. Legend has it that during this encounter Forrest
charged the Union troops and found himself surrounded. A Union sol-
dier shot him in the hip, but Forrest scooped up a Union soldier and used
him as a shield. Once he was safe, he dropped the frightened soldier. The
Confederate cavalry might have provided more support during the with-
drawal, but 200 cavalrymen had been dismounted so their horses could be
used to bring off captured artillery.
Logistics Support
Victory on Civil War battleelds seldom hinged on the quality or
quantity of tactical logistics. On the operational and strategic levels,
however, logistics capabilities and concerns always shaped campaign
plans and sometimes their outcomes. As the war lengthened, the logistics
advantage shifted inexorably to the North. The Federals controlled most
of the nation’s nancial and industrial resources, and with their ability
to import any needed materials, the Federals ultimately created the best-
supplied army the world had yet seen. Despite suffering from shortages of
raw materials, the Confederates generated adequate ordnance but faltered
gradually in their ability to acquire other war materiel. The food supply
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for Southern armies was often on the verge of collapse, largely because
the transportation network’s limitations were compounded by politico-
military mismanagement. Still, the state of supply within eld armies
on both sides depended more on the caliber of the people managing the
resources than on the constraints of the available materiel.
One of the most pressing needs at the start of the war was for suf-
cient infantry and artillery weapons. Large quantities of outmoded
muskets were on hand for both sides, either in arsenals or private hands.
The Federals initially had only 35,000 modern rie muskets, and the
Confederates had seized about 10,000 of them. Purchasing agents rushed
to Europe to buy existing stocks or to contract for future production. This
led to an inux of outmoded weapons that resulted in many soldiers going
into battle with Mexican War-era smoothbore muskets. As late as fall 1863
soldiers on both sides in the western theater were armed with smoothbore
muskets. Several of Grant’s regiments in the Vicksburg Campaign noted
exchanging their muskets for captured Confederate Enelds. Modern artil-
lery pieces were generally available in adequate quantities, although the
Confederates usually were outgunned. Although breech-loading technol-
ogy was available and the Confederates had imported some Whitworths
from England, muzzle-loading smoothbore or ried cannon were the stan-
dard pieces both armies used.
With most of the government arsenals and private manufacturing ca-
pability located in the North, the Federals ultimately produced sufcient
modern rearms for their armies, but the Confederates also accumu-
lated adequate quantities, either from battleeld captures or through the
blockade. In addition, exceptional management within the Confederate
Ordnance Bureau led to the creation of a series of arsenals throughout the
South that produced large quantities of munitions and weapons.
The Northern manufacturing capability eventually permitted the
Federals to produce and outt their forces with repeating arms, the best of
which had been patented before 1861. Initially, however, the North’s con-
servative Ordnance Bureau would not risk switching to a new, unproven
standard weapon that could lead to soldiers wasting huge quantities of
ammunition in the midst of an expanding war. By 1864, after the retire-
ment of Chief of Ordnance James Ripley and with President Lincoln’s
urging, Federal cavalry received seven-shot Spencer repeating carbines
that greatly increased their battle capabilities.
Both sides initially relied on the states and local districts to provide
some equipment, supplies, animals, and foodstuffs. As the war progressed,
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more centralized control over production and purchasing emerged under
both governments. Still, embezzlement and fraud were common problems
for both sides throughout the war. The North, with its preponderance of
railroads and developed waterways, had ample supply and adequate dis-
tribution systems. The South’s major supply problem was subsistence.
Arguably, the South produced enough food during the war to provide
for both military and civilian needs, but mismanagement, parochial local
interests, and the relatively underdeveloped transportation network often
created havoc with distribution.
In both armies, the Quartermaster, Ordnance, Subsistence, and Medi-
cal Bureaus procured and distributed equipment, food, and supplies. The
items for which these bureaus were responsible are not dissimilar to the
classes of supply used today. Some needs overlapped, such as the Quar-
termaster Bureau procuring wagons for medical ambulances, but conicts
of interest usually were manageable. Department and army commanders
requested needed resources directly from the bureaus, and bureau chiefs
wielded considerable power as they parceled out occasionally limited re-
sources.
When essential equipment and supplies could not be obtained through
normal channels, some commanders used their own resources to procure
them. One example of someone who used this practice was COL John
T. Wilder, who personally contracted for Spencer ries for his mounted
brigade in the Army of the Cumberland. Wilder obtained an unsecured
personal loan to purchase the weapons, and his men reimbursed him from
their pay. The federal government picked up the cost after the ries’ worth
was demonstrated in the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns.
Typically, materiel owed from the factory to base depots as the re-
sponsible bureaus directed. Supplies were then shipped to advanced de-
pots, generally a city on a major transportation artery safely within the rear
area of a department. During campaigns, the armies established temporary
advance depots served by rail or river transportation. From these points,
wagons carried the supplies forward to the eld units. This principle is
somewhat similar to the modern theater sustainment organization.
Managing this logistics system was complex and crucial. A corps wag-
on train, if drawn by standard six-mule teams, would be spread out from 5
to 8 miles, based on the difculty of terrain, weather, and road conditions.
The wagons, which were capable of hauling 4,000 pounds in optimal con-
ditions, could carry only half that load in difcult terrain. Sustenance for
the animals was a major restriction because each animal required up to 26
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pounds of hay and grain a day to stay healthy and productive. Bulky and
hard to handle, forage was a major consideration in campaign planning.
Wagons delivering supplies more than one day’s distance from the depot
could be forced to carry excessive amounts of animal forage. If full ani-
mal forage was to be carried, the required number of wagons to support a
corps increased dramatically with each subsequent day’s distance from the
forward depot. Another problem was created by herds of beef that often
accompanied the trains or were appropriated en route. This provided fresh
(though tough) meat for the troops, but it slowed and complicated move-
ment.
The bulk supply problems were alleviated somewhat by the practice
of foraging, which, in the proper season, supplied much of the food for
the animals and men of both sides. Foraging was practiced with and with-
out command sanction wherever an army went, and it became command
policy during Grant’s Vicksburg Campaign.
Table 4. Sample of Federal Logistics Data
Item Packing Weight in Pounds
Bulk ammunition:
.58-caliber, expanding ball 1,000 rounds per box 98
(500-grain bullet)
12-pound Napoleon canister 8 rounds per box 161
(14.8 lb per round)
“Marching” ration (per man per day): 2
1 lb hard bread (hardtack)
lb salt pork or lb fresh meat
1 oz coffee
3 oz sugar and salt
Forage (per horse per day): 26
14 lb hay and 12 lb grain
Personal equipment: 50-60
Includes rie, bayonet,
60 rounds of ammunition,
haversack, 3 days’ rations,
blanket, shelter half, canteen,
personal items
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Logistics at Shiloh
Union troops depended on riverboats for most of their logistics sup-
port. The Union used 174 riverboats for transportation and supply during
the campaign and battle. Riverboat operations were the purview of the
Quartermaster Department of the Army, not the Navy. The Navy provided
all gunboat support, but the Army controlled riverboats that were used for
logistics.
The Army of the Tennessee moved from northern Tennessee to Savan-
nah and Pittsburg Landing on riverboats, bringing all of its supplies and
equipment on the boats. Due to the large number of boats, the Union sol-
diers enjoyed a comfortable camp life with many good tents and assorted
comfort items. They had all of the required supplies on hand, but the distri-
bution system was faulty. Due to a lack of covered storage areas, supplies
remained on the boats. As items were needed, the appropriate boat landed
at Pittsburg Landing and unloaded those items. The boat then left the land-
ing and loitered in the river. This system took a long time to obtain the
required items that were on hand. During the battle, Pittsburg Landing was
overwhelmed with riverboats shuttling Buell’s troops across the river and
evacuating the wounded. As such, when units needed ammunition, it was
difcult to obtain because the ammunition boats could not nd berthing
space at Pittsburg Landing. The ammunition was on hand, but the troops
who needed it could not get it.
When the Confederates evacuated Nashville, they lost their major lo-
gistics base in the west. Nashville had many quartermaster and subsistence
warehouses as well as two gunpowder mills. When the Army of the Ohio
occupied Nashville, it captured vast amounts of supplies.
Johnston concentrated at Corinth because it was a rail hub. Accord-
ingly, the Confederates were able to accumulate required supplies. Corinth
became the Army of the Mississippi’s base of supply. During the concen-
tration, the Confederates sent 1,800,000 rounds of rie ammunition and
4,000 artillery rounds to Johnston. As the Confederate troops moved to
Corinth, they brought their wagons with them. The Confederacy forward-
ed more than 30 more complete wagons with mule teams to Johnston.
(These wagons came disassembled to Corinth. By a Herculean effort, the
Confederates assembled the wagons before the battle.) During the battle
the Confederates captured large amounts of supplies from the Union
camps. Many Confederate soldiers obtained a lot of individual equipment
and luxuries while pilfering Union camps.
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Engineer Support
Engineers on both sides performed many tasks that were essential to
every campaign. West Point-trained engineers were at a premium; thus,
many civil engineers, commissioned as volunteers, supplemented the
work that professional engineer ofcers did. The Confederates, in par-
ticular, relied on civilian expertise because many of their trained engineer
ofcers sought line duties. State or even local civil engineers planned and
supervised much of the work done on local fortications.
In the prewar US Army, the Corps of Engineers contained a handful
of staff ofcers and one company of trained engineer troops. This cadre
expanded to a four-company Regular engineer battalion. Congress also
created a single company of topographic engineers that joined the Regular
battalion when the engineer bureaus merged in 1863. In addition, several
volunteer pioneer regiments, some containing up to 2,000 men, supported
the various eld armies. The Corps of Engineers also initially controlled
the edgling Balloon Corps, which provided aerial reconnaissance. The
Confederate Corps of Engineers, formed as a small staff and one company
of sappers, miners, and pontoniers in 1861, grew more slowly and gener-
ally relied on details and contract labor rather than established units with
trained engineers and craftsmen.
Engineer missions for both sides included constructing fortications;
repairing and constructing roads, bridges, and, in some cases, railroads;
demolition; limited construction of obstacles; and constructing or reduc-
ing siege works. The Federal Topographic Engineers, a separate prewar
bureau, performed reconnaissance and produced maps. The Confederates,
however, never separated these functions in creating their Corps of
Engineers. Experience during the rst year of the war convinced the
Federals that all engineer functions should be merged under a single corps
because qualied engineer ofcers tended to perform all related functions.
As a result, the Federals also merged the Topographic Engineers into their
Corps of Engineers in March 1863.
Bridging assets included wagon-mounted pontoon trains that carried
either wooden, canvas-covered, or inatable rubber pontoon boats. Using
this equipment, trained engineer troops could bridge even large rivers in a
matter of hours. The most remarkable pontoon bridge of the war was the
2,200-foot bridge that Army of the Potomac engineers built in 1864 over
the James River. It was one of more than three dozen pontoon bridges built
to support campaigns in the east that year. In 1862, the Confederates began
developing pontoon trains after they had observed their effectiveness. In
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fact, during the Atlanta Campaign of 1864, General Joseph Johnston had
four pontoon trains available to support his army.
Both armies in every campaign of the war traveled over roads and
bridges that their engineers built or repaired. Federal engineers also
helped clear waterways by dredging, removing trees, or digging canals.
Fixed fortications laid out under engineer supervision played critical
roles in the Vicksburg Campaign and in actions around Richmond and
Petersburg. Engineers also supervised the siege works to reduce those
fortications.
While the Federal engineer effort expanded in both men and ma-
teriel as the war progressed, major problems continued to hamper the
Confederate engineer efforts. The relatively small number of organized
engineer units available forced Confederate engineers to rely heavily on
details or contract labor. Finding adequate manpower, however, was often
difcult because of competing demands for it. Local slave owners were
reluctant to provide labor details when labor was crucial to their eco-
nomic survival. Despite congressional authorization to conscript 20,000
slaves as a labor force, state and local opposition continually hindered
efforts to draft slave labor. Another related problem concerned the value
of Confederate currency. Engineer efforts required huge sums for men
and materiel, yet initial authorizations were small, and although congres-
sional appropriations grew later in the war, ination greatly reduced the
Confederates’ effective purchasing power. A nal problem was the simple
shortage of iron resources that severely limited the Confederates’ ability to
increase railroad mileage or even produce iron tools.
In 1861 maps for both sides were also in short supply; for many
areas in the interior, they were nonexistent. As the war progressed, the
Federals developed a highly sophisticated mapping capability. Federal
topographic engineers performed personal reconnaissance to develop
base maps, reproduce them by several processes, and distribute them
to eld commanders. Photography, lithographic presses, and eventually
photochemical processes enabled the Federals to reproduce maps quickly.
Western armies, which usually operated far from base cities, carried
equipment to reproduce maps on campaigns with their army headquarters.
By 1864, annual map production exceeded 21,000 copies. Confederate
topographic work never approached the Federal effort in quantity or
quality. Confederate topographers initially used tracing paper to reproduce
maps. Not until 1864 did the South’s use of photographic methods become
widespread.
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Engineers at Shiloh
Lack of engineer support for the armies was the standard during the
battle. When Buell’s troops were marching to join Grant, they found the
bridges destroyed at the Duck River. A small battalion of inexperienced
pioneers and an infantry regiment made repairs, but it took the Army of
the Ohio two weeks to cross the river. The Army of the Tennessee brought
a pontoon bridge with them on riverboats, intending to use it to cross the
Tennessee. It remained on the boats throughout the battle and was not laid
until well after.
West Point produced military engineers, so both armies had an abun-
dance of engineer staff ofcers. When MG Charles F. Smith ordered Sher-
man to Pittsburg Landing, he sent Lieutenant Colonel James McPherson,
the army’s chief engineer, with Sherman. McPherson assisted Sherman as
he laid out the camps and provided valuable positioning advice that many
brigade commanders ignored. McPherson also conducted many recon-
naissance missions for the army.
MG Lew Wallace used his cavalry troops to reconnoiter a route from
Crump’s Landing to Pittsburg Landing. Once the route was selected, the
troops improved the route by repairing the bridges and road where needed
because engineer troops were unavailable.
The Confederates also had ample engineer staff ofcers. Lieutenant
Colonel Jeremy Gilmer was Johnston’s engineer, and he provided valuable
assistance during the concentration of troops. Bragg’s engineer, Captain
S.H. Lockett, conducted a reconnaissance of the Union left and conrmed
the Confederate plan to turn the Army of the Tennessee away from the river.
Despite reporting a brigade as a division, Lockett’s mission was successful.
Union troops did not entrench their positions. Sherman stated the
troops did not entrench because the Confederates were not near, and en-
trenching discouraged the troops. The Union troops’ performance would
have been much more effective if they had entrenched and placed obsta-
cles. The value of entrenchments was not learned until later in the war.
Communications Support
Communications systems used during the Civil War consisted of line-of-
sight signaling, telegraphic systems, and various forms of the time-honored
courier. The telegraph mainly offered viable strategic and operational commu-
nications, line-of-sight signaling provided operational and limited tactical
possibilities, and couriers were most heavily used for tactical communica-
tions.
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The Federal Signal Corps was in its infancy during the Civil War;
Major Albert C. Myer was appointed the rst signal chief in 1860. His
organization grew slowly and became ofcially recognized as the Signal
Corps in March 1863, achieving bureau status by November of that year.
Throughout the war the Federal Signal Corps remained small. Its maxi-
mum strength reached just 1,500 ofcers and men, most of who were on
detached service with the corps. Myer also indirectly inuenced the
Confederate Signal Service’s formation. Among the men who assisted
Myer in prewar testing of his wigwag signaling system was Lieutenant
E.P. Alexander. (Myer’s wigwag system, patented in 1858, used ve sepa-
rate numbered movements of a single ag. Four number groups represent-
ed letters of the alphabet and a few simple words and phrases. The system
could also be employed at night using kerosene torches.) Alexander used
wigwag signals to the Confederates’ advantage during the First Battle of
Bull Run and later organized the Confederate Signal Corps. Ofcially es-
tablished in April 1862, the Confederate Signal Corps was attached to the
Adjutant and Inspector General Department. It attained the same size as
its Federal counterpart, with nearly 1,500 men ultimately being detailed
for service.
Myer also fought hard to develop a Federal eld telegraph service.
This eld service used the Beardslee device, a magneto-powered machine
operated by turning a wheel to a specic point that sent an electrical im-
pulse that keyed the machine at the other end to the same letter. Although
less reliable than the standard Morse code telegraph key, an operator
could use the Beardslee with only several hours’ training, and it did not
require bulky batteries for a power source. Myer’s eld telegraph units
carried equipment on wagons that enabled its operators to establish lines
between eld headquarters. The insulated wire used could also be hooked
into existing trunk lines, thus offering the potential to extend the civilian
telegraph network’s reach. However, the US Military Telegraph Service
maintained control over the existing xed telegraph system. Myer lost his
struggle to keep the eld telegraph service under the Signal Corps when
Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton relieved Myer as the signal chief
in November 1863 and placed all telegraph activity under the Military
Telegraph Service.
Although the Confederate Signal Corps’ visual communications
capabilities were roughly equal to the Federals’, Confederate eld tele-
graph operations remained too limited to be operationally signicant. The
Confederates’ existing telegraph lines provided strategic communications
capabilities similar to the Federals’, but lack of resources and factories in
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the South for producing wire precluded them from extending the prewar
telegraph networks.
The courier system, using mounted staff ofcers or detailed soldiers
to deliver orders and messages, remained the most viable tactical com-
munications option short of commanders meeting face to face. Although
often effective, this system was fraught with difculties because couriers
often were captured, killed, or delayed en route. Commanders sometimes
misinterpreted or ignored messages, and situations often changed by the
time messages were delivered. The courier system’s weaknesses, though
not always critical in themselves, did tend to compound commanders’ er-
rors or misjudgments during campaigns and battles.
Communications at Shiloh
Communications, or rather a lack of communications, played a major
role at Shiloh. The department commander did not join the forces in the
eld because of communications concerns. Halleck remained in St. Louis
because he doubted his ability to communicate with Grant and Buell. He
informed Washington that he would not move his headquarters until the
telegraph reached Fort Henry, New Madrid, and Ironton.
Once Grant had seized Fort Donelson, he established his headquarters
at Fort Henry so he would be on the Tennessee River. The telegraph lines
connecting Halleck to Grant ended at Cairo, Illinois. As early as 8 March,
Halleck complained to Grant that he was not being kept informed. Grant’s
communication with Halleck was tenuous at best. All of Grant’s messages
traveled by boat from Fort Henry to Cairo where they were telegraphed to
Halleck in St. Louis. One problem was that the telegraph operator at Cairo
was a Confederate sympathizer who had held up messages moving in both
directions. Grant’s lack of reporting to Halleck was one of the reasons
cited when Halleck relieved Grant in March 1862.
As the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Ohio converged
on Pittsburg Landing, communications problems hindered coordination.
Once Grant was back in command of the Army of the Tennessee he moved
his headquarters to Savannah, Tennessee. Messages between Grant and
Halleck traveled by boat or courier to a newly created telegraph station at
Fort Henry where they were transmitted to Halleck in St. Louis. Buell’s
main telegraph station was in Nashville. Buell stretched a telegraph line
with him as he moved, and he was able to maintain reliable communica-
tions while he moved. Communication between Grant and Buell was bur-
densome. Grant sent messages to Fort Henry by boat or courier where they
were relayed between telegraph stations until they nally reached Buell.
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Messages between Buell and Grant could take four days one way. Buell
complained of this so much that on 20 March Halleck sent a telegraph
party to Savannah to connect Grant and Buell directly. Grant received a
supply of telegraph wire on 21 March and immediately started stretching
a line between Savannah and Fort Henry although the line would not be in
before the start of the battle.
Grant had no tactical telegraph lines and had to rely on couriers and
staff ofcers to send messages to subordinates. Grant moved from his
headquarters in Savannah to Pittsburg Landing early on 6 April as soon
as he heard the ring, using the steamer Tigress as a headquarters ship.
On the way, as he passed Crump’s Landing, he gave instructions to Lew
Wallace by yelling from the side of his vessel. As soon as Grant arrived at
Pittsburg Landing, he immediately dispatched his staff ofcers as couriers.
He also used cavalrymen as couriers. Grant visited every division com-
mander so he could talk to each face to face and size up the situation. Once
that was complete, he moved back to Pittsburg Landing and established
his command post.
Grant decided to send for Lew Wallace’s division early during the
battle on 6 April. He sent Captain A.S. Baxter, the army’s quartermaster, to
Crump’s Landing to tell Wallace to come to the battleeld. Baxter thought
a written order was needed, so Captain James Rawlins, the assistant adju-
tant general, drafted an order but did not sign it. The exact content of the
order was lost when the order disappeared after its delivery, but it appar-
ently gave some latitude for Wallace’s route. Wallace would not reach the
battleeld until 1930, and Grant dispatched a total of four staff ofcers to
check on Wallace. Once Grant had visited the front lines he remained in
his command post around Pittsburg Landing. Grant communicated with
his subordinates by dispatching orderlies, staff ofcers, and cavalry troop-
ers with messages.
The Army of the Ohio had better communications support than the
Army of the Tennessee. In January 1862, it activated a signal detachment,
something the Army of the Tennessee would not do until November. As
the rst of Buell’s troops, Nelson’s Division, arrived at Pittsburg Landing,
they brought part of the signal detachment with them, and soon Nelson
could communicate with Buell via ag signals. While sending messages,
Lieutenant Hinson, the ofcer in charge of the detachment, noticed a
mounted ofcer blocking the view. Hinson told the ofcer, “Git out of
the way there; ain’t you got no sense! Don’t you see you’re in the way?”
The mounted ofcer quietly apologized and moved out of the way. The
mounted ofcer was Grant.
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The Confederates enjoyed an excellent telegraphic network as they
concentrated for the battle because they used the existing civilian infra-
structure, which tended to follow the rail line. The Confederates also used
a system of ciphers to ensure their communications stayed protected. On
10 March, Beauregard wired Johnston with a simple alphabetic code. The
day of the month a message was written indicated which letter represented
“A.” If a message was written on the 10th of the month, “J” would equal
“A.” “K” would equal “B”, etc. On the 27th of the month, “A” would cor-
respond with “C.” Once Johnston arrived in Corinth, President Davis sent
him a dictionary of which he had a duplicate. The two could communicate
in code by citing a word’s page number, column (“L” for left column, “M”
for middle, and “R” for right), and number of words from the top.
Confederate tactical communication was no different than the Union’s.
Commanders remained close to the battleeld to observe, and they de-
pended on staff ofcers and couriers to deliver instructions to subordinates
who were not within close distances.
Medical Support
Federal and Confederate medical systems followed a similar pattern.
Surgeons General and medical directors for both sides had served many
years in the prewar Medical Department but were hindered by an initial
lack of administrative experience in handling large numbers of casualties.
The state of medical science in the mid-19th century hampered them as
well. Administrative procedures improved with experience, but through-
out the war the simple lack of knowledge about the true causes of disease
and infection led to many more deaths than direct battleeld action.
After the disaster at the Battle of First Bull Run, the Federal Medical
Department established an evacuation and treatment system that surgeon
Jonathan Letterman had developed. At the heart of the system were three
precepts: consolidating eld hospitals at division level, decentralizing
medical supplies down to regimental level, and centralizing medical con-
trol of ambulances at all levels. A battle casualty evacuated from the front
line normally received treatment at a regimental holding area immediately
to the rear. From this point, wagons or ambulances carried wounded men
to a division eld hospital, normally within a mile of the battle lines.
Seriously wounded men could then be further evacuated by wagon, rail,
or watercraft to general hospitals located usually in towns along lines of
communication in the armies’ rear areas.
Although the Confederate system followed the same general prin-
ciples, Confederate eld hospitals were often consolidated at brigade
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level rather than at division level. A second difference lay in medical
activities’ established span of control. Unlike their Federal counterparts
who controlled all medical activities within an army area, a Confederate
army medical director had no control of activities beyond his own brigade
or division eld hospitals. A separate medical director for large hospitals
was responsible for evacuation and control. In practice, both sets of medi-
cal directors resolved potential problems through close cooperation. By
1863, the Confederacy had also introduced rear area “wayside hospitals”
to handle convalescents en route home on furloughs.
Procedures, medical techniques, and medical problems for both sides
were virtually identical. Commanders discouraged soldiers from leaving
the battle lines to escort wounded back to the rear, but such practice was
common, especially in less-disciplined units. The established technique
for casualty evacuation was to detail men for litter and ambulance duty.
Both armies used bandsmen, among others, for this task. Casualties would
move or be assisted back from the battle line where litter bearers evacuated
them to eld hospitals using ambulances or supply wagons. Ambulances
were specially designed two- or four-wheeled carts with springs to limit
jolts, but rough roads made even short trips agonizing for wounded men.
Brigade and division surgeons staffed consolidated eld hospitals.
Considerations for hospital sites included the availability of water, poten-
tial buildings to supplement the hospital tents, and security from enemy
cannon and rie re. Most operations performed at eld hospitals in the
aftermath of battle were amputations. Approximately 70 percent of Civil
War wounds occurred in the extremities, and the soft Minié ball shattered
any bones it hit. Amputation was the best technique available to limit the
chance of serious infection. The Federals were generally well supplied
with chloroform, morphine, and other drugs, although shortages did occur
on the battleeld. Confederate surgeons often lacked critical drugs and
medical supplies.
Medical Support at the Battle of Shiloh
By April 1861 the US Army Medical Department had not evolved from
a system for a small peacetime army to a system to support a large eld
army. The Army of the Tennessee had established a large general hospital
of 1,700 beds at Mound City, Illinois. There were also large general
hospitals at Paducah, Louisville, Cincinnati, Evansville, New Albany,
and St. Louis. The Medical Director of the Army of the Tennessee was
surgeon H.S. Hewit. The Army of the Tennessee generally had a surgeon
and an assistant surgeon with each regiment. The regimental surgeon’s
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equipment consisted of one or two two-wheeled ambulances, one or two
four-wheeled ambulance wagons, a medicine chest, a hospital knapsack
(much like a modern aid bag), 20 blankets, two hospital tents, and three
stretchers. Hewit developed a good medical plan to support the Army.
During battle, regimental surgeons were to remain with their regiments
and provide immediate care after a soldier was wounded. Once the patient
was stabilized, he walked or was moved by ambulance to a point a few
hundred meters behind the lines where the ambulance train waited. From
there, the wounded would move to a large hospital established by the
Army. While Hewit had a good plan, the pace of the battle wrecked his
efforts.
Most of the regimental surgeons lost all of their equipment when the
Confederates overran the Union camps. On 6 April many Union surgeons
remained with their wounded on the eld and were captured. Many joint
Union-Confederate hospitals were established on the battleeld. Surgeons
established hospitals wherever they could nd cover, including Grant’s
headquarters cabin at the landing, which was converted into a hospital.
When the Army of the Ohio arrived to reinforce Grant, its surgeons were
woefully unequipped. Surgeons had been ordered to leave their equipment
behind, so they arrived on the battleeld with whatever they could carry.
On 7 April the rst regular tent hospital ever was established on the
Shiloh battleeld. Dr. B.J.D. Irwin, medical director, 4th Division, Army
of the Ohio, established the hospital in COL David Stuart’s camps on the
eastern part of the battleeld. Irwin had many casualties and took posses-
sion of the abandoned tents and equipment in the area. Soon he had a well-
organized, efcient eld hospital. During the battle, the hospital ship City
of Memphis and other boats from the Quartermaster Department evacu-
ated wounded to Savannah where the entire town had been converted to a
hospital. After the battle, the surgeons evacuated the wounded to the large
hospitals farther north. The City of Memphis departed the landing on 8
April with 700 patients destined for Mound City.
The Quartermaster Department turned over steamers Hiawatha, J.J.
Roe, War Eagle, and Crescent City to the medical department. A surgeon
was placed on each steamer, and the boats were loaded with wounded
bound for large general hospitals. Surgeons performed many operations
on the voyages. Soon, civilian ships dispatched from the north arrived.
The Sanitary Commission sent a boat loaded with badly needed supplies
and evacuated patients on the return trip. Many state governors sent boats
to evacuate wounded, but most would only carry wounded from their
state, greatly adding to the confusion of this massive evacuation. A ship
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that the city of Louisville sent was the only civilian boat that would carry
captured Confederate wounded. The Quartermaster Department sent addi-
tional ships to evacuate wounded, including the Louisiana, D.A. January,
Empress, and Imperial.
The overworked Union surgeons did an adequate job with their lim-
ited supplies and experience. Although they had 8,400 Union and 1,000
Confederate casualties to care for, they established hospitals where they
could and organized a system to quickly evacuate the wounded. While the
excessive number of casualties overwhelmed them at Shiloh, they learned
many lessons from this battle that they applied in future operations.
There is little specic information on Confederate medical support
during the Battle of Shiloh. Generally, the Confederates had fewer sur-
geons and less supplies than the Union. Confederate hospitals sprang up
in the captured Union camps. There, Confederate surgeons cared for the
wounded, often using captured supplies. During the retreat on 7 April,
the Confederates evacuated as many of their casualties as they could.
Every wheeled vehicle was converted into an ambulance. Despite their
best efforts, the Confederates left 1,000 of their wounded on the eld. The
Confederates established large hospitals in Corinth where civilian doctors
and volunteers from all over the South converged to care for the wounded.
Once the wounded were able to travel, trains evacuated them to hospitals
in Jackson, Canton, Columbus, and Holly Springs.
Both sides cared for the enemy wounded as well as could be ex-
pected. Often on 6 April Union and Confederate surgeons worked side
by side in Union camps. General Johnston’s personal surgeon was not
at Johnston’s side when he was shot because he stopped to care for the
wounded of both sides. After the battle, the Confederates returned serious-
ly wounded prisoners to the Union because they could not care for them.
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Map 1. Operational movement.
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II. Shiloh Campaign Overview
At the end of 1861 the Confederacy was still trying to maintain a cor-
don defense around all of the original territory of the southern states. The
commander of all western Confederate troops was General Albert Sidney
Johnston. To prevent a Union advance south into Tennessee or along the
Mississippi River, Johnston had spread his forces in an irregular line that
ran from Somerset, Kentucky, in the east to Columbus, Kentucky, in the
west. By January 1862, the Confederate defensive line in the west was
established.
MG George B. Crittenden had 6,000 troops spread between Somerset
and Cumberland Gap, the natural route of advance to eastern Tennessee.
At Bowling Green, a rail center with lines leading to Nashville and to
Memphis, Johnston placed 23,000 troops under the command of MG Wil-
liam J. Hardee. At the western end of the line at Columbus, overlooking
the Mississippi River, there were 12,000 troops under the command of
MG Leonidas Polk. In between, Johnston defended his center with 5,000
troops in two forts along the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.
The Confederate Fort Henry protected the Tennessee River. Because
of early political considerations, the fort was not located on the better ter-
rain in Kentucky; rather, it was located in a very low place along the river
in Tennessee. This poor location unfortunately meant that the fort was
under water most of the time. Fort Donelson was located on commanding
ground, and it protected the Cumberland River. Between these two forts
the Confederates had 5,000 soldiers.
While the Confederates enjoyed a unied command in the west, the
Union command was disjoined. MG Henry Halleck commanded the De-
partment of Missouri, with headquarters in St. Louis. His area of responsi-
bility began just east of the Cumberland River and ran to the west, includ-
ing the Mississippi River. Halleck had 90,000 troops in his department.
BG U.S. Grant had 20,000 troops along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers
in the vicinity of Cairo, Ilinois. BG John Pope had 15,000 troops in central
Missouri. The remaining 55,000 troops were spread out west of Pope.
MG Don Carlos Buell commanded the Department of the Ohio with
an area of responsibility comprised of the area east of Halleck’s depart-
ment to the Appalachian Mountains. Buell had 45,000 troops spread
around central Kentucky. The rst common link in the chain of command
between Halleck and Buell was the War Department in Washington, a fact
that hindered a united effort.
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In December 1861 Halleck developed a strategic plan for piercing the
Confederate cordon defense. Halleck determined that the ends of the Con-
federate defensive line were too strong to be taken easily but that piercing
the line in the center would cause the entire Confederate line to collapse.
Halleck determined that if he seized Forts Henry and Donelson, he would
control the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, which would make the
Confederate positions at Columbus and Bowling Green untenable.
On 19 January 1862 BG George Thomas, with 4,000 troops, attacked
and defeated 4,000 troops under Crittenden at Mill Springs, Kentucky.
The Confederate defeat opened an invasion route for the Union; only a
few thousand Confederate troops blocked the Cumberland Gap. The de-
feat at Somerset helped the Confederate high command understand the
size of Johnston’s department, and they determined that he needed help.
In response, Richmond sent General P.G.T. Beauregard to be Johnston’s
second in command. Beauregard had become a “thorn in the side” of
the Confederate government. He and his troops had helped win the First
Battle of Manassas, but now his forces had been combined with Johnston’s
forces, with Johnston commanding the combined force. Beauregard was
now an “extra” general who voiced his unsolicited opinion to the govern-
ment all the time. The territory in the east was much smaller than the west,
so Richmond determined Beauregard would be of more use in the west. In
January Beauregard was ordered to move to the west.
Halleck selected Grant to execute the reduction of the Confederate
forts on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, and Pope went to reduce
the forts at Island Number 10 to open the Mississippi River to Memphis.
Grant commanded the land forces while Commodore Andrew H. Foote led
a otilla of gunboats. The cooperating forces started operations from Cairo
on 3 February. Unexpectedly, Fort Henry fell on 6 February after a short
bombardment by Foote’s gunboats. Almost immediately Grant moved his
forces overland to Fort Donelson while Foote moved his otilla up and
over to the Cumberland River. While Grant moved, Johnston reinforced
Fort Donelson to a strength of 21,000 troops, but he was too late. After an
unsuccessful US naval attack and an equally unsuccessful Confederate
breakout attempt, Grant seized Fort Donelson on 16 February. Grant cap-
tured 15,000 Confederate troops, but more importantly, the lower Tennes-
see and Cumberland Rivers were in Union hands. Federal gunboats could
now traverse the entire length of the Tennessee River to Muscle Shoals,
Alabama, and the Cumberland River was open to Nashville.
With the defeat at Mill Springs and the loss of Forts Henry and Donel-
son, the Confederate situation in the west was critical. Johnston’s Confed-
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erate troops were now split; Johnston personally commanded 17,000 troops
in the vicinity of Nashville facing Buell’s 50,000 Union troops. Beauregard
had 21,000 troops spread out from Columbus, Kentucky, to Corinth, Mis-
sissippi, facing 40,000 troops under Grant and 25,000 under Pope. The
problem was that the Tennessee River split the Confederate troops. Confed-
erate strategy was in a shambles. Something had to be done or all of Ten-
nessee would be lost, and Mississippi and Alabama would be threatened.
Richmond authorities decided to reinforce Johnston’s department. MG
Braxton Bragg was ordered to reinforce middle Tennessee with 10,000 of
his troops guarding the seacoast. BG Daniel Ruggles was ordered to come
from Louisiana with 5,000 troops. Beauregard ordered Polk and his 17,000
troops to abandon Columbus and move to Corinth. Additionally, Johnston
determined that he had to abandon the cordon defense and concentrate
his troops. He selected Corinth as the point of concentration. Corinth was
a critical rail hub where the east-west Memphis and Charleston Railroad
crossed the north-south Mobile and Ohio Railroad. Johnston considered
its defense to be critical for the Confederacy. Johnston ordered Beauregard
to command the troops west of the Tennessee River while he moved his
forces from Nashville. Johnston was taking a large gamble. 90,000 Union
troops separated Johnston from Beauregard. Nashville was abandoned by
22 February, and with it tons of badly needed provisions and supplies were
lost. Johnston moved to Murfreesboro, Tennessee, and on 28 February, he
started his retreat south toward Corinth.
The Confederate populace and politicians were irritated by the defeats
in the west, and all of them blamed Johnston. Luckily for Johnston, Presi-
dent Davis was behind him. When a delegation of Tennessee politicians
asked him to replace Johnston, Davis said, “If Sydney Johnston is not a
general, the Confederacy has none to give you.” Johnston remained in
command, but many had lost faith in him.
As Beauregard withdrew forces from Columbus, he left a large gar-
rison at Island Number 10. Island Number 10 was the most northern
Confederate defensive position on the Mississippi River. Beauregard
determined that as long as Island Number 10 remained a threat Union
forces under Pope could not campaign against Corinth. The Confederate
fort at Island Number 10 had 8,000 troops and 51 cannon. Eventually,
Beauregard reduced the island’s garrison to 3,500 men and told the com-
mander, BG William Mackall, that he had to x Pope’s troops. Mackall’s
3,500 men tied down Pope’s 25,000 men until Island Number 10 fell on 7
April. However, the defense of Island Number 10 tied down 25,000 Union
soldiers during the Battle of Shiloh.
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On 1 March gunboats Tyler and Lexington were traveling down the
now-open Tennessee River when they discovered a battery of eld ar-
tillery and a Confederate regiment at Pittsburg Landing. The gunboats
opened re and the Confederates soon retreated, having suffered a few
casualties. The gunboats returned on 4 March and disembarked troops
who moved inland 1 mile. The gunboat captains were convinced that the
Confederates had permanently abandoned their defense of Pittsburg Land-
ing, so they embarked the troops and moved on.
After the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson, Halleck decided to press
his advantage. He moved Grant via the Tennessee River to seize Corinth
and its vital rail lines. Once Corinth was secure, Halleck planned for Grant
to seize Memphis. By seizing Memphis, Halleck believed that all of the
Confederate forts on the Mississippi River north of Memphis would be un-
tenable and either would be abandoned or easy prey to an invading force.
To execute this plan, Halleck wanted Buell’s troops. Halleck wanted to
combine the two armies with him in command so their combined numbers
could overwhelm the Confederates. He wanted Buell under his command,
and he began pestering Washington for this new command.
The Union command arrangement was in turmoil as Halleck fought
for his new organization. Halleck did not like Grant. Grant had gained a
reputation for having a drinking problem while he was on active duty in
the 1850s, and Halleck knew this. Grant had become a national hero after
he took Fort Donelson, and Halleck now felt slighted. Additionally, Hal-
leck and Buell did not like each other. Neither trusted the other, and they
could not work together. Buell did not want to be under Halleck’s com-
mand, and he would not cooperate with Halleck and his plans.
As Halleck continued to argue for overall command, he decided to
start operations with or without Buell. He sent Buell numerous messages
asking him to cooperate, but he decided to start movement without him.
Halleck continued to increase the size of Grant’s force. Grant had had four
divisions for his campaign against the Confederate river forts, and as he
started this new campaign, a new division under BG William T. Sherman
was added to Grant’s troop list. Surprisingly, as preparations for the cam-
paign were under way, Halleck suddenly relieved Grant of command.
Halleck started out not liking Grant, and he found even more reasons
to dislike him. Grant caught Halleck’s ire after he crossed department lines
by going to Nashville after he took Fort Donelson. Halleck was enraged
that Grant had left the department’s boundaries without permission (Grant
had gone to coordinate with Buell). Halleck pestered Grant for reports on
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his strength and locations, and Grant’s communication arrangements were
poor. Grant was located at Fort Henry, and his messages went by boat to
the telegraph station at Cairo where they were transmitted to Halleck in
St. Louis. This situation was poor at best but was complicated because
the telegraph operator at Cairo was a Confederate sympathizer who held
some of Grant’s messages. Halleck informed General in Chief George Mc-
Clellan that he was having trouble with Grant and told him that Grant had
“resumed his old habit,” a reference to Grant’s drinking. McClellan told
Halleck to relieve Grant if it was for the best. On 4 March Halleck told
Grant to remain at Fort Henry and turn command of the expedition over to
MG Charles F. Smith, the senior division commander.
On 6 March the expedition, now under Smith, started south; by 9
March all of the troops were embarked and heading down the Tennessee
River. Smith had 27,000 troops in ve divisions with their full comple-
ment of cavalry and artillery. Smith’s initial objective was
Savannah,
Tennessee, and his rst troops arrived there on 8 March and started
to disembark.
While Smith was moving, Halleck received good news. On 11 March
Lincoln issued General Order #3. The order created the Department of
the Mississippi by combining the Departments of the Ohio and Missouri.
Halleck was placed in command of the new department. The Department
of the Ohio became the Army of the Ohio, and Smith’s troops became the
Army of the Tennessee. Halleck now commanded Buell’s troops, and on
16 March, Halleck ordered Buell to move his troops overland to the Ten-
nessee River.
While the Union troops moved, Johnston kept moving to Corinth.
After leaving Murfreesboro on 28 February, Johnston moved his forces
to Fayetteville, Tennessee, arriving on 5 March. By 10 March, part of
Johnston’s troops arrived at Decatur, Alabama. Johnston planned to move
his forces by rail from Decatur, but the Confederate rail system was in
disarray. Still under civilian control, Bragg was using most of the railcars
and engines to move his troops, so Johnston only had 160 cars to move his
troops. Thus, the lack of railcars hindered Johnston’s efforts to concentrate
his forces. The rst of Johnston’s troops arrived in Corinth on 19 March,
but troop units stretched all the way back to Decatur. Johnston himself
nally arrived in Corinth on 22 March.
Having been told by Halleck to avoid battle until Buell arrived, Smith
learned of the Confederate concentration at Corinth and decided to con-
duct two raids to cut vital rail links to Corinth. He sent one division under
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MG Lew Wallace to Crump’s Landing to cut the Mobile and Ohio rail
lines at Bethel Station, Tennessee, and another division under Sherman to
cut the same line east of Corinth at Burnsville, Mississippi. On 12 March,
Smith went to see Wallace. While getting off of the boat, Smith badly
scraped his leg from the knee to the ankle. The laceration seemed minor at
rst, but it would soon prove otherwise.
Wallace’s division landed at Crump’s Landing on 13 March. He sent
his detachment of the 5th Ohio Cavalry to Bethel Station to damage the
large rail trestle there. The cavalry was successful in damaging 150 feet
of the trestle and returned to Crump’s Landing. The Confederates sent a
small force to Bethel Station to repair the line and to protect it.
On 14 March Sherman and his division loaded on transports and head-
ed upriver toward Burnsville. As Sherman sailed past Pittsburg Landing,
he became concerned that a Confederate force could occupy the bluffs and
block his return route. He sent a message to Smith advising a division to
move to and occupy Pittsburg Landing as a precaution. In response, Smith
ordered BG Stephen A. Hurlbut’s division to move to Pittsburg Landing.
Sherman arrived at Tyler’s Landing on 14 March and quickly sent 400
troops of the 5th Ohio Cavalry to destroy a trestle in the vicinity Burns-
ville. The cavalry commander attempted the mission, but recent rainy
weather had made crossing creeks and streams extremely treacherous.
Finally the cavalry turned back when it could go no farther. Realizing the
futility of continuing operations, Sherman embarked his command on the
transports and sailed downstream. Sherman still wanted to accomplish the
mission so he looked for the nearest accessible landing for a point to wait
for better conditions. The Tennessee River was swollen, and the rst place
north of Tyler’s Landing that Sherman could use was Pittsburg Landing.
Sherman ran into Hurlbut’s troops at Pittsburg Landing. Leaving both
divisions embarked at the landing, Sherman continued to Savannah to
discuss the matter with Smith. Sherman suggested to Smith that he should
occupy Pittsburg Landing and attempt an advance on the railroads from
there. Sherman was convincing, and Smith ordered him to occupy Pitts-
burg Landing with his own division and Hurlbut’s.
Sherman returned to Pittsburg Landing and conducted a personal
reconnaissance before landing the troops. Convinced that there were no
Confederate troops nearby, he disembarked the troops. Early the next
morning Sherman sent his cavalry toward Corinth to destroy the Mobile
and Ohio line. Soon the cavalry returned, reporting that they had encoun-
tered Confederate cavalry. Sherman was now convinced that he could not
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cut the railroad, so he ordered his troops to bivouac about of a mile from
the landing.
On 15 March Grant resumed command of the Army of the Ten-
nessee. President Lincoln had found out about his dismissal and told
Halleck to provide specic information on Grant. Halleck backed
down. He informed the War Department that he was satised with
Grant’s explanation and would return him to command. On 16
March, Grant departed Fort Henry and arrived on the 17th at Savan-
nah, where he established his headquarters.
When Grant arrived at Savannah, he found Smith conned to a bed be-
cause his abrasion had developed a tetanus infection. Grant had two divi-
sions at Pittsburg Landing and one at Crump’s Landing with the rest of the
army at Savannah. Based on Sherman’s report, Grant ordered the troops at
Savannah, except for McClernand’s division, to move to Pittsburg Land-
ing and go into camp. Grant wanted McClernand to remain in Savannah
because he outranked Sherman; Grant wanted Sherman to be the senior
commander at Pittsburg Landing.
Despite having most of his troops at Pittsburg Landing, Grant kept his
headquarters at Savannah. With Smith ill and McClernand at Savannah,
Sherman was in charge at Pittsburg Landing. Sherman placed most of his
division in camps blocking the Corinth Road. He placed Stuart’s brigade
of his division in camps astride the Hamburg-Savannah Road, the only
other avenue of approach to Pittsburg Landing. As other divisions arrived,
Sherman assigned them camps. Hurlbut’s division went into camps south-
west of the landing along the Hamburg-Savannah Road. Smith’s division,
temporarily under W.H.L. Wallace’s command, occupied camps along the
Pittsburg Landing Road.
Sherman had given detailed instructions for establishing camps. He
wanted camps tactically situated where the men could occupy battle lines
quickly. However, most commanders established their camps based on
comfort, not tactical dispositions. Camps were located based on water
supplies and good camping grounds. Additionally, Sherman did not be-
lieve it was necessary to prepare fortications because he was convinced
the Confederates were at Corinth with no intent to move, and building
fortications would demoralize the Union men.
As soon as the Union troops had established their camps, commanders
began a regimen of drills and reviews. The area around Pittsburg Land-
ing was heavily wooded, with occasional open elds. Union commanders
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used these open areas as drill elds and review elds. Many of the troops
were new to the Army and badly needed the training.
On the Confederate side, the last of Johnston’s troops arrived at Corinth
on 27 March; 49,000 troops were now concentrated around Corinth. In con-
sultation with his commanders, Johnston decided he would attack Grant’s
army before it combined with Buell’s. He also decided that with the inux
of troops his army had to be reorganized. The mission fell to Beauregard.
Beauregard named the army the Army of the Mississippi and reorganized
it. He created four corps within the army. MG Polk would command the I
Corps, a two-division corps with 9,000 men. MG Bragg would command
the 13,000-man, two-division II Corps. MG Hardee would command the
III Corps. This corps would only have three brigades with no division
structure. Finally, Beauregard created a Reserve Corps and gave BG John
C. Breckinridge command. Like the III Corps, the Reserve Corps would
have three brigades with no division structure. Bragg was named the Army
Chief of Staff in addition to being a corps commander.
Grant nally decided to send all of his troops to Pittsburg Landing.
McClernand’s division moved from Savannah on 20 March and occupied
camps to the rear of Sherman’s camps. By 22 March Grant realized that
Smith could not take the eld, so he made W.H.L. Wallace the commander
of Smith’s division. On 26 March Grant created a 6th Division from newly
arriving units with BG Benjamin Prentiss as its commander. Prentiss went
into camp between Sherman’s division and Stuart’s brigade. Sherman and
Prentiss had the “greenest” troops in the Army, and their divisions now
occupied the exterior lines of the Army’s encampment.
While Grant established his camp and Johnston reorganized, Buell
continued to move. He left Nashville on 16 March, and by 19 March his
troops were at the Duck River, about 80 miles from Savannah. The Con-
federates had destroyed all of the bridges over the river, so Buell stopped.
For seven days Buell’s troops tried to bridge the river. Finally, BG William
Nelson convinced Buell to try to ford the river. For the next three days, the
Army of the Ohio forded the Duck River, but the destroyed bridges had
stopped Buell for 10 days. Once across the river, Buell continued march-
ing toward the Tennessee River.
While Sherman was in camp, his troops had sporadic contact with
Confederate cavalry. On 24 March Sherman led two of his brigades on a
reconnaissance south of his camps toward Corinth. Sherman did not make
contact, but the Confederates had seen his movement and were concerned
about Union aggressiveness.
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51
All of the Army of the Tennessee was now in the vicinity of Pittsburg
Landing except MG Lew Wallace’s division, which remained encamped
in the vicinity of Crump’s Landing. Wallace was concerned that he was
more than 4 miles from the concentrated Army, so he decided to prepare
a route to the Army. He had two options. The River Road closely paral-
leled the Tennessee River, and it ended at BG W.H.L. Wallace’s camps
along the Pittsburg Landing Road. The Shunpike Road twisted through the
countryside and ended at Sherman’s camps. Both roads were in appalling
condition.
After a personal reconnaissance, Lew Wallace decided to repair the
Shunpike as his route to the Army. He considered it the better of the two
roads and felt it would be easier to repair. On 31 March Confederates
from Purdy harassed the Union troops working on the road. Wallace was
concerned and deployed his entire division toward the threat. The Confed-
erates saw this and retreated to Purdy. When this action was reported to
Johnston, he was concerned that the move meant an impending attack by
the entire Army of the Tennessee. He sent MG Benjamin Franklin Cheath-
am’s division to Purdy to stabilize the situation, but he determined that the
Army of the Ohio had to be near. At that moment Johnston decided he had
to attack Grant immediately, before the Army of the Ohio joined him.
On 2 April Johnston went to see Bragg. Beauregard had sent Johnston
a telegram telling him the time was right to attack. Johnston laid out the
information about MG Lew Wallace’s division and that he had learned
Buell had crossed the Duck River and was again moving. Bragg agreed
with Beauregard’s assessment. Johnston told an aide to write a dispatch
to the corps commanders telling them to be prepared to advance the next
morning.
The Confederate plan called for a departure at 0600 on 3 April. Hard-
ee’s corps was to lead on the Ridge Road, followed by Clark’s division
of Polk’s corps. Polk would consolidate his corps when Cheatham came
down from Purdy and linked up. Bragg would travel along the Monterey
Road followed by Breckinridge. Once the Army reached a small farm-
house named Michie’s, it would form for the attack. Johnston planned to
attack with his four corps in successive lines. Hardee’s corps would lead,
followed in sequence by Bragg, Polk, and Breckinridge. The main goal of
Johnston’s attack was to turn Grant’s left, driving the Federals away from
the Tennessee River. Johnston and Beauregard used this particular attack
formation because they were short of experienced ofcers and because the
terrain was difcult.
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53
The Confederate movement was a debacle from the start. The streets
of Corinth were so clogged that the start time was pushed back. Com-
manders battled among themselves for road use, which caused confusion
and delay. Bragg’s troops got a late start due to an error in their orders.
Cheatham’s division never started this day because of vague orders. Hard-
Map 2.
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53
ee’s troops turned off the main road to nd a bivouac location, but Polk’s
troops continued on the main road. It rained the night of 3 April, and the
Confederates slept in the open.
On the morning of 4 April the disjointed advance continued. When
Hardee’s troops returned to the main road, they found Polk in the way.
Much time was lost as Hardee attempted to pass Polk. The Confeder-
ates made poor time, and a rainstorm in the afternoon again slowed the
advance. By the night of 4 April the Army of the Mississippi was widely
dispersed between Corinth and Michie’s farmhouse. Johnston met with
Beauregard, Bragg, and Breckinridge on the night of the 4th. Johnston
ordered an attack on Grant’s troops for the next morning at 0800.
During the night the rain came in torrents, soaking the Confederates
lying in the open elds. As the corps commanders attempted to move their
troops to their starting positions, the rain and darkness caused them to halt
movement. The Confederates did not start their movement on 5 April until
0700. At 1000 Hardee’s troops began to deploy into the line of battle and
soon were ready to attack. Bragg was to form the next line behind Hardee,
but his troops were delayed and not in position until 1600. Once Bragg
was in line, Polk quickly moved into position. Cheatham’s division had
moved that morning and linked up with his corps. By the time the fourth
line, Breckinridge’s corps, was in position, it was dark.
The Union troops were not completely unaware of the Confederates’
presence. On 4 April an advance picket from the 77th Ohio Regiment of
Sherman’s division saw a large number of Confederates around Seay
Field. They reported their sighting, but Sherman dismissed it. Later that
day, one of the picket posts of the 72d Ohio Regiment of Sherman’s divi-
sion was captured. After the capture, Sherman sent his cavalry to investi-
gate. The cavalry ran into a long line of infantry and some artillery. COL
Ralph Buckland, one of Sherman’s brigade commanders, brought up some
infantry to support the cavalry. After a brief skirmish, the Union forces
withdrew to their lines. When Buckland reported what he saw, Sherman
replied, “You militia ofcers get scared too easily.”
Grant came to Pittsburg Landing when he learned of the ring, arriving
after dark. As he made his way to Sherman’s camp in the dark and rain, his
horse fell, pinning his leg between the saddle and the ground and severely
spraining his ankle. Grant would be on crutches for the next few days, thus
reducing his mobility and capacity to move around the battleeld.
The indications of a Confederate presence continued on 5 April. COL
Jesse Appler, commander, 53d Ohio Regiment, was concerned and sent
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55
Map 3.
out a reconnaissance party. The party soon made contact, and Appler
formed his regiment and sent an ofcer to report to Sherman. The ofcer
soon returned with Sherman’s reply, “Take your damn regiment to Ohio.
There is no enemy nearer than Corinth!” On the afternoon of the 5th, BG
Prentiss reviewed his entire division in Spain Field. Major James Pow-
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ell of the 25th Missouri noticed Confederates watching the review and
received permission to conduct a reconnaissance. Powell’s patrol did not
make contact but did hear noise indicating a large Confederate presence.
Powell reported this information to his brigade commander, COL Everett
Peabody.
5 April was a day of reorganization in the Army of the Tennessee.
Grant had decided to reorganize his army’s cavalry and artillery. The re-
organization occurred on 5 April. Sherman lost his detachment of the 5th
Ohio Cavalry Regiment and received a detachment from the 4th Illinois
Cavalry Regiment. During the daylight hours of 5 April Sherman had no
cavalry because of the reorganization.
On the evening of 5 April the Confederate commanders met. Once
Bragg’s troops were in position, Beauregard rode up and conferred with
Bragg. Both generals agreed that the Union had to know of the Confeder-
ates’ presence and had to be entrenched. They thought it best to fall back to
Corinth without a ght. They sent for Polk, and while Beauregard, Bragg,
and Polk talked, Johnston rode up. It was 1700. Beauregard and Bragg
recommended to Johnston that the Army retreat to Corinth. The reasons
they stated were that they would have had to have lost surprise, the Union
troops had to be entrenched, and the soldiers had eaten all of their rations.
Johnston asked Polk for his opinion, and Polk recommended they attack.
Breckinridge rode up and stated his corps was ready to attack. Johnston
looked at the assembled generals and said, “Gentlemen, we shall attack at
daylight tomorrow.” The corps commanders returned to their troops. As
Johnston was leaving the meeting, he turned to an aide and said, “I would
ght them if they were a million.”
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Map 4.
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Map 5.
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III. Suggested Routes and Vignettes
Introduction
The Battle of Shiloh occurred over a two-day period in a large area of
rugged, wooded terrain. This guide is designed to examine the entire battle
during a one-day visit. To accomplish this, a very early start is required.
Groups should carefully examine this guide and plan their visit, adjust-
ing stand times as required. Most of this guide requires driving between
stands, although there are a few places where one may leave a vehicle and
complete a couple of stands before returning to it.
Due to the terrain and road conditions, this guide examines the battle
in sectors rather than sequentially in time. First we examine the attacks
on the Confederate left/Union right. Then we transition to the ght on the
Confederate right/Union left. The recommended route follows no signs
or monuments. Directions are as specic as possible, but group leaders
should use the vehicle odometer to track distances. Directions for the
route are sometimes given in cardinal directions rather than “left or right.”
Group leaders should have a compass.
Before starting, the group leader should check in with the park head-
quarters to obtain information on road conditions and other park condi-
tions. He may want to begin the staff ride at a location where he can
discuss the strategic and operational overview (part II of this guide). Lo-
cations for this stand could be Pittsburg Landing by the park headquarters
or at Wood’s Field in the southwest portion of the park.
If time is critical during the staff ride, use the route on map 5, “Shiloh
Battleeld Compressed Tour Route.” This route will take approximately
4 to 5 hours versus 7 to 8 hours for the “full” route. You can conduct the
following stands from each stop (a white circle with a black number marks
stops on the map):
Stop 1: Stands 1, 2
Stop 2: Stands 3, 4
Stop 3: Stands 5, 6, and 7
Stop 4: Stands 8, 9, and 10
Stop 5: Stand 11
Stop 6: Stands 12, 13, and 14
Stop 7: Stands 15, 16
Stop 8: Stands 17, 18, and 19
Stop 9: Stand 20
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Map 6.
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Stand 1
Fraley Field
Directions: Starting at the park headquarters, travel west 1.1 miles on
Pittsburg Landing Road. Turn left (south) on TN 22 and travel 1.7 miles.
Turn left (east) on Hamburg-Purdy Road and travel .4 mile. Turn right
(south) on Corinth Road and travel 1.2 miles (bear to the right at the “Y”
intersection). As the road ends and turns to the left (east), park the vehicle.
Take the trail to the west (there are two metal tablets and an open eld vis-
ible from the vehicle). Go 50 meters into the eld; you are now in Fraley
Field.
Description: COL Everett Peabody, commander, 1st Brigade, 6th
Division (Prentiss) was worried about reports of a Confederate presence.
Early on the evening of 5 April he debriefed a patrol from the 25th Mis-
souri. The patrol’s leader, Major James Powell, reported that he heard a
large body of Confederates south of the camps. Very early on 6 April Pea-
body, on his own authority, ordered Powell to conduct another reconnais-
sance with three companies from the 25th Missouri and two companies of
the 12th Michigan. At 0300 Powell formed ve companies and cautiously
headed south.
During the night the Confederates had slept on their arms. BG S.A.M.
Wood’s brigade of Hardee’s corps was in the front line, and before dark-
ness, Wood had placed Major A.B. Hardcastle’s 3d Mississippi Battalion
in front of his brigade as skirmishers.
At approximately 0445 Powell’s skirmish line entered Fraley Field.
When it was partially across, Hardcastle’s troops opened re. Powell’s
men took cover on the east side of the eld, and for the next 60 minutes
these small units traded re, causing minor casualties. During the ght
Prentiss learned that his troops were in contact so he ordered COL David
Moore to take ve of his companies of the 21st Missouri (Peabody’s bri-
gade) to assist Powell.
At 0630 Powell noticed some Confederate cavalry moving to his left.
Fearing he was being anked, Powell ordered his men to withdraw. As
Powell withdrew, the general Confederate advance began. Continuing his
withdrawal, Powell met Moore coming up with the relief column. Moore,
after berating Powell for retreating, took charge of the troops now in Seay
Field. The rest of the 21st Missouri soon joined Moore along the eastern
edge of Seay Field. Moore led these troops across the eld, and when he
was halfway across, the Confederates hidden along the west side of the
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eld opened re. Moore was wounded in the leg and soon ordered a retreat
to the northeast corner of the eld.
Confederate COL R.G. Shaver was also in the front line of Hardee’s
corps, to the right of Wood. When the order to advance was given, his bri-
gade entered Seay Field from the southwest and exchanged re with the
21st Missouri. After some delay, Shaver advanced across the eld and sent
the 21st Missouri retreating back to its camps. Shaver and the rest of the
Confederates continued their attack.
Vignette 1: Henry Stanley was a private in the 6th Arkansas of
Shaver’s brigade. Later he would become a journalist and earn unending
fame for his search in Africa for Dr. David Livingstone, “Dr. Livingstone
I presume.” Stanley reected on the opening of the battle:
“We loaded our muskets and arranged our cartridge pouches ready for
use. Our weapons were the obsolete intlocks, and the ammunition was
rolled in cartridge-paper, which contained powder, a round ball, and three
buckshot. . . . Within a few minutes, there was another explosive burst
of musketry, the air was pierced by many missiles, which hummed and
pinged sharply by our ears, pattered throughout the tree-tops, and brought
twigs and leaves down on us. ‘Those are bullets’ Henry whispered in awe.
. . . ‘There they are!’ was no sooner uttered, than we cracked into them
with levelled (sic) muskets. ‘Aim low men!’ commanded Captain Smith. I
tried hard to see some living thing to shoot at, for it appeared absurd to be
blazing away at the shadows. . . . My nerves tingled, my pulse beat double
quick, my heart throbbed loudly, almost painfully. . . . I was angry with my
rear rank because he made my eyes smart with the powder of his musket;
and I felt like cufng him for deafening my ears!” (Private Henry Stan-
ley, 6th Arkansas, quoted in Henry M. Stanley, The Autobiography of Sir
Henry Morton Stanley, Cambridge, MA: Riverside Press, 1909, 187-90.)
Vignette 2: As General Albert Sidney Johnston ordered the attack to
commence, he turned to his aides: “Tonight, we will water our horses in
the Tennessee River.” (William P. Johnston, The Life of General Albert
Sidney Johnston, New York: 1878.)
Teaching point 1: Reconnaissance. Was the cavalry optimally orga-
nized for each side, and what was its mission? What did each side know
about the enemy, and could/should they have known more?
Teaching point 2: Initiative. Was Peabody correct to send out a patrol
when he was told not to bring on an engagement?
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Map 7.
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Stand 2
Peabody’s Camps
Directions: Travel east on Reconnoitering Road for .7 mile. As you
are driving, notice the slight ridge with the tablets; this is where COL Pea-
body initially formed his brigade. At the intersection, pull into the parking
spot straight ahead. Dismount the vehicle and walk to Peabody’s death
marker. You are now in the location of Peabody’s brigade camps.
Description: Peabody had sent almost half of his brigade forward to
Seay Field. As he received reports of its actions, he ordered the remaining
two regiments into the line of battle. Soon BG Prentiss rode up and asked
Peabody if he had brought on this battle. Peabody replied that he had or-
dered a reconnaissance. Prentiss was angered and said, “COL Peabody, I
will hold you personally responsible for bringing on this engagement.”
Peabody was now angered and told Prentiss that he was responsible for all
of his actions and rode off to form his troops. He occupied a position on a
slight ridge south of his camps. The time was 0730.
Soon Peabody’s men on the line were greeted with a curious sight—
dozens of rabbits running toward them. Soon Powell’s reconnaissance
party returned and joined the line, closely followed by the 21st Missouri,
which also went into the line. Before long Confederates appeared, march-
ing toward their lines. These troops were Shaver’s men and part of Wood’s
brigade; two regiments had split and were heading north toward Rhea
Field. When Shaver’s men were 75 yards distant, Peabody opened re.
Shaver was stopped and one of his regiments broke. The two sides traded
shots at this close range, but no one advanced.
Soon Swett’s Confederate battery occupied a position to the right of
Shaver. While their re was effective, Swett was in danger of becoming
ineffective because so many of his men were being shot. To relieve the
battery, Hardee ordered Shaver and Wood to charge. Peabody’s troops
could not stand the assault and soon retreated. Peabody, who had been
wounded four times already, attempted to rally his troops. While mounted
on his horse, he was shot in the head and killed. By 0900 the combination
of the Confederate attack and the death of their commander was more than
the Federal troops could handle. They broke for the rear. The Confederates
had captured their rst Union camp.
Vignette: One of the soldiers assigned to Peabody’s brigade describes
the night before battle: “All day Saturday we had the instinctive feeling
that a great battle was imminent. . . . We felt that we were going to be ar-
rayed in a deadly conict and that some of us would probably pay the price
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of loyalty and be numbered with the slain. On Saturday evening a number
of us gathered in one of the large Silbey Tents we were then using. One of
the boys struck up a song in which we all joined. The song was followed
by others, and the spell, which seemed to be over all caused us with one
accord, to sing the songs of home and bygone days. Our last song was
‘Brave Boys are They.’ How the words come back to me today!
‘Thinking no less of them,
Loving our country the more.
We sent them forth to ght for the ag
Their fathers before them bore.’
We closed the evening’s singing with these lines:
‘Oh! The dread eld of battle!
Soon to be strewn with graves!
If brothers fall, then bury them where
Our banner in triumph waves.’
The singing ended, and under the spell of its patriotic pathos, without
uttering a word, we separated and each man retired to his own tent; some
to dream of homes to which they would never return, and of friends they
would never meet this side of the ‘eternal shore.’ That little company never
met again.” (Private Jacob Fawcett, 16th Wisconsin Infantry, Jacob Faw-
cett, “Address at the Dedication of the Monument Erected by the State of
Wisconsin on the Battleeld of Shiloh in Memory of Her Soldiers Who
Fought on the Field” published in Wisconsin at Shiloh, compiled by F.H.
Magdeburg, Madison, WI: Wisconsin Shiloh Monument Commission,
1909, 89.)
Teaching point 1: Battle command. Was Peabody successfully com-
manding his brigade? Was Prentiss a help or a hindrance?
Teaching point 2: Preparedness. Were the Union camps tactically laid
out and mutually supporting? How could Prentiss have better laid out his
camps so the men were comfortable but ready for battle?
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Map 8.
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Stand 3
Rea Field
Directions: Travel northwest on Peabody Road for .7 mile. Pull off
the road opposite the two cannons in the eld on your left (south). Dis-
mount the vehicle and walk south to the 53d Ohio’s marker. You are in
Rea Field.
Description: COL Jesse Hildebrand’s brigade of Sherman’s division
was in camps around Rea Field. The 53d Ohio Regiment had its camp in
Rea Field. COL Jesse Appler, commander, 53d Ohio had heard the ring
to his south early in the morning. He wanted to put his troops on the line,
but the rebuke from Sherman the previous day was still fresh in his head.
When a wounded soldier came retreating through the camp yelling for the
men to get on the line, Appler formed his regiment. Appler sent an aide
to tell Hildebrand and Sherman. The aide that went to Sherman returned
and told Appler “General Sherman says you must be badly scared over
there.”
Confederate BG Patrick Cleburne commanded a brigade in Hardee’s
corps. He was in line to the left of Wood. As his troops approached Rea
Field, they split. Three of his regiments remained west of the stream run-
ning to the west of the eld while the remaining two, with Cleburne,
crossed the stream and entered Rea Field.
Captain A.C. Waterhouse deployed his Illinois battery to support the
53d Ohio. At 0700 Sherman and an orderly rode to Appler’s line to investi-
gate. As Sherman was examining the terrain, Cleburne attacked. A soldier
told Sherman, “Look to your right.” Sherman was nally convinced as
he uttered, “My God, we are attacked.” Cleburne’s troops red and Sher-
man’s orderly was killed; Sherman was shot in the hand with a buckshot
from a “buck and ball” cartridge. Sherman rode to Appler and told him to
hold on while he promised to get him some support. Appler, assisted by
Waterhouse’s battery, repulsed three charges by Cleburne’s troops. One of
Cleburne’s regiments, the 6th Mississippi, suffered more than 70-percent
casualties in Rea Field.
Sherman rode to Hildebrand and told him to deploy his remaining
two regiments. The 57th and 77th Ohio formed but remained north of the
eld. Appler’s troops had been ghting well, but Appler suddenly lost
his composure and yelled, “Retreat and save yourselves!” The 53d Ohio
abandoned its position in the Rea Field and retreated to the vicinity of Lost
Field. Waterhouse’s battery withdrew to Shiloh Church.
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At 0830 BG Patton Anderson’s brigade from Bragg’s second line
came up to support Cleburne. Anderson attacked up Corinth Road but was
repulsed by Buckland’s brigade and Waterhouse’s battery. At 0845 COL
Robert M. Russell’s brigade from Polk’s corps attacked through Rea Field,
but it too was repulsed. At 0900 Polk’s Confederate battery went into posi-
tion in Rea Field and dueled with Waterhouse. As soon as Polk’s battery
was in position, BG Bushrod Johnson’s brigade from Polk’s corps unsuc-
cessfully attacked. For 2 hours Buckland’s and Hildebrand’s brigades and
one battery had held up four Confederate brigades that had attacked seven
times using piecemeal frontal attacks.
At 0930 the Confederates were nally able to coordinate their attack.
Anderson, Russell, and Cleburne attacked simultaneously. The remnants
of Hildebrand’s brigade and Waterhouse’s battery retreated toward Shiloh
Church.
Vignette: A lieutenant in Cleburne’s brigade described his rst com-
bat: “Presently, I began to see men on the ground and soon realized they
were hurt. At rst I couldn’t see their faces. Maybe I didn’t want to see
them. The rst wounded man I recognized was my Uncle Henry’s eldest
son, cousin James Mangum, a private in my company. He had been shot in
the face. I wanted to stop and help him, but everyone was moving forward,
all seemed to be hollering at the top of their lungs. We just had to get to
those Federals who were shooting us; therefore there was no time to help
the wounded. I did manage to tell James, as I stopped briey beside him,
to take shelter behind a large oak. Most of the men on the ground were
our close friends, neighbors, kinfolk. I saw Stephen Gordon but knew I
could not help him. His eyes were glazing over. He was dead. Next I came
to Elias McLendon. He was badly wounded. It was awful, but I keep on
moving. I had not gone far when a sudden pain hit me. My legs folded and
I was on the ground. I had been yelling, but the fall knocked the breath out
of me, and I was quiet. . . . I must have fainted, for the next thing I knew
someone had me by the shoulders and was dragging me out of the line of
re. He helped me to get to the hospital area. I didn’t recognize who had
helped me until I had gone some distance. He was our major, Pat Brandon,
who was also wounded.” (Lieutenant William Thompson, 6th Mississippi,
in William C. Thompson, “From Shiloh to Port Gibson,” Civil War Times
Illustrated, October 1964, 20.)
Teaching point 1: Synchronization. Why were the initial Confederate
attacks in Rea Field not synchronized? Who was responsible for synchro-
nizing them?
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Teaching point 2: Mass. How did Hildebrand’s brigade hold off four
Confederate brigades for so long? What was the effect when the Confeder-
ates nally massed troops in Rea Field?
Teaching point 3: Fire support. Who directed Waterhouse’s battery?
Was Waterhouse’s re important to this ght?
Side Trip: Confederate Burial Trench. (You should only do this side
trip if you decide to use the compressed route because you will conduct
a stand at another Confederate burial trench on the full route.) Continue
75 yards to the south and you will be at one of the ve known Confeder-
ate burial trenches. After the battle, Union troops quickly buried the dead
of both sides. They took care to bury their own dead who were moved to
the National Cemetery near the Visitor’s Center after the war. The Union
troops did not take such good care of the Confederate dead. Union troops
dug large trenches and stacked the Confederates allegedly sometimes up
to seven deep. There are ve known Confederate burial trenches, but there
are probably many more that have never been found and are therefore lost
to history.
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Map 9.
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Stand 4
Shiloh Church
Directions: Continue northwest on Peabody Road for .1 mile. Turn
right (north) at the triangle intersection. Travel .3 mile on Corinth Road
and turn into the Shiloh Church parking lot. This is private property, but
visitors are allowed without coordination. Move to the middle of the eld
to the east.
Description: During the ght on Rea Field, COL Ralph Buckland’s
4th Brigade of Sherman’s division held a line by its camps. By 0800 Buck-
land knew of the Confederate attacks and formed his brigade to the north
of the ooded Shiloh Branch. The rst Confederates to attack Buckland
were the regiments of Cleburne’s brigade that stayed west of Rea Field.
Buckland easily drove them back. The Confederates had positioned 16
cannon to support the attack into Rea Field and west of Corinth Road. At
1000, after the Confederates had seized Rea Field, they continued their
attack. Two regiments from Russell’s brigade—the 12th and 13th Tennes-
see—swung in a wide arc to the east of Hildebrand’s brigade. Additionally,
men from Johnson’s and Anderson’s brigades pressed the attack frontally.
As Russell’s troops struck Hildebrand’s ank, the Union troops started to
break. First the 57th Ohio broke and headed for the landing. Waterhouse
attempted to move his battery but lost four cannon to the charging Tennes-
seans. Soon the combined weight of the Confederate attack fell on the 77th
Ohio, and it, too, broke for the rear. Sherman’s left had now completely
collapsed.
The Confederates now focused on Buckland’s brigade west of Shiloh
Church. Sherman had been all over the eld that morning, rallying the men
and coordinating the defense. As he saw Hildebrand’s troops retreating, he
determined his line was no longer tenable. He knew Buckland’s ank was
“in the air,” so he ordered his division to fall back and establish a new line
along the Purdy-Hamburg Road. Sherman dispatched staff ofcers and
orderlies to deliver the message. Sherman’s last brigade, the 1st, under
COL John McDowell’s command, had spent a relatively quiet morning.
It had received sporadic artillery and sniper re but no major Confederate
attacks. McDowell received the order from one of Sherman’s staff ofcers
and easily withdrew to the north.
MG John McClernand, commander, 1st Division, also heard the ring
south of his camps early in the morning. Sherman soon sent McClernand
a request for aid, and McClernand formed his men. McClernand’s camps
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were not tactically arranged either, so his three brigades were spread out.
The 3d Brigade was the closest to Sherman’s line. COL Leonard Ross
commanded this brigade, but he was on leave for his wife’s funeral. Acting
Commander COL J. Reardon was sick and absent from the command that
day, leaving COL Julius Raith in command. Upon receiving McClernand’s
orders, Raith posted his men behind Hildebrand’s brigade. When Hildeb-
rand broke, Raith was in position to stem the advancing Confederates,
which his brigade did, at least for a while.
All along the line now, the Confederate attack stalled for about 30
minutes. Some of the units were exhausted; others were out of ammuni-
tion. Some units stopped to plunder Union camps. This Confederate pause
was time for Sherman to reorganize his men in a new defensive position.
Vignette: A lieutenant in the 53d Ohio of Hildebrand’s brigade de-
scribes his unit’s leadership: “As I turned to go back from the left to the
right, I saw the Fifty-seventh Ohio, which had been ghting on its color
line, falling back through its camp, its ranks broken by the standing tents,
despite the gallant efforts of its gallant lieutenant-colonel, A.V. Rice, the
only eld ofcer with it. I ran to where the colonel was lying on the ground
behind a tree and stooping over said, ‘Colonel, let us go and help the Fifty-
seventh; they are falling back.’ He looked up; his face was like ashes; the
awful fear of death was on it; he pointed over his shoulder in an indenite
direction and squeaked out in a trembling voice: ‘No, form the men back
here.’ Our miserable position ashed upon me. We were in the front of a
great battle. Our regiment had never had a battalion drill. Some men in it
had never red a gun. Our lieutenant colonel had become lost in the confu-
sion of the rst retreat, the major was in the hospital, and our colonel was a
coward! I said to him, with an adjective not necessary to repeat, ‘Colonel,
I will not do it!’ He jumped to his feet and literally ran away.” (Lieutenant
Ephraim Dawes, 53d Ohio, in Ephraim C. Dawes, “My First Day Under
Fire at Shiloh”, Sketches of War History, vol. IV, Ohio Military Order of
the Loyal Legion of the United States, 1903, 10-11.)
Teaching point 1: Leadership. For most of the unit leaders, this is their
rst action. Why do some leaders perform well and others cower? How do
you prepare junior leaders for the reality of combat?
Teaching point 2: Battle command. Sherman’s division is breaking.
Sherman is all over the eld encouraging the men and trying to maintain
his unit’s cohesiveness. How can Sherman best “ght” his division at this
point in the battle?
Teaching point 3: Face of battle. For most of the soldiers, this is their
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rst combat experience. How do you prepare soldiers for what they will
see in combat? Why did the Confederate soldiers stop their attack when
they were pushing the Union soldiers all along this line?
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75
Map 10.
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75
Stand 5
Sherman’s Second Line
Directions: Travel north on Corinth Road for .2 mile. At the intersec-
tion, park and dismount. Move to the Raith death marker. You are at the
intersection of Corinth Road and Hamburg-Purdy Road, also known as
“the Crossroads.”
Description: As Sherman’s troops fell back, MG John McClernand
was reacting. At Sherman’s request he had organized his troops and
moved forward. As COL A.M. Hare’s and COL C.C. Marsh’s brigades
arrived north of the Purdy-Hamburg Road, McClernand halted them and
formed a line of battle. He had Hare’s brigade north of Review Field with
Marsh’s brigade west of Hare. McClernand sent a message to Raith and
told him to fall back and form to the west of Marsh. Dispersed among
McClernand’s brigades were four artillery batteries. Once McClernand
was set, COL James Veatch brought his brigade of Hurlbut’s division
forward in response to a request from Sherman. Veatch went into position
behind Marsh.
As Sherman fell back, he tried to reform his lines. The disorganized
survivors of Hildebrand’s brigade were to the west of McClernand with
Buckland to the west of Hildebrand. McDowell’s brigade was still moving.
As Buckland formed his troops in the road, the 6th Indiana Light Artillery
Battery came ying past, scattering Buckland’s troops. As Captain Freder-
ick Behr brought the battery into position, the Confederates attacked. Behr
was wounded, and his men broke for the rear without ring a shot.
By 1100 the Confederates were back in ranks and regained the initia-
tive by resuming the attack. Fresh from the ght around Shiloh Church,
the brigades of Anderson, Cleburne, Russell, and Johnson attacked Sher-
man and McClernand’s right. Shaver and Wood, fresh from their ght
against Prentiss, attacked McClernand’s left. BG A.P. Stewart came up
to join the attack. As he was trying to get in line, his 4th Tennessee Regi-
ment became separated from the brigade. When Stewart found them, he
received orders to seize Battery D, 1st Illinois Light Artillery in Review
Field. Stewart moved out with the 4th Tennessee. The battery opened re
on Stewart’s men, but the infantry support did not, thinking Stewart’s men
were friendly. When Stewart was 30 yards from the battery, he red one
volley and charged, capturing one piece as the battery withdrew. Stewart’s
other regiments attacked east of Russell.
As Stewart attacked, Wood’s brigade came into the eld and attacked
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Marsh. Marsh held for a time, but one by one, the Federal regiments broke
and retreated. The 14th Ohio Light Artillery Battery was in Marsh’s line
and was captured when Marsh retreated. Veatch’s brigade, in line behind
Marsh, could not open re because Marsh’s men were retreating through
its ranks. The combination of Marsh’s men and the Confederates soon had
Veatch falling back as well. The center of McClernand’s line was pierced.
Soon after Wood defeated Marsh, Shaver’s brigade attacked Hare. Hare’s
men did not stand long; they red one volley and ed.
On the Confederate left, the brigades of Johnson, Russell, and Ander-
son attacked. Russell and Johnson attacked Raith as he was organizing,
and Raith was shot in the leg as his line crumbled. Raith was left behind
and died on 11 April. Anderson’s brigade and part of Russell’s fell on
Sherman’s confused line that was soon again retreating.
McDowell’s brigade had not yet reached Sherman’s new line when
COL Preston Pond’s brigade from Ruggles’ division of Bragg’s corps at-
tacked him at Ben Howell Field. McDowell was holding Pond when he
received a message from Sherman to retreat to the north. He was able to
break contact and was soon heading north again.
The Confederates had now defeated Prentiss’, Sherman’s, and Mc-
Clernand’s divisions, but the pace of the battle was great and the Confed-
erates again paused. Units from different corps were intermingled, men
were exhausted and out of ammunition, and McClernand’s camps were
fresh for the taking. As Sherman and McClernand withdrew, they were
not pursued.
Vignette: Henry Stanley continued the attack with Shaver’s brigade.
He fell behind his unit, and as he tried to catch up, he found the debris
of battle: “My company was not in sight. I was grateful for the rest, and
crawled feebly to a tree, and plunging my hand into my haversack, ate
ravenously. Within half an hour, feeling renovated, I struck north in the
direction which my regiment had taken, over a ground strewn with bodies
and the debris of war. . . . Close by . . . a young lieutenant, who, judging
by the new gloss on his uniform, must have been some father’s darling. A
clean bullet hole through the center of his forehead had instantly ended his
career. A little further were some twenty bodies, lying in various postures,
each by its own pool of viscous blood, which emitted a peculiar scent,
which was new to me, but which I have since learned is inseparable from
a battleeld. Beyond these, a still larger group lay, body overlying body,
knees crooked, arms erect, or wide-stretched and rigid, according as the
last spasm overtook them. . . . For it was the rst Field of Glory I had
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seen in my May of life, and the rst time that Glory sickened me with its
repulsive aspect, and made me suspect it was all a glittering lie.” (Private
Henry Stanley, 6th Arkansas, in Henry M. Stanley, The Autobiography of
Sir Henry Morton Stanley, Cambridge, MA: Riverside Press, 1909, 194-
95.)
Teaching point 1: Coordination. How are Sherman and McClernand
coordinating their actions? Who should be coordinating these? How are
the Confederate units coordinating? Who should be coordinating their at-
tack?
Teaching point 2: Momentum. How could the Confederates have
maintained their momentum? Was the loss of momentum critical at this
point?
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79
Map 11.
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79
Map 12.
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81
Stand 6
Jones Field
Directions: Go west on Hamburg-Purdy Road for .4 mile. Turn right
(north) on TN 22 and go 1.1 miles. Pull off in the turnout by the Hare
Headquarters Monument. Dismount and move to the cannon in the center
of the eld. You are now in Jones Field.
Description: Sherman’s and McClernand’s troops had fallen back in
disarray in the vicinity of Jones Field. One of Sherman’s brigades (Hil-
debrand) had been routed and left the eld, another (Marsh) was greatly
disorganized and trying to regroup, but McDowell’s brigade was relatively
fresh. McClernand’s troops were also disorganized but regrouping, wisely
using the time the Confederates had given them. The Confederates were
still busy plundering captured camps and reorganizing after seizing Sher-
man’s and McClernand’s camps.
Sherman rst placed a collection of nine cannons from three batteries
in Jones Field to shell the Confederates. Sherman and McClernand met
and decided that since their troops were intermingled and disorganized,
they would divide the battleeld into sectors. Sherman would command
on the right and McClernand on the left. Additionally, the two decided the
time was right to counterattack the Confederates. At 1230 they attacked.
Sherman and McClernand’s counterattack slammed into the unpre-
pared Confederates. The Union troops drove the Confederates out of
Marsh’s captured camps and continued south until they reached Woolf
Field where they halted and dressed the lines. Beauregard, Hardee, and
Polk were surprised by this attack and moved to organize a defense. As
Hardee and Polk formed their lines, Beauregard ordered his last Re-
serve brigade forward. COL Robert Trabue’s brigade from the Reserve
corps had been following the attack all morning and was fresh. Trabue’s
fresh regiments and other recently reorganized units fought the stubborn
Union troops. At 1400, after almost 1 hour of close ghting, Sherman and
McClernand’s troops were near breaking and ordered to fall back to Jones
Field again. The Confederates cautiously pursued.
The Union troops made a short stand in Jones Field but again decided
to fall back. Earlier Sherman and McClernand had selected positions
along the Hamburg-Savannah Road as a strong contingency position. The
ground there was defensible, and Sherman wanted to secure the bridge
over Snake Creek for Lew Wallace’s division, which he expected to arrive
soon.
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As Sherman and McClernand formed their new line the Confederates
launched an attack on the Union ank with Pond’s brigade and a small
cavalry battalion, COL John A. Wharton’s Texas Rangers. Pond’s men
wore uniforms that the State of Louisiana issued, which were blue. As
Pond formed, other Confederates mistakenly red into his blue-clad men,
causing casualties and disorganizing the unit. Once the unit recovered,
Pond attacked but was repulsed. Wharton’s Texas Rangers also attacked
but were driven off.
Sherman and McClernand now were in a position with the Tennessee
River at their backs. They could not withdraw much farther. Their counter-
attack at 1200 had bought time for Grant and some of the other command-
ers on the eld. As the Union troops reorganized, many of the Confederate
units they had been ghting moved to a new focal point—Union troops in
the Hornet’s Nest.
Vignette: The soldiers in Pond’s brigade wore blue jackets that the
State of Louisiana issued to them. On two occasions they were red on by
their own troops. COL Pond reported on the effects of this “friendly re”:
“The left of the brigade was immediately thrown forward and the whole
put in motion at double-quick to cut him off, and the movement would,
without doubt, have been successful, but when nearly across the eld a
deadly re was received from our own forces on the right, killing and
wounding several of the Eighteenth Regiment Louisiana Volunteers, under
the command of Colonel Mouton. Not knowing at rst from whence the
re was directed, and feeling that I might have passed some of the enemy’s
forces, the brigade was halted and thrown back 100 yards, to the edge of
the woods.” COL Preston Pond, Brigade Commander, Ruggles’ division,
Bragg’s corps, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Ofcial
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, hereafter cited as OR, vol.
10, part 1, 517.)
Teaching point 1: Seizing the initiative. Were Sherman and McCler-
nand correct in attacking, or should they have spent the time preparing a
strong defensive position?
Teaching point 2: Reorganization. What was the effect of reorganiza-
tion or a lack of it to the battle at this point?
Teaching point 3: Fratricide. What was the effect of fratricide on
Pond’s brigade? Could it have been prevented? How do we prevent it
today?
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Map 13.
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Stand 7
Lew Wallace’s Division
Directions: Continue north on TN 22 for .5 mile. Turn right (east)
toward the Visitor Center. Drive to the pullout 100 meters ahead, park, and
dismount. Walk back toward the intersection and stop just short of it. The
road across TN 22 is the road where Lew Wallace’s division arrived.
Description: On 13 March 1862 Lew Wallace and his division dis-
patched from transports at Crump’s Landing. His original mission was to
damage the Mobile and Ohio Railroad at Bethel Station. Wallace had two
battalions of cavalry assigned to his division. He sent the battalion from
the 5th Ohio Cavalry to damage the railroad, and it eventually tore up 150
feet of trestle before returning to its camps (the Confederates repaired the
damage the next day). While on the raid, the cavalry learned that there
was a large Confederate force nearby, so Wallace was ordered to remain
while the rest of the Army went into camp around Pittsburg Landing.
Wallace disposed his troops with COL Charles Whittlesey’s 3d Brigade
at Adamsville, COL John Thayer’s 2d Brigade at Stoney Lonesome, and
COL Morgan Smith’s 1st Brigade and division headquarters at Crump’s
Landing. Wallace was concerned because his division was isolated from
the rest of the Army. Believing that any reinforcements coming to his aid
would come from the end of the line (Sherman), Wallace decided to pre-
pare the Shunpike, a small, dirt road, that ran from Sherman’s camp to
Stoney Lonesome. In late March Wallace had his cavalry recon and repair
the Shunpike toward Sherman’s camps.
At 0600, 6 April a sentinel woke Wallace and told him he heard ring
to the south. Believing an attack to the south could mean a Confederate
offensive, Wallace decided to concentrate his division at Stoney Lone-
some in case the Confederates attacked from Purdy. He maintained a
headquarters boat at Crump’s Landing and moved there anticipating
that orders would soon come. At 0830 Grant arrived at Crump’s Landing
aboard his headquarters boat, the Tigress. Grant did not disembark, but he
moored to Wallace’s boat and the two conferred across the rails of their
respective boats. Grant told Wallace to be prepared to move to the south
on a moment’s notice. Wallace told Grant that he had already ordered his
division concentrated and would wait for orders. When Grant left Wallace
moved his headquarters to Stoney Lonesome. Before he departed he left a
horse at Crump’s Landing for any of Grant’s staff ofcers who might ar-
rive by boat with orders.
When Grant arrived at Pittsburg Landing and determined the seriousness
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of the situation, he ordered his Assistant Adjutant General Captain John
Rawlins to send Chief Quartermaster Captain A.S. Baxter to Crump’s
Landing to order Wallace’s division forward. When Rawlins gave Baxter
the instructions, Baxter thought it best that orders be written, so Rawlins
went on the Tigress, found a scrap of paper and a pencil, and drafted the
orders. Baxter immediately departed on the Tigress, arriving at Crump’s
Landing at 1100. There he found the horse Wallace left and rode to Stoney
Lonesome, arriving at 1130. Baxter handed the order to Wallace, who read
it and said he was prepared to move. Baxter returned to the Tigress, and
Wallace handed the order to one of his staff ofcers, Captain Frederick
Kneer, who put it under his sword belt. Sometime during the day the
orders fell out of the belt, an event that would haunt Wallace for the rest
of his life.
After the battle there was a controversy about Wallace’s movements
to the battle. Grant and his staff ofcers said the order told Wallace to take
“the road nearest to and parallel with the river.” Wallace and his staff of-
cers, however, said the order told them to “come up and take position on
the right of the Army.” Regardless, Wallace decided to move his division
down the Shunpike as he had planned.
Baxter had given the order to Wallace at 1130, and after allowing his
troops a quick meal (another decision drawing criticism later), Wallace
was marching by 1200. Grant had expected Wallace to arrive quickly since
he was only 5 miles away and throughout the day sent orderlies to hurry
Wallace. One cavalry lieutenant reported that Wallace would not move un-
less he had written orders. Grant sent Captain W.R. Rowley of his staff to
determine the situation with Wallace and to hurry him up.
Rowley found Wallace on the Shunpike at 1400. Rowley told Wallace
that the cavalry lieutenant reported that Wallace would not move with-
out written orders. “That’s a damn lie!” was Wallace’s response. Rowley
then asked Wallace why he was using the Shunpike. Wallace responded
that this was the route to Sherman and McClernand’s camps. Rowley
pulled Wallace aside and informed him that Sherman and McClernand
had been pushed back almost to the river. Wallace was troubled by this
news. Rowley then told Wallace that he was needed at Pittsburg Landing.
Wallace countermarched his troops (instead of turning around he had the
lead troops march back through the next in line). Wallace said he did this
because he wanted his best troops in the front; but valuable time was lost.
Back at Pittsburg Landing Grant could not imagine what was keeping
Wallace. At 1430 he sent Lieutenant Colonel James McPherson from his
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staff to hurry Wallace. Between 1530 and 1600 McPherson found Wallace.
McPherson told Wallace that he was needed quickly and wondered why
the lead elements were now halted. Wallace said he was allowing the trail
elements time to close up because Grant “wanted the division, not part of
it.”
Lew Wallace did not arrive at the battleeld until after dark on 6
April. Due to the vague orders and Wallace’s marching decisions, the 3d
Division’s 5,800 men did not ght that day. For the rest of his life Wallace
would have to defend his actions on 6 April. Why did he take the Shun-
pike? Why did he let his soldiers eat before they marched? Why did he
countermarch? Why was he so slow?
Vignette: Grant vented his feelings about Wallace in a letter written
soon after the battle: “Had General Wallace been relieved from duty in the
morning, and the same orders communicated to Brigadier General Mor-
gan L. Smith (who would have been his successor), I do not doubt but the
division would have been on the eld of battle in the engagement before
10 o’clock of that eventful 6
th
of April. There is no estimating the differ-
ence this might have made in our casualties.” (MG U.S. Grant to COL J.C.
Kelton, 13 April 1863, in O.R., vol. 10, part 1, 178.)
For the rest of his life Wallace had to defend his actions: “Apropos
of my failure to get to the eld Sunday, the rst day of the battle, various
statements have appeared in the earlier histories of the war. Some say I
lost my way; others that I took the wrong road; others that the march was
circuitous owing to a guide. Some deal with me in a friendly spirit; others
maliciously. I give the facts, and beg to be judged by them.” (Lew Wallace,
Lew Wallace: An Autobiography, New York, 1906, 469.)
Teaching point 1: Clarity of orders. Could Wallace’s confusion have
been prevented? How do you ensure verbal orders are clear and concise?
Teaching point 2: Unit selection. Wallace could have just turned his
men around when he changed routes. Instead, he had the lead brigade pass
through the trailing units so he had the best brigade leading. Is it accept-
able for commanders to select certain units for the “hard” missions?
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Map 14.
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Stand 8
Spain Field
We now shift to the actions on the Confederate right/Union left and go
back to the early morning. This “jump in time” is required because of the
road conditions in the park today.
Directions: Make a U-turn and head south on TN 22 for 3.3 miles.
In the town of Shiloh, TN, 22 turns to the right, but you continue straight
on TN 142 East for .3 mile past the intersection. Turn left (east) on Bark
Road. After 1 mile, bear to the left (north) at the Y intersection (Bark
Road becomes Gladden Road). Go .7 mile and park by the Gladden death
marker. Spain Field is to your east.
Description: COL Madison Miller commanded the 2d Brigade of
Prentiss’ 6th Division. His brigade was composed of regiments that were
newly arrived to the Army of the Tennessee. One had only joined the Army
the previous day. Miller was having breakfast as his troops prepared for
an inspection at 0900 when Prentiss rode rapidly into the camp shouting,
“Colonel Miller, get out your brigade!” By 0730 Miller had formed his
three regiments along the northern edge of Spain Field. Prentiss did not
approve of the position and ordered Miller to advance to the southern edge
of the eld, which he did reluctantly. The 5th Ohio Battery and 1st Min-
nesota Battery unlimbered in the northwest corner of the eld.
BG Adley H. Gladden commanded a brigade in BG Jones Withers’
division of Bragg’s corps. When the Army of the Mississippi formed for
its attack, Gladden had been moved to Hardee’s front line to cover the
Army’s ank along Lick Creek. Gladden advanced with the rest of the
Army, but the difcult terrain ruined his alignment. Withers soon realized
Gladden’s troops could not extend all the way to Lick Creek, so he ordered
BG James Chalmers’ brigade from the second line to the rst to extend his
line to Lick Creek. At 0800 Gladden’s troops approached Spain Field. The
brigade quickly fell into disarray because of the swampy condition of the
ground. Immediately, Miller’s troops opened re on Gladden. Gladden’s
troops slowly fell back and engaged in long-range ring with the Union
troops.
Surprisingly, Prentiss ordered Miller to withdraw to his original posi-
tion along the northern edge of the eld because of Peabody’s difculties
on Miller’s right ank. As Miller fell back, the 15th Michigan Infantry
arrived. They had reached Pittsburg Landing the day before and had been
assigned to Prentiss’ division. They advanced and took position on the left
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of Miller’s line. Unfortunately, the 15th Michigan had never been issued
ammunition! They went into the line armed only with bayonets.
Seeing the Union troops falling back, Gladden ordered a charge. As
Gladden was watching the attack from his horse, a shell exploded over
him, nearly severing his left arm. Gladden would die in Corinth on 12
April. Command of the brigade passed to COL Daniel Adams. Adams
continued across the eld, but the artillery’s canister and the infantry’s
small-arms re forced the Confederates back to the southern edge of the
eld.
In response, the Confederates brought up an artillery battery to duel
with the Federal artillery. As soon as their re was effective, Adams or-
dered another charge. The Confederate attack forced Miller’s troops to
retreat, leaving his artillery unsupported. One of the batteries lost two
cannons, and both batteries were able to escape only through Herculean
efforts.
Miller attempted to reform his regiments in their camps, but at 0830
Chalmers, brigade joined the ght on Gladden’s (now Adams’) right.
Chalmers had a difcult time getting into position because of the rough
terrain. Nevertheless, the combined attack broke Miller’s brigade, and by
0900 Prentiss’ division was shattered and streaming north toward Pitts-
burg Landing.
Vignette: A soldier in Gladden’s brigade described the action: “The
21st Ala. & the 1st La. suffered more than any other Reg’t engaged. Gen.
Gladden’s left arm was taken off about the rst re & Col. Adams of the
1st La. took com’d. Soon afterwards Maj. Armstead fell by a grape shot
thro’ his bowell [sic]. In a few minutes more Col. Deas rec’d a slight
wound in his left hand. Then Col. Adams had his horse shot from under
him while leading a charge. He soon rec’d a severe wound in the head &
Col. Deas took command of the brigade & not long afterwards had his
horse killed & rec’d a wound in his—arm & one, I beleive [sic], in his hip,
tho’ neither of them at all serious. On both sides the slaughter was heavy
until the Com’d to charge was given & as soon as our columns began to
move the enemy ed & our forces took possession of their camp. Here was
a perfect curiosity shop. Every thing in the eating & wearing line, in fact
every tent told of high & extravagant living.” (Sergeant Horatio Wiley,
22d Alabama Infantry in Horatio Wiley, letter to “My Dear Josie,” 11 April
1862 in the collection of the Northeast Mississippi Museum Association,
Corinth, Mississippi.)
Teaching point 1: Succession of command. What was the effect of
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Gladden’s death? How do you prepare for a change of commander during
a ght?
Teaching point 2: Battle command. Was Prentiss a help or a hindrance?
Should he have ordered Miller to change positions?
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Map 15.
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Stand 9
Stuart’s Brigade
Directions: Continue north on Gladden Road for .1 mile. Bear right
(north) on Eastern Corinth Road for .5 mile. Turn right (east) on Hamburg-
Purdy Road for .7 mile. Turn into the service road on the left and stop by
Stuart’s Headquarters Monument. You are now in Larkin Bell Field.
Description: When Sherman disembarked his division at Pittsburg
Landing on 17 March he took most of his troops to the vicinity of Shiloh
Church. Sherman left COL David Stuart’s 2d Brigade to guard the Lick
Creek ford on the Hamburg-Savannah Road. Stuart placed his three regi-
ments in camps around Larkin Bell Field.
After routing Miller’s brigade at Spain Field, Chalmers continued his
attack. BG John K. Jackson was ordered to bring his men up from the
second line to ll a gap that had occurred between Gladden and Chalm-
ers. These brigades now approached the Union troops around Sarah Bell’s
Cotton Field.
Early in the day Bragg had sent his engineer, Captain Samuel Lock-
ett, to conduct a reconnaissance of the Union left. Lockett found Stuart’s
brigade around Larkin Bell Field and concluded that it was a Union divi-
sion. Concerned for the safety of the Confederate right ank, Lockett sent
messages to General Johnston informing him of this Union “division.”
Johnston immediately sent a message to Beauregard telling him to send
Breckinridge’s corps to the right. Johnston also sent an order to Chalmers
and Jackson to disengage and move to the right. At 0930 Chalmers and
Jackson easily broke contact and took the Bark Road to the right.
Stuart heard the ring to the west early in the morning, and when
Prentiss sent him a message that he was under attack, Stuart put his men
in the line of battle. He placed skirmishers at the ford and along Locust
Grove Run. Stuart spread the rest of his brigade on the line from McCuller
Field to Larkin Bell Field. Having sent his battery away as part of the artil-
lery reorganization, he had no artillery.
At 1000 Jackson and Chalmers began forming their lines. Addition-
ally, they placed an artillery battery to support their advance. At 1100 they
attacked. Stuart’s brigade performed poorly from the start. His right regi-
ment broke quickly when faced with Jackson’s advancing troops. On the
left the units put up a little better ght, but they were soon routed and ed
to the rear. Stuart was wounded while trying to rally his men.
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The Confederates had mostly cleared the Union troops from the
right (Union reinforcements were approaching), but a path to Pittsburg
Landing was open. All the Confederates had to do was reinforce the at-
tack and they would accomplish their plan of turning the Union Army
away from Pittsburg Landing. With victory in their grasp, the Confed-
erates faltered. Chalmers’ men were out of ammunition, and there were
no ordnance wagons nearby. Jackson’s men plundered Stuart’s camps
and could not be reformed; Breckinridge’s corps had not arrived at the
right.
Vignette: On 7 April Dr. B.J.D. Irwin, 4th Division, Army of the Ohio,
established one of the rst ever tent eld hospitals. He recounted: “During
the military movements of troops during the battle of Shiloh, one of the
operating hospitals was moved forward to a deserted farmhouse situated
on an open piece of unbroken ground. The presence of a spring of cool
potable water and the nearness of the building to a branch of the creek
were advantages that were promptly recognized. . . . The proximity of this
eld hospital to the recaptured camp of a division of our troops defeated
and made prisoner the preceding day, suggested the utilization of the aban-
doned tents for the benet of the wounded; and as soon as the battle ceased
the hospital tents, commissary tents, and wall tents pertaining thereto were
accordingly taken possession of, and in short space of time were removed
to and pitched in regular order on the level ground by which the house was
surrounded. The building afforded an operating room, dispensary, ofce,
kitchen, and dining room. Long into the night the ambulances continued
to bring in the wounded, who, after receiving the necessary professional
attendance, were made as comfortable as possible being supplied with
an abundance of warm food, good bedding, and shelter from inclement
weather. Next day the hospital camp was enlarged as to accommodate
300 patients, and the tents were systematically arranged; all bedsteads,
cots, bedding, cooking and messing utensils, hay and straw found in the
abandoned camp were taken possession of, and on the evening of the 8th
the Division Medical Purveyor reached us with our medical supplies and
hospital stores. . . . It soon became manifest that the wounded in this im-
provised eld hospital were better provided for and more comfortable in
every way than those who were moved aboard the hospital transports.”
(Report of Dr. B.J.D. Irwin in Medical and Surgical History of the War of
the Rebellion, vol. II, part III, 1883, 921-22.)
Teaching point 1: Reconnaissance. Should the Confederates have
known the disposition of the Union left before the battle? What was the
effect of Lockett’s report of a division?
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Teaching point 2: Reserves. Was Breckinridge’s corps in the correct
position? Were the Confederate dispositions faulty if the plan was to turn
the Union left?
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Map 16.
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Map 17.
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Stand 10
The Peach Orchard
Directions: Depart the service road and bear right (north) on Ham-
burg-Savannah Road for .2 mile. Turn right (east) toward Johnston’s death
marker. Dismount and walk west across the road into Sarah Bell Field.
Depart the service road and turn right (north) on Hamburg-Savannah
Road for .2 mile. Turn left (west) into the parking lot. Dismount and walk
to the W. Manse George cabin. Sarah Bell Field is to your south, and the
Peach Orchard is to your east.
Description: At 0730 Sherman sent a request for assistance to BG
Stephen A. Hurlbut, commander of the 4th Division. Hurlbut dispatched
his 2d Brigade under COL James Veatch and formed his remaining two
brigades in the vicinity of their camps. At 0800 Hurlbut received another
request for aid, this time from Prentiss. Hurlbut immediately had his com-
mand on the Hamburg-Savannah Road. As Hurlbut’s men advanced, they
ran into survivors from Prentiss’ division who were full of tales of despair
and doom. Hurlbut immediately ordered his men into line where they
were, in Sarah Bell Field. COL Nelson Williams formed his 1st Brigade
facing south while BG Jacob G. Lauman formed on Williams’ right and
oriented west. Hurlbut assigned a battery to each infantry brigade and
placed a third, his best, at the seam between the infantry units.
Three Confederate brigades—Gladden (now under Deas), Jackson,
and Chalmers—formed to attack. The Confederates unlimbered a bat-
tery, and one of its rst shots wounded Williams, who was replaced by
COL Isaac Pugh. The Confederate battery also caused one of the Union
batteries to break and run. At 0930 the three Confederate brigades began
their attack. Before they could get far a staff ofcer from Johnston ordered
Jackson and Chalmers to move to the right to attack the Union “divi-
sion” there. Gladden’s brigade, however, continued the attack. It ran into
Lauman’s troops and soon drifted to the east, right in front of Williams’
brigade. Soon, the Confederates were retreating, but Pugh, fearing an at-
tack on his left ank, ordered his men to the north side of the eld. Hurlbut
had no choice but to withdraw Lauman as well.
At the moment, Gladden’s brigade was the only Confederate brigade
fronting Sarah Bell Field, and there was a pause in the action. Prentiss
used this time to rally some individual regiments and formed them on the
right of Hurlbut. Again, the Federals gained valuable time during the Con-
federates’ suspended action.
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When Johnston had ordered Jackson and Chalmers to the right he
also instructed Beauregard to send the Reserve corps to the right. Breck-
inridge brought up two of his three brigades (the third had been sent to the
Confederate left). Additionally, COL William H. Stephens’ brigade from
Polk’s corps, badly depleted after an assault on the Hornet’s Nest (which
we will discuss at the next stand), moved into position south of Sarah Bell
Field.
About 1030 Union BG John McArthur brought part of his brigade
(three of the ve regiments were detached) from W.H.L. Wallace’s divi-
sion to the Union left and went into position on Hurlbut’s left. The survi-
vors of Stuart’s brigade formed on McArthur’s left. At 1100 Jackson and
Chalmers, fresh from routing Stuart’s brigade, attacked McArthur and
Stuart. For the next 2 hours, they tried to defeat the Union troops but were
unsuccessful in every attack. At 1230 BG John Bowen’s brigade and COL
Wineld Statham’s brigade of Breckinridge’s Reserve corps joined the
attack. The attacks were all uncoordinated and piecemeal, and therefore
were unsuccessful.
At 1330 Breckinridge told Johnston that his men would not attack
anymore. Johnston rode around the lines encouraging the men and coordi-
nating the attack. At 1400 everything was nally ready for a coordinated at-
tack. Five Confederate brigades—Stephens, Statham, Bowen, Jackson, and
Chalmers—attacked. Leading this attack were the highest-ranking eld
general in the Confederacy, Johnston; former Vice President of the United
States Breckinridge; and the Governor of Tennessee, Isham G. Harris.
On the Confederate left, Stephens’ brigade met a terrible re from
the Union troops. The troops pressed on, but the re was too much and
Stephens’ men retreated. Statham’s men entered the eld and were able to
push Hurlbut’s men back but could not break them. On the Confederate
right, the combined efforts of Bowen’s and Jackson’s men were too much
for the battered men of Stuart’s brigade who retreated. McArthur’s ank
was now exposed, and the Confederates exploited this. Soon McArthur
was falling back, exposing Hurlbut’s ank. McArthur and Stuart tried to
rally their men, but both were wounded and their brigades ed. Hurlbut’s
troops fell back to Wicker Field, but with three Confederate brigades
poised to attack their ank, the men did not hold and started to retreat.
Prentiss’ survivors now had their left ank exposed. Prentiss refused
his ank, and the men formed a new line facing east. The way to Pittsburg
Landing was again open, but the Confederates slowly started to surround
the Union troops to the west.
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Vignette: Separated from his regiment and ghting with McArthur’s
brigade, 16-year-old musician John A. Cockerill stopped to help a com-
rade during the retreat: “Just by my side ran a youthful soldier, perhaps
three years my senior, who might, for all I knew, have been recruited as I
was. I heard him give a scream of agony, and, turning, saw him dragging
one of his legs, which I saw in an instant had been shattered by a bullet. He
had dropped his rie, and as I ran to his support he fell upon my shoulder
and begged me for God’s sake to help him. I half carried him for some dis-
tance. . . . All this time, the bullets were whistling more ercely than at any
time during the engagement, and the woods were lled with ying men,
who, to all appearances, had no intention of rallying on that side of the
Tennessee River. My companion was growing weaker all the while, and
nally I set him down beside a tree, with his back toward the enemy, and
watched him for a few moments, until I saw that he was slowly bleeding to
death. I knew nothing of surgery at that time and did not even know how
to staunch the ow of blood. I called to a soldier who was passing, but he
gave no heed. A second came, stood for a moment, simply remarked, ‘He’s
a dead man’ and passed on. I saw the poor fellow die without being able
to render the slightest assistance.” (John A. Cockerill, “A Boy at Shiloh,”
published in C.R. Graham, Under Both Flags: A Panorama of the Great
Civil War, San Francisco: J. Dewing Co., 1896, 368.)
Teaching point 1: Synchronization. Did the Confederates have enough
combat power to defeat the Union troops at this location? If so, why did it
take them so long?
Teaching point 2: Battle command. Was Johnston commanding the
Army well? Should he have coordinated the attacks sooner?
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Stand 11
Johnston’s Death
Directions: Recross the road (east) toward Johnston’s death marker
and walk toward the gully southeast of the marker.
Description: Johnston had been active the entire morning. He spent
most of his time on the Confederate right, supervising activities there. At
0900 he rode into the recently captured camp of Miller’s brigade. Seeing
a Confederate ofcer carrying an armful of trophies, Johnston clamored,
“None of that sir; we are not here for plunder!” Johnston regretted the
strong rebuke and picking up a tin cup said, “Let this be my share of the
spoils today.”
After ordering Jackson and Chalmers to the far right, Johnston moved
there. Early in the afternoon Breckinridge rode to Johnston and told him he
had could not get his men to make a charge. Johnston rode in front of BG
John Bowen’s brigade, and with the tin cup he had “captured,” Johnston
tapped the soldiers’ bayonets and told them, “I want you to show General
Breckinridge and General Bragg what you can do with your bayonets and
tooth picks.”
At one point Johnston led an attack part of the way. During the charge,
his uniform was shot through, and the sole of one of his boots was shot
partially away. He was also nicked in the shoulder. After the attack, John-
ston told Tennessee Governor Harris, a volunteer aide, “Governor, they
came very near putting me hors de combat in that charge.”
At 1415 Harris, recently returned from carrying on an order from
Johnston, looked over at the army commander and noticed that he was
pale and ready to fall from the saddle. Harris rode over, grabbed Johnston,
and asked, “General, are you wounded?” Johnston replied, “Yes and I fear
seriously.” Harris, with the help of other staff ofcers, moved Johnston
to the cover of the gully and took him from his horse. The staff ofcers
ripped open Johnston’s coat and shirt trying to nd the wound. BG Wil-
liam Preston was a Johnston staff ofcer who was also his brother-in-law.
Preston held Johnston’s head and yelled, “Johnston, don’t you know me?”
At 1430 Johnston was dead.
Johnston had been shot in the back of the right knee. The bullet had
severed an artery in his leg. Johnston had earlier dispatched his personal
surgeon to help with the massive number of wounded. Ironically, the gen-
eral had a life-saving tourniquet in his pocket, but no one knew about it.
The exact time that Johnston was wounded is unknown. Johnston had very
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poor sensation in his right leg because of an old dueling wound. He may
have been hit while leading the charge or by a stray shot later. Who red
the shot is also unknown. The fatal bullet came from an Eneld rie, a
weapon that both sides used on this part of the eld.
Members of Johnston’s staff wrapped his body, hiding his identity so
his loss would not damage morale and started it back to Corinth. Staff
ofcers quickly rode to Beauregard at the intersection of the Pittsburg-
Corinth Road and Purdy-Hamburg Road and told him of Johnston’s death.
Beauregard was now commander of the Army of the Mississippi.
Vignette: Governor Harris recalled telling Beauregard of Johnston’s
death: “Immediately after the death of Albert Sydney Johnston I hur-
riedly sought out General Beauregard, whom I found sitting on his horse
at Shiloh Church, and to whom I reported the death of General Johnston.
General Beauregard said nothing in reply to my announcement for some
moments but seemed to be in a deep study. He then said, ‘Well Governor,
everything is progressing well, is it not?’ I answered that it was as far as
my observation extended and then turned my horse and rode away.” (W.B.
Ellis, “Who Lost Shiloh to the Confederacy?” Confederate Veteran, vol.
22, 1914, 313.)
Teaching point 1: Commander’s location. Should Johnston have been
leading charges and placing himself in such a dangerous position? Should
Johnston have been a commander or a leader (and what is the difference)?
Teaching point 2: First aid. Could Johnston’s death have been pre-
vented? How do you have enough medically trained personnel without
reducing the number of ghters?
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Map 18.
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Map 19.
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Stand 12
The Hornet’s Nest
Directions: Depart the parking lot and turn left (north) on Hamburg-
Savannah Road. Bloody Pond is on your left. (During the battle, wounded
soldiers of both sides, in an attempt to quench their thirst, made their way
to this pond. Their blood turned the water red, and it has forever been
known as “Bloody Pond.”) Travel .7 mile on Hamburg-Savannah Road.
Turn left (southwest) on Corinth-Pittsburg Landing Road for .5 mile. Park
at the pullout on the right. Dismount and walk east on the Sunken Road,
over the bridge to the 7th Iowa Monument. You are on the Sunken Road
looking into Duncan Field. The Sunken Road was a farm road that had
settled lower than the surrounding terrain because of the excessive weight
of the farmer’s wagons that traveled the road.
Description: After dispatching McArthur’s brigade to the Union left,
BG W.H.L. Wallace had the remaining two brigades of his division on the
road by 0900. He moved his men forward and formed on Hurlbut’s right
along a slightly sunken road that bordered Duncan Field. Wallace placed
COL Thomas G. Sweeny’s understrength brigade (only two regiments; the
rest were in reserve and were sent to the Union left) to the right and COL
James Tuttle’s brigade to the left. Wallace was in position behind a brush-
covered fence at 1000. Soon survivors from Prentiss’ division lled in a
gap between Wallace and Hurlbut.
At 0920 Beauregard, while moving his headquarters, spotted COL
William Stephens’ brigade of Cheatham’s division and Polk’s corps.
Beauregard ordered Cheatham to move the brigade toward the center of
the line. At 1000 Cheatham had Stephens in position on the west end of
Duncan Field. Observing Union troops across the eld, Cheatham ordered
a charge. Stephens’ brigade was slaughtered as it crossed the eld; Union
artillery and infantry re tore large gaps in the lines. Stephens’ men made
it halfway across the eld before they had to retreat. Stephens withdrew
and moved to the Confederate right.
By 1100 the Confederate corps commanders realized that corps integrity
was lost. Bragg and Polk decided on their own to divide the battleeld into
sectors: Bragg would command the right, Polk the center, and Hardee the
left. Each corps commander would command the troops in his sector regard-
less of their original organization. At 1130 3,500 Confederate troops from
four brigades—all of Shaver’s and parts of Cleburne’s, Wood’s, and Stew-
art’s) made a second attack. Their line stretched from Eastern Corinth Road
to Corinth Road. This second attack faltered along the edge of the eld.
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After reorganizing the command structure, Bragg found COL Randal
L. Gibson’s brigade from BG Daniel Ruggles’ division. Bragg immedi-
ately ordered Gibson to attack. At 1200 Gibson formed his four regiments
and advanced. Unfamiliar with the terrain, Gibson advanced his men
through a thicket by a streambed. The men stumbled forward through the
rough terrain until they were right on top of the Union line. Suddenly the
Union troops arose and blasted Gibson’s men. Almost immediately the
survivors of this “ambush” retreated in haste.
At 1215 Grant and his escort arrived at Prentiss’ location. After re-
ceiving Prentiss’ report, Grant told him to “maintain that position at all
hazards.” Grant additionally promised that Lew Wallace’s division would
soon arrive.
As soon as Gibson had fallen back, Bragg immediately ordered the
brigade to try again. Many troops and leaders thought it was suicide, but
they followed orders. At 1230 Gibson attacked again along the same line.
Gibson’s troops reached the Union lines and ghting was hand to hand.
Local Union counterattacks and effective canister re forced Gibson back
again. A re broke out in front of the Union positions, and many wounded
men who could not escape burned to death in front of the Union troops
who were powerless to rescue them.
As Gibson withdrew for a second time, some of the regimental com-
manders recommended to Bragg that they try to ank the position. Bragg
would have none of that and ordered Gibson to make a third attack. Gibson
and his regimental commanders led the men back across the eld at 1300
and again were repulsed. Major James Powell, the leader of the patrol that
started the battle that morning in Fraley Field, was mortally wounded dur-
ing this attack.
For a fourth time Bragg ordered Gibson back across the eld. Appar-
ently enraged that the attacks had all failed, Bragg sent staff ofcers to
the regiments to encourage them, aggravating their commanders. At 1400
Gibson’s troops attacked Sunken Road for the fourth time. By this stage
of the battle, Gibson’s men had become demoralized, and the attack ended
very soon after it started. During these attacks, Gibson lost more than 25
percent of his men, whose bodies now littered Duncan Field and adjoining
woods.
At 1430 Bragg located COL R.G. Shaver who was in command of
Hindman’s brigade of Hardee’s corps. Bragg ordered him to assault the
Sunken Road. Shaver’s troops slammed into Tuttle and Prentiss and soon
retreated.
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COL Sweeny, encouraged by the Confederate repulses, led his two
regiments across Duncan Field and ran into the eighth Confederate assault
in that spot for the day. This time BG Patton Anderson’s brigade from
Ruggles’ division of Bragg’s corps attacked. Like the seven previous at-
tacks, this one also failed.
From 1030 to 1530 the Confederates had attacked the Union troops
of W.H.L. Wallace and Prentiss along the Sunken Road eight times. All of
the attacks were uncoordinated, had minimal artillery support, and were
piecemeal. The re was so severe that the Confederates said the re re-
minded them of hornets ying by their heads. They would forever call this
part of the eld the Hornet’s Nest. At 1530 the Union troops in the center
were still holding on, but over the next few hours, the situation would
change.
Vignette: Captain Andrew Hickenlooper, 5th Ohio Light Artillery
described the action in the Hornet’s Nest: “Quickly came the orders sharp
and clear: ‘Shrapnel,’ ‘Two seconds,’ ‘One second,’ ‘canister.’ Then, as
the enemy made preparations for their nal dash, ‘double canister’ was
delivered with such rapidity that the separate discharges blended into
one continuous roar. Then the supporting infantry, rising from their re-
cumbent position, sent forth a sheet of ame and leaden hail that elicited
curses, shrieks, groans and shouts, all blended into an appalling cry. . . .
Again and again, through long and trying hours, this dance of death went
on, at frequent intervals, from 9 in the morning until 4 in the afternoon,
thus gradually sapping the energies of these heroic men, who had borne
the heat and burden of the fateful day with a courage unparalleled in the
annals of the Civil War.” (Andrew Hickenlooper, “The Battle of Shiloh,”
Sketches of War History, vol. V, Wilmington, NC: Broadfoot Publishing
Co., 1903, 420).
Teaching point 1: Mass and synchronization. How did this small
Union force defeat eight attacks by ve Confederate brigades? Who
should have coordinated the Confederate attacks?
Teaching point 2: Fire support. Where was the Confederate artillery?
Was their absence a key factor in the Confederate failure? Was the Union
artillery effective?
Teaching point 3: Battle command. Evaluate Bragg’s performance.
Was he doing his job on this part of the eld? Was it a good idea for
the Confederate commanders to divide the battleeld into sectors in the
middle of a battle?
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Map 20.
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Stand 13
Ruggles’ Line
Directions: Walk back north over the bridge. As soon as you cross
the bridge, turn left (west) and cross Duncan Field. Move to the line of
cannons. You are now along the Confederate artillery position known as
Ruggles’ Line. Today this line includes some of the most rare guns in the
United States. The many different types of cannons also exemplify the
lack of standardization of the Confederate artillery.
Description: Southeast of W.H.L. Wallace and Prentiss the Union line
started to crumble. The numerous Confederate attacks had worn down the
Federal defenders. By 1530 Hurlbut’s troops had fallen back, exposing
Prentiss’ left ank. By 1600 Prentiss had bent his line back 90 degrees to
refuse the ank.
Confederate leaders now realized that infantry alone would not carry
the line along the Sunken Road. Beginning at 1530 Confederate ofcers
started gathering all available artillery units on the eld. The ofcer who
orchestrated this concentration is not really known denitely. BG Ruggles
later asserted he was responsible, while Hardee’s Chief of Artillery Major
Francis Shoup also claimed credit. Needless to say numerous ofcers were
probably responsible for this concentration, which by 1630, numbered 53
cannons. This was possibly the largest artillery concentration in North
America up to that time. While the Confederates formed this line, a con-
siderable artillery duel began. For 1 hour the cannoneers traded re, the
Union gunners compelling a few Confederate artillery units to retire.
As more Confederate artillery units arrived and the Confederate bom-
bardment reached its peak, the Union batteries on the ridge behind the Sunken
Road now started to fall back. The Confederate artillery was setting the
conditions for a successful attack. At 1630 a coordinated Confederate
attack struck the defenders along the Sunken Road. Union units started
to break. The rst to go was Sweeny’s brigade that was attacked frontally
from across Duncan Field while additional Confederate units struck it
from the north on its right ank. As Sweeny’s men fell back, he rode to
Wallace to tell him of the collapse. Wallace ordered the entire division to
retire. Things were now very confused in the Union line; four of Wallace’s
regiments did not get the word to retire. Soon the Union line crumbled.
Small units and individuals tried to withdraw as the Confederates closed
around them. Prentiss found out that Wallace was pulling back, and at
1700 Prentiss also ordered a retreat.
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Vignette: Captain C.P. Searle, 8th Iowa Infantry, in Sweeny’s bri-
gade, described the destruction in the Hornet’s Nest: “The enemy, being
encouraged by additional forces, made another frightful assault from three
directions—front and anks—pouring shot and shell into our ranks with
fearful effect. Finally, with two hundred or more dead and wounded, and
after ten hours of hard ghting, with very little cessation, seeing that we
were surrounded, the order came to retire, but too late. We started from the
high ground on which we had been ghting down a ravine, on the retreat,
hoping to be able to cut through the Rebel lines, which were at our rear and
had been for two hours. We started back under a most galling re of grape
and canister, seeming to come from every direction. An incident here may
not be uninteresting. Retreating on the double quick, with leaden and iron
hail ying thick around us, a soldier a pace in front of me fell, and I was so
close that I fell over him. At the same time a spent ball struck my left arm
and another went through my canteen. My arm tingled with pain, and the
little water left in my canteen was warm and running over me as I feel to
the ground. I thought it was my lifeblood. In fact, I was sure I was killed,
but spying a ‘Reb’ close by, coming with all speed, for they had us on
the run, I made one grand, desperate effort to gain my feet, and, much to
my surprise, succeeded without trouble. I assure you I was a pretty lively
corpse, for I left old ‘Butternut’ far in the rear, and did not even say ‘Good
day.’ The poor fellow that I stumbled over was not so fortunate. He had
received his nal discharge.” (C.P. Searle, “Personal Reminiscences of
Shiloh,” Sketches and Incidents, vol. I, Des Moines: Press of P.C. Kenyon,
1893, 333-34.)
Teaching point 1: Fire support. Was the Confederate artillery support
the key to reducing the Union line? Who was responsible for ensuring the
infantry had adequate artillery support?
Teaching point 2: Clarity of orders. Who was responsible for four
regiments not getting the withdrawal order?
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Map 21.
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Stand 14
Hell’s Hollow
Directions: Walk back to your vehicle. Do a U-turn (if in a bus, you
will have to drive down the road to nd a place to turn around) and travel
northeast on Corinth-Pittsburg Road for .4 mile. Pull over by the United
Daughters of the Confederacy monument. Dismount and walk to the mon-
ument. Cloud Field is to your east, and Hell’s Hollow is the low ground to
the southwest.
Description: All along the Sunken Road line, Union troops were try-
ing to escape as the Confederates encircled them. Artillerymen limbered
up and made for Pittsburg Landing, driving their horses into a frenzy. The
infantrymen were left to their own devices. Some units attempted to main-
tain their integrity while other units disintegrated into small bands.
By 1630 W.H.L. Wallace was trying to get his men out of the trap. Sit-
ting on his horse, Wallace turned to get a better view when he fell hard to
the ground. A bullet hit Wallace in the back of the head, exiting through his
left eye. Initially Wallace’s staff ofcers started to carry him to the rear, but
they soon decided he was dead and fearing their own capture, they gently
placed Wallace’s body behind some ammunition boxes and ran away. Wal-
lace was not dead, however. Counterattacking Union troops found Wallace
on 7 April, and he was evacuated to Savannah. Wallace’s wife, Ann, had
arrived at Pittsburg Landing on the morning of 6 April for a surprise visit,
and she now nursed her critically injured husband. Wallace lingered until
10 April and died in his wife’s arms.
All around the eeing Union troops, Confederate units “tightened
the noose.” Confederate units that had been ghting Sherman and Mc-
Clernand now circled in from the west. Confederate units that had been
ghting on the far Confederate right now came in from the east. Additional
Confederate pressure came from units in the center that pressed the attack
when they saw the Federals falter.
At 1730 large bands of Union troops started to surrender. The 14th
Iowa and 18th Missouri were the rst to be completely trapped, and they
soon surrendered. A ravine ran behind the Sunken Road line, and many
Union soldiers were captured there. The men came to know this ravine as
“Hell’s Hollow.” The 23d Missouri, 58th Illinois, and 8th Iowa all sur-
rendered there. The 12th Iowa made it a little farther north before it too
joined the others in captivity. Battery B, 2d Michigan Light Artillery lost
four cannon and had 56 men captured as Confederate cavalrymen chased
them down before they could escape. Prentiss tried to escape, but at Hell’s
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Hollow he was forced to surrender his sword to COL William Rankin of
the 9th Mississippi.
Despite the surrender, confusion reigned on this part of the eld. Some
Union troops surrendered, while a few hundred feet away other Federals
continued to ght on. Seeing blue uniforms, some Confederates red on
the Union soldiers, not knowing they had surrendered. Some units armed
with modern ries attempted to destroy their weapons before their capture,
and Confederates red on them to prevent the loss. Two Confederate regi-
ments swapped their antiquated weapons for modern Enelds captured
from surrendering Union troops.
By 1800 it was over. In the end, approximately 2,200 Union soldiers
were surrounded and compelled to surrender. The men along the Sunken
Road line had withstood numerous charges by several Confederate bri-
gades from 1000 to 1700. They had bought Grant valuable time to reorga-
nize and prepare a new defensive line, time he used well.
Vignette: CPT Searle, who we left at Ruggle’s Line, described his
capture: “My time had come to receive personal attention. A big, burly
Rebel captain stepped up to me and said, ‘You d----d Yankee, give me
your sword!’ Oh, how I did want to give it to him point rst. But discretion
prevailed, and I gave it to him hilt rst, which probably saved the burial
squad two interments.” (C.P. Searle, “Personal Reminiscences of Shiloh,”
Sketches and Incidents, vol. I, Des Moines: Press of P.C. Kenyon, 1893,
335.)
Teaching point 1: Timeliness of orders. Did the Union commanders
wait too long to give the order to retreat?
Teaching point 2: Seless service. Was the capture of the 2,000 Union
soldiers necessary? Was their loss necessary, or were they sacriced?
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Map 22.
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Stand 15
Grant’s Last Line
Directions: Go north on Corinth-Pittsburg Road for .8 mile. Turn right
(east) on Pittsburg Landing Road (notice the long line of cannons). Park
in the lot by the National Cemetery. Dismount and walk down Riverside
Drive to the cannons and marker for Margraf’s battery.
Description: At 1430 Grant told his chief of staff, COL Joseph D.
Webster, to begin forming a last line of defense on the ridge south of Pitts-
burg Landing. Using the time Sherman and McClernand gained at Jones
Field and W.H.L. Wallace and Prentiss along the Sunken Road, Webster
laid out a formidable line. Initially he established the position with three
unused batteries (including a battery of 24-pound siege guns). As artillery
units fell back from the front, Webster arranged for their resupply and then
placed them in line. By 1700 Webster had 52 cannons under his control.
When Grant departed Savannah that morning, he did not know that
MG Don Carlos Buell had arrived there the day before. Before leaving for
the battleeld, Grant ordered BG William “Bull” Nelson of Buell’s army
to move his division down the east side of the river to Pittsburg Landing.
Grant had promised guides, but none ever arrived. Nelson lost 6 hours try-
ing to nd a passable route on the ooded east side, but his division moved
at 1300. Buell, meanwhile, took a steamer to Pittsburg Landing where he
met with Grant around 1300. The meeting was brief and revolved around
moving Buell’s troops to Pittsburg Landing.
At 1700 Nelson’s lead brigade, commanded by COL Jacob Ammen,
arrived across the river from Pittsburg Landing. Nelson arranged for boats
in the river to start moving his men across, and by 1800 he had about 600
men west of the river and in line.
After reducing the pocket at the Hornet’s Nest, Bragg believed that
one more attack would destroy Grant’s army. He placed artillery on a ridge
south of Dill Branch and formed four brigades—Chalmers’, Jackson’s,
Deas’, and Anderson’s—for an attack. All was ready by 1800 when
Chalmers’ and Jackson’s brigades attacked. The men rst had to cross the
deep ravine of Dill Branch. As the men ascended the northern side, they
met the re of the gun line Webster had formed. Additionally, the gunboats
Tyler and Lexington in the Tennessee River opposite the mouth of Dill
Branch added large-caliber naval shells to the Federal defensive artillery
barrage. Under such a concentrated bombardment, the Confederates did
not stand long under this re. As Chalmers and Jackson retreated, Bragg
was surprised to see units to their left retiring. Beauregard had ordered a
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halt to the ghting for the day, directing his commanders to retire a short
distance away.
At his headquarters at Shiloh Church, Beauregard received a telegram
from Colonel Ben Helm saying that Buell’s Army was near Decatur,
Alabama, nowhere near the battleeld (Helm had seen one of Buell’s
divisions, not his whole army). He assessed his army to be exhausted and
disorganized. He knew daylight was almost gone. Now armed with the in-
correct information that Buell was far away, Beauregard ordered a halt to
the ghting. He dispatched staff ofcers across the eld with the message
to end the day’s action. Apparently, Beauregard planned to nish Grant in
the morning. When Bragg learned of Beauregard’s order, he was livid. As
he considered what to do, he noticed troops falling back. Bragg exclaimed,
“My God, my God, it is too late!”
Vignette: Sometimes the remembrance of an event depends on the
echelon of command. This is a Confederate corps commander’s percep-
tion of the gunboat re: “They were covered by a battery of heavy guns,
well served, and their two gunboats, which now poured a heavy re upon
our supposed positions, for we were entirely hid by the Forrest. Their re,
though terric in sound and producing some consternation at rst, did us
no damage, as the shells passed over and exploded far beyond our posi-
tions.” (General Braxton Bragg, OR, vol. 10, part 1, 466.)
A Confederate regimental commander had a different opinion of the
gunboats: “I then anked to the left about 300 yards and halted to rest,
but in a very few minutes the shelling from the gunboats was so as to be
unbearable, killing and wounding several of my men. I thereupon retired
to a ravine and remained until dusk, and then moved back and encamped
for the night.” (Lieutenant Colonel C.D. Venable, 5th Tennessee, OR, vol.
10, part 1, 434.)
Teaching point 1: Culmination. With the information known to Beau-
regard, was the decision to stop ghting for the night the correct one?
Teaching point 2: Battle command. Was Beauregard in the correct
location to make the decision to stop ghting? Should Beauregard have
consulted with his corps commanders before halting the ght?
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Map 23.
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Stand 16
The Night
Directions: Walk north on Riverside Drive toward your vehicle. Stop
at the intersection where you can see the landing and Grant’s line to the
west.
Description: The Army of the Tennessee had been roughly handled
on 6 April. It had lost most of its camps and had been driven back 2 miles.
Its back was to the Tennessee River. One division commander had been
mortally wounded and left on the eld, and another had been captured.
Numerous brigade and regiment commanders were on the casualty list.
Near dark Lieutenant Colonel James McPherson joined Grant around a
re. McPherson asked Grant if he should prepare to retreat. Grant replied,
“Retreat? No! I propose to attack at daylight and whip them.” At 1915
Lew Wallace’s division arrived on the eld and joined Sherman. Grant
now had 5,800 fresh troops. The Army of the Tennessee had been bent but
not broken.
After the Confederate withdrawal, Nelson continued shuttling Army
of the Ohio units across the river, completing the move at 2100. Nelson’s
troops saw quite a spectacle as they arrived at Pittsburg Landing. Up
to 10,000 men of the Army of the Tennessee were cowering below the
bluffs. Grant had been trying to get these men to rejoin their outts, but
they wanted no more ghting and disregarded him. These sulkers had
been trying to get on any boat that landed, which hampered evacuating
the wounded and resupplying the Army. As Nelson’s troops landed, these
survivors told tales of woe and warned the men. Nelson became irritated
and shouted, “Damn your souls, if you won’t ght, get out of the way, and
let men come here who will!”
At 2100 the rst troops of BG Thomas Crittenden’s division of the
Army of the Ohio arrived. Crittenden’s men arrived on boats from Savan-
nah. By 2300 all of Crittenden’s men were ashore. Buell would continue
moving his troops to Pittsburg Landing during the night; he would even-
tually have 18,000 men available on 7 April. When complete, the Union
dispositions ran (from west to east): Lew Wallace’s division, Sherman’s
division, McClernand’s division, Hurlbut’s division, Crittenden’s division,
and Nelson’s division. Prentiss’ division was effectively destroyed, and
W.H.L. Wallace’s division (under COL Tuttle) was behind the line trying
to reorganize.
Buell and Grant had only one short meeting on 6 April, and they did
not discuss operations for 7 April. Both men were army commanders and
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independent of each other. There was no overall commander on site on
the Union side. However, both commanders had independently decided
to attack.
At 2200 rain began to fall, and it came down in torrents. The Union
soldiers had no tents or proper equipment, having lost it all when their
camps were overrun. The men just had to lie in the rain, trying to get what
sleep they could. Adding to the misery, the Tyler and Lexington red shots
all night long in the hope of preventing the Confederates from sleeping.
They also prevented the Union troops from getting any sleep.
Beauregard spent the night in Sherman’s tent by Shiloh Church. He
met with each corps commander during the night. All of the Confederate
commanders were ecstatic. They decided to rest the men and reorganize in
the morning to complete the destruction of Grant’s army. When the rains
came at 2200, the Confederates occupied the Union camps. During the
night Hardee’s men camped south of Sarah Bell Field, Breckinridge in
the center, Bragg in the west around Sherman’s camps, and for unknown
reasons, Polk camped at his bivouac site of 5 April, almost 2 miles from
the eld. Pond’s brigade did not get the word, and it stayed in position in
close proximity to the Union troops.
Not all of the Confederates retired to the captured tents. COL Nathan
Bedford Forrest conducted a reconnaissance by dressing his men in cap-
tured blue overcoats. Forrest’s men moved to where they could see the
landing and were surprised to learn Buell’s troops were arriving. Forrest
found Hardee and passed along this intelligence bonanza. Hardee told him
to go to Beauregard’s headquarters, but Forrest could not nd it. Forrest
returned and ordered another reconnaissance, which again learned that
more of Buell’s troops were arriving. No one would take Forrest’s report.
The Confederate commanders slept in captured tents that night think-
ing that only the routed Army of the Tennessee was to their front. They
were convinced that Buell was far away. They were sure of victory in the
morning. Forrest held the critical information but could not get it to the
proper authorities.
Vignette: A private in Nelson’s division described Pittsburg Land-
ing: “At the landing—but how shall I attempt to set the picture forth? I
have never yet seen told in print the half of the sickening story. Wagons,
teams and led horses, quartermaster’s stores of every description, bales of
forage, caissons—all of the paraphernalia of a magnicently appointed
army—were scattered in promiscuous disorder along the bluff side. Over
and all about the fragmentary heaps, thousands of panic-stricken wretches
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swarmed from the river’s edge far up toward the top of the steep; a mob in
uniform, wherein all arms of the service and well-nigh every grade were
commingled in utter confusion; a heaving, surging herd of humanity, smit-
ten with a very frenzy of fright and despair, every sense of manly pride,
of honor, and duty, completely paralyzed, and dead to every feeling save
the most abject, pitiful terror. A number of ofcers could be distinguished
amid the tumult, performing the pantomimic accompaniments of shouting
incoherent commands, mingled with threats and entreaties. There was a
little drummer boy, I remember too, standing in his shirt sleeves, pounding
his drum furiously, although to what purpose we could not divine. Men
were there in every stage of partial uniform and equipment; many were
hatless and coatless, and but few retained their muskets and their accou-
terments complete. Some stood wringing their hands, and rendering the
air with cries and lamentations, while others, in the dumb agony of fear,
cowered behind the object that was nearest them in the direction of the en-
emy, though but the crouching form of a comrade. . . . There was a rush for
the boat when we neared the landing, and some, wading out breast deep
into the stream, were kept off only at the point of a bayonet.” Anonymous
Private, 6th Ohio, Nelson’s division. (Ebenezer Hannaford, The Story of a
Regiment: A History of the Campaigns and Associations in the Field of the
Sixth Regiment, Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Cincinnati, 1868, 567.)
Teaching point 1: Reorganization and consolidation. The Confederate
soldiers had fought hard all day and were exhausted. With the information
known at the time, should the Confederate commanders have reorganized
that night or let the men rest?
Teaching point 2: Perseverance. Grant had been defeated on 6 April.
He had the means to evacuate his troops. Should he have withdrawn his
battered army?
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Map 24.
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121
Map 25.
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Stand 17
Buell’s Attack
Directions: Travel west on Pittsburg Landing Road. Turn left (south)
on Corinth-Pittsburg Landing Road for .8 mile. Turn left (south) on Ham-
burg-Savannah Road for .8 mile. Pull into the parking lot north of the
peach orchard. Dismount and move to the eld.
Description: At 0500 on 7 April, Buell’s attack started with the ad-
vance of Nelson’s division. Nelson had all three of his brigades on the line
and slowly advanced south against almost no opposition. By 0700 Nelson
had reached Cloud Field and halted while BG Thomas Crittenden’s two
brigades formed on his right. With two divisions now on the line the attack
continued south. Soon the Union troops encountered Confederate pickets
who red and quickly fell back. Nelson’s troops entered Wicker Field and
began to receive artillery and concentrated infantry re. For 90 minutes
Nelson’s men fought a long-range battle with Confederate troops in Sarah
Bell Field. Nelson had not brought his artillery with him, so Buell assigned
one of Crittenden’s batteries to him. While ghting in Wicker Field, BG
Lovell Rousseau’s brigade from BG Alexander McCook’s division arrived
from the landing and joined the line on Crittenden’s right. At 1000 the
Union line resumed the advance. Nelson’s division moved to the north end
of Sarah Bell Field and Crittenden to the Sunken Road.
Hardee was surprised that his pickets in Cloud and Wicker Fields
had been pushed back. He was expecting an easy morning, but now
Union troops were pushing hard against his position. Hardee threw any
brigade he could nd into the line to stem the Union attacks. By 1100
Nelson and Crittenden attacked south from the Sunken Road and from
the peach orchard in Sarah Bell Field. COL Sanders Bruce’s brigade and
COL Ammen’s brigade from Nelson’s division assaulted all the way to
Davis Field, capturing a Confederate battery. Several Confederate regi-
ments were thrown in to stem this penetration. The battle seesawed back
and forth, but eventually, the Union troops withdrew to positions along the
Sunken Road.
Hardee, seeing the Union troops retreating, ordered a counterattack.
A makeshift brigade made of remnants led the attack. Having been told
that friendly troops were to the front, this ad hoc unit did not cover his
line with skirmishers. As they entered Sarah Bell Field, Moore’s men were
decimated when Ammen’s brigade opened re. Seeing Moore’s difcul-
ties, Hardee sent a mixture of the other units to attack Nelson. (Confeder-
ate organizational structure had disintegrated by this time, even at brigade
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level. Commanders organized demi-brigades from available regiments,
gave them a commander, and sent them forward.) The combatants traded
re for a while, but by 1200 the Confederates had withdrawn from Sarah
Bell Field and Nelson had pulled back to Wicker Field.
To the west in Crittenden’s area, the ghting also seesawed. COL Rob-
ert Trabue’s brigade of Confederates attacked COL Morgan Smith’s bri-
gade of Federals but was repulsed. Crittenden’s division followed Trabue
all the way to the Hamburg-Purdy Road, but Confederate artillery forced
it back to Duncan Field.
By this time, McCook’s entire division had arrived and was now in
line on Crittenden’s right. Bragg commanded this part of the eld for Be-
auregard and ordered Russell’s brigade to attack the Federals. Russell was
easily repulsed, and McCook pursued him. McCook’s troops made it to
Review Field before counterattacks and artillery forced them back. During
this ght, Kentucky Governor George W. Johnson, serving as a private in
the Confederate 4th Kentucky, was mortally wounded.
A little after 1200 Buell’s troops attacked again. Until 1400 Buell’s
troops fought hard to gain ground. On the left Nelson’s men made steady
progress and by 1400 had reached the Hamburg-Purdy Road. Crittenden
pressed down Eastern Corinth Road until he, too, reached Hamburg-Purdy
Road. On the right McCook advanced to the west along the Corinth-
Pittsburg Landing Road. McCook’s western movement opened a gap
between himself and Crittenden, which was lled by brigades from Grant’s
army that had been in reserve. The disorganized, battle-weary Confederate
army had held up the 18,000 fresh troops of Buell for 6 hours, but now the
tide was turning.
Vignette: Captain F.A. Shoup, Hardee’s chief of artillery, described
the confusion on the Confederate side: “The commands were all mixed up.
We were simply blown into line by the enemy’s re. I wanted to nd Gen-
eral Hardee. I made my way to Shiloh Church, where I found Beauregard
with an enormous staff. Just as I arrived, Pickett, Hardee’s Adjutant, rode
up with a message to the Commanding General. He had a hard time try-
ing to make the General understand where Hardee was. It was astonishing
how well we fought, and how well we held them, considering the horrible
state of case with us the second day, and the new troops they had.” (F.A.
Shoup, “How We Went to Shiloh,” Confederate Veteran, vol. 2, 1894,
140-41.)
Teaching point 1: Reorganization and consolidation. If the Confeder-
ates had reorganized during the night, could they have defeated Buell?
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123
Teaching point 2: Battle command. Should Hardee have committed
units as he found them, or should he have taken the time to organize units
for attacks?
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125
Map 26.
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125
Map 27.
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Stand 18
Grant’s Attack
Directions: Go south on Hamburg-Savannah Road for .1 mile. Turn right
(west) on Hamburg-Purdy Road for .7 mile. Turn right (north) on Eastern
Corinth Road for .6 mile. Turn left (west) on Corinth-Pittsburg Landing Road
for .7 mile. Park by Water Oak Pond. Dismount and move to the pond.
Description: As the sun came up on 7 April, three batteries of artillery
assigned to Lew Wallace’s division saw a Confederate battery in Jones
Field, and they opened re on them. Grant came to investigate and after
observing a few minutes ordered Wallace to attack.
For some reason, COL Preston Pond had not withdawn during the
night, and his tired Confederate troops faced Wallace’s fresh division.
Pond’s battle-weary troops did not stand long, and Beauregard ordered
them to the rear as a reserve. Wallace’s troops retook Jones Field. In
response to this threat, Gibson’s and Wood’s brigades were ordered to
attack. This attack was initially successful, but Sherman brought his bat-
tered division on line and pushed the Confederates back. While Gibson
and Wood were attacking, other Confederate units were forming a defen-
sive line south of Jones Field. BG Daniel Ruggles gathered a group of unit
fragments and Cleburne’s and Anderson’s brigades, all badly pounded the
previous day.
The rest of Grant’s troops arrived. McClernand formed on Sherman’s
left, and Hurlbut formed on McClernand’s left. At 1030 Grant’s army
moved forward en masse. In a desperate effort to respond, Bragg ordered
Cleburne to attack, an order he protested. Yet Cleburne attacked and his
brigade was destroyed. The Confederate line was now untenable, and its
units slowly began to give ground. Cheatham’s division had spent the
night well south of the eld but had moved north early that morning. Hear-
ing of the Union thrust, Cheatham advanced and ran into Sherman and
McClernand. Cheatham stopped the Federal divisions, and when Wallace
saw this, he ordered his division into the defense despite having no enemy
to his front. Cheatham traded re with the Union troops but eventually
was forced back. While Cheatham was ghting, Bragg had formed another
defensive line by Water Oaks Pond. Wallace, Sherman, and McClernand
now advanced against this line and a 2-hour ght resulted. During this
ghting, Beauregard was all over this part of the eld, personally leading
units into the ght.
At 1330 McCook’s division advanced from Duncan Field and slammed
into the ank of Bragg’s line. Bragg, pressured on the front by Wallace,
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Sherman, and McClernand and on the ank by McCook started to fall
back south of the Hamburg-Purdy Road. Beauregard formed a small coun-
terattack force built around Wood’s brigade. These men splashed across
Water Oaks Pond and pushed back McCook’s men. McCook repositioned
his troops and forced Wood back across Water Oaks Pond.
Beauregard now had only one unit left, Pond’s brigade. Since with-
drawing from Jones Field, Pond had been out of the ghting but stayed
busy. Ruggles had ordered him to the far left. As he was moving, he was
ordered to the far right to support Hardee. Before he could get there, Be-
auregard ordered him to the center in reserve. As he was complying, Polk
ordered him to support his line. As he moved to Polk, Pond received an
order from Beauregard to report to him. Beauregard personally led Pond’s
brigade, which slammed into the advancing Union troops and had momen-
tarily stopped the Federal attack, but he was soon forced back. The Union
troops crossed the Hamburg-Purdy Road at 1430.
With the Confederate line on the verge of collapse, a staff ofcer asked
Beauregard, “General, do you not think our troops in the condition of a
lump of sugar thoroughly soaked with water, but yet preserving its original
shape, though ready to dissolve?” Beauregard replied, “I intend to with-
draw in a few moments.” True to his word, Beauregard sent staff ofcers
around the eld ordering the army back to Corinth. The Confederates tried
to bring off as much of the spoils as possible when they retreated south.
Beauregard formed a nal line south of Shiloh Church to cover the with-
drawal. By 1700 the Confederates had abandoned the eld. Due to the late
hour and the army’s condition, the Union troops did not pursue that day.
Vignette: The ghting on this part of the eld was very confused.
Private Henry Stanley, 6th Arkansas, who we last saw at Fraley Field on
6 April recounted: ”However, as despite our ring, the blues were com-
ing uncomfortably near, I rose from my hollow; but, to my speechless
amazement, I found myself a solitary grey, in a line of blue skirmishers!
My companions had retreated! The next I heard was, ‘Down with that gun
Secesh, or I’ll drill a hole through you! Drop it quick!’ Half a dozen of the
enemy were covering me at that same instant, and I dropped the weapon,
incontinently. Two men sprang at my collar, and marched me, unresisting,
into the ranks of the terrible Yankees. I was a prisoner!” (Henry M. Stan-
ley, The Autobiography of Sir Henry Morton Stanley, Cambridge, MA:
Riverside Press, 1909, 200.)
Teaching point 1: Culmination. Was Beauregard correct in ordering a
retreat? Was the Army of the Mississippi defeated?
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129
Teaching point 2: Pursuit. Should the Union have pursued the Confed-
erates in a timely manner? Was the Federal victory complete?
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Stand 19
The Cost
Directions: Walk north on McClernand Road; the road will veer to the
northwest. Halt at the Confederate burial trench at the apex of the curve
in the road.
Description: On the morning of 8 April Sherman, with two infantry
brigades and two squadrons of cavalry slowly, pursued the Confederates
south. At Fallen Timbers, Sherman ran into a small cavalry force under
COL Nathan Bedford Forrest’s command. When Forrest saw the lead
Union regiment forming, he charged. Forrest’s charge broke up the Union
troops, but while withdrawing, Forrest was shot in the hip at point blank
range. Legend has it that Forrest scooped up a Union infantryman and
used him as a shield as he rode away, dropping him when he was out of
danger. Sherman was convinced the Confederates were gone and returned
to the vicinity of Pittsburg Landing. The Battle of Shiloh was over.
The Union troops held the eld, and collecting the dead and wounded
became the rst priority. More than 8,000 Union and 1,000 Confederate
wounded were on the battleeld. Additionally, more than 3,500 Union and
Confederate dead had to be buried. The Union troops buried their own
dead rst, some in long trenches and others in individual graves. In 1866
the Union dead were disinterred and moved to the National Cemetery on
the bluff overlooking the landing. The Confederate dead were also buried
in trenches, but the Union burial parties were not as careful with the Con-
federate dead. The Confederates were stacked on top of each other in the
trenches (legend says seven deep). Today, ve of these trenches have been
located on the eld.
The battle was costly. More Americans fell at Shiloh than the total
casualties in all of the previous wars United States had fought. Exact num-
bers are difcult to determine, but according to the ofcial records, the
casualties follow:
Killed Wounded Missing Total
Army of the Tennessee 1,513 6,601 2,830 10,944
Army of the Ohio 241 1,807 55 2,103
Union Totals 1,754 8,408 2,885 13,047
Army of the Mississippi 1,728
8,012 959 10,699
Total 3,482 16,420 3,844 23,746
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Vignette: Wilbur F. Crummer, 45th Illinois, a Union soldier on a burial
detail described the process: “On Tuesday I was detailed with others to
bury the dead lying within our camp and a distance of two hundred yards
in advance. I had charge of digging the grave, if a trench over sixty feet
long and four feet deep, can be called a grave. The weather was hot, and
most of the dead had been killed early Sunday morning, and dissolution
had already commenced. The soldiers gathered up the bodies and placed
them in wagons, hauling them near to the trench, and piling them up like
cord wood. We were furnished with plenty of whiskey, and the boys be-
lieved it would have been impossible to have performed the job without
it. When the grave was ready, we placed the bodies therein, two deep; the
father, brother, husband and lover, all to lie till Gabriel’s trumpet shall
sound. All the monument reared to those brave men was a board, nailed to
a tree at the head of the trench, upon which I cut with my pocket knife, the
words: ‘125 rebels.’ We buried our Union boys in a separate trench, and on
another board were these words: ’35 Union.’ ” (Wilbur F. Crummer, With
Grant at Fort Donelson, Shiloh, and Vicksburg, Oak Park, IL: E.C. Crum-
mer & Co., 1915, 74-75.)
Teaching point 1: Graves registration. How can commanders best deal
with the dead on a battleeld?
Teaching point 2: The cost of battle. How do you prepare soldiers
for the carnage of a battleeld? How do you minimize the psychological
effects of death on soldiers?
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Stand 20
The War is Won
Directions: Return to your vehicle. Go west on Hamburg-Purdy Road
for .5 mile. Turn right (north) on TN 22 for 1.7 miles. Turn right (east) on
Pittsburg Landing Road for .9 mile. Park near the National Cemetery and
walk through the cemetery to the monument of three large cannons. You
are at the location of Grant’s headquarters.
Description: The campaign leading up to the battle and the battle of
Shiloh itself had been hard on Ulysses S. Grant. He had been removed
from command, and his superior seemed to lack condence in him. On 6
April his army nearly had been destroyed and had suffered thousands of
casualties. His original headquarters was a small building on the bluff, but
surgeons had taken over the building. Where once he controlled the battle,
now the cabin was lled with piles of amputated limbs and the screams of
the wounded. Thousands of his soldiers had run from the battleeld and
were now cowering under the bluffs. Throughout the day numerous sub-
ordinates had either asked Grant if he was going to retreat or had recom-
mended that he do so. Grant would have none of it. He was here to stay.
Arguably, Grant’s determination was one of the keys to victory for the
Union during the American Civil War. In 1863 Grant spent seven months
reducing the garrison at Vicksburg. He tried numerous ways to accomplish
the mission, and when they each failed in turn, he developed a new plan
until one worked. His forward movement after the Battle of the Wilderness
in 1864 surprised many on both sides; they were all accustomed to Army
of the Potomac commanders retreating after losing a battle. Grant did not
retreat; he kept the pressure on the armies of the Confederacy and forced
them to quit. Grant truly rst demonstrated his determination to win at
Shiloh.
During the rainstorm on the night of 6 April, Grant rested under a tree
at this location. Despite the severe setback of the day Grant was resolved
to attack in the morning. He would not let the misfortunes of 6 April affect
him. Grant was resolved to win the Battle of Shiloh, and he did. He would
demonstrate the same determination to win throughout the Civil War, and
in the end, he was victorious.
Vignette: After the ghting had ended on 6 April, Sherman went to
Grant’s headquarters to talk to him about retreating across the Tennessee
River: “I started out to nd Grant and see how we were to get across the
river. It was pouring rain and pitch dark, there was considerable confu-
sion, and the only thing just then possible, as it seemed to me, was to put
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the river between us and the enemy and recuperate. Full of only this idea,
I ploughed around in the mud until at last I found him standing backed
up against a wet tree, his hat well slouched down and coat well pulled up
around his ears, an old tin lantern in his hand, the rain pelting on us both,
and the inevitable cigar glowing between his teeth, having retired, evi-
dently, for the night. Some wise and sudden instinct impelled me to a more
cautious and less impulsive proposition than at rst intended, and I opened
up with, ‘Well, Grant, we’ve had the devil’s own day, haven’t we?’ ‘Yes,’
he said, with a short, sharp puff of the cigar: ‘lick ’em tomorrow though.’”
(William T. Sherman, Washington Post, in “Grant’s Pertinacity,” Army and
Navy Journal, 30 December 1893, 317.)
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IV. Integration Phase for the Battle of Shiloh
As dened in The Staff Ride by Dr. William G. Robertson, a staff ride
consists of three phases. The rst phase is the Preliminary Study Phase.
This phase is conducted before the visit to the battleeld and prepares
students for the visit. It may take various forms, including classroom in-
struction, individual study, or a combination of the two. The second phase
is the Field Study Phase. This phase is conducted on the battleeld and
better allows students to understand historical events through analyzing
the actual terrain. The third phase is the Integration Phase. No staff ride is
complete without the Integration Phase because it is critical for students
to understand what happened, why it happened, and most important, what
can be learned by studying the battle. The staff ride leader can conduct the
Integration Phase on the battleeld immediately after completing the Field
Study Phase. However, it is recommended that, when possible, students
have some time for personal reection and thought. Thus
the Integration
Phase may best be conducted the day after the Field Study Phase ends.
The staff ride leader can organize the Integration Phase based on the
unit, time available, and training objectives. The leader can conduct the In-
tegration Phase like an after-action review or may simply lead a discussion
with students on what they learned. The following are potential Integration
Phase topics the staff ride leader could use.
Synchronization. Throughout the battle, both sides had difculty co-
ordinating their units to mass maximum combat power at a decisive point.
Recall the piecemeal Confederate attacks at Rea Field, Sarah Bell Field,
and the Hornet’s Nest. Discuss how a modern ofcer or soldier can learn
the value of synchronization from studying this battle.
Mass. During the Battle of Shiloh, commanders were unsuccessful
until they massed their available combat power at a decisive point. The
Confederates attacked into Rea Field for 2 hours with more troops than
the Union defenders, but they were unsuccessful until they were able to
mass their available units all at once. The same is true at Sarah Bell Field.
Discuss the benets of mass to a modern ofcer or soldier using lessons
from Shiloh.
Battle command. The staff ride leader can discuss how certain com-
manders exercised command in operations against a hostile, thinking en-
emy. There are a plethora of examples during this battle. Discuss Johnston
as a commander and a leader. Discuss how certain commanders were able
to be successful despite the odds while others failed miserably. Discuss
Grant’s actions throughout the battle; was he critical to the victory? Discuss
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the location of command posts in view of their suitability for the task.
Fire support. The staff ride leader can discuss the success and fail-
ure of re support throughout the battle. Discuss artillery command and
control. Discuss the successes of re support (Ruggles’ Line, Grant’s Last
Line) and its failure (Hornet’s Nest, Jones Field).
Planning and orders. The staff ride leader can discuss the effects
of planning and order dissemination. Discuss the Confederate plan: was
it a good plan, were the formations the best possible, was it executed as
drafted, was it exible and adaptable, how did they branch from the origi-
nal plan? Discuss orders and order dissemination. Discuss the problem
between Grant and Lew Wallace. Discuss Beauregard ending the ghting
on 6 April.
Intelligence and reconnaissance. The staff ride leader can discuss
how intelligence affected the battle. Discuss what each side knew about
the other and how it affected the battle. Discuss the role of cavalry and
other reconnaissance troops. Discuss Forrest’s reconnaissance on the night
of 6 April.
Face of battle. Some things do not change on any battleeld—death,
destruction, maiming, and carnage. How did the soldiers and leaders react
to the ghastly scenes at Bloody Pond and along the Sunken Road?
These are just a few examples the staff ride leader can use during the
Integration Phase. Ask students what they learned of lasting value and
scrutinize each issue to gain the most benet for a modern ofcer or sol-
dier.
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V. Support for a Staff Ride to Shiloh
1. Information and assistance.
a. The Staff Ride Team, Combat Studies Institute (CSI), Fort Leav-
enworth, Kansas, has conducted Shiloh staff rides for military groups and
can provide advice and assistance on every aspect of the battle. The Staff
Ride Team can also provide staff ride leadership for a Shiloh staff ride.
Visit the CSI web site for information on obtaining staff ride leadership.
Additional support includes battle information, detailed knowledge of the
battle and battleeld, and familiarity with the Shiloh battleeld and sur-
rounding areas.
Address: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Combat Studies Institute
ATTN: ATZL-SWI
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900
Telephone: DSN 552-2078
Commercial (913) 684-2078
Web site: http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/csi/staff_ride/
b. The National Park Service, which maintains the Shiloh National
Military Park, can provide advice and assistance to any group desiring to
visit the park. The Visitors Center includes a small museum with a lm
on the battle, a bookstore, and restrooms. There is a small fee to enter the
park, but military groups can be exempted. Coordinate group plans with
the park headquarters before your visit.
Address: Superintendent
Shiloh National Military Military Park
1055 Pittsburg Landing Road
Shiloh, TN 38376
Telephone: (731) 689-5275
Web site: http://www.nps.gov/shil/
2. Logistics.
a. Meals. No facilities exist within the park, but a few restaurants are
within a 5-minute drive of the park. The nearest fast-food restaurants are
located in Savannah, Tennessee, approximately 12 miles from the park.
There is one picnic area located within the park’s boundary. Groups may
consider bringing food and drinks with them on the staff ride and eating
meals in the picnic area to save time.
b. Lodging. The nearest quality lodging is in Savannah, which has
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several national chain motels. Additionally, Savannah has a campground.
Corinth, Mississippi, is approximately 20 miles from the battleeld but is
a bigger city with a Civil War museum, hotels, and restaurants. Pickwick
Landing State Park is 40 minutes from Shiloh and has camping, a lodge,
cabins, and a restaurant.
c. Medical. The Park Rangers are trained in rst aid and can call
for aerial evacuation. The nearest hospital is the Hardin County General
Hospital in Savannah, approximately 15 minutes from the park. The phone
number is (731) 926-8000.
3. Other considerations.
a. Make provisions for liquids and food since they are not available
on the battleeld. Personnel on the ride should carry water with them.
b. Ensure the group has proper clothing. The battleeld is rural, so
good hiking boots and outdoor clothing are required. Be prepared for in-
clement weather since violent thunderstorms can occur in any season.
c. Environmental hazards include ticks, snakes (water moccasins in
the wet areas and copperheads throughout), and poison ivy. Check weather
conditions and forecasts before traveling to the battleeld.
d. Maintain good relations with the Shiloh National Military Park.
Coordinate with them well in advance, and ascertain current road condi-
tions, construction, etc. Follow the park rules.
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Appendix A
Order of Battle, Union Forces
Numbers in parentheses: present/killed/wounded/missing
K = killed, MW = mortally wounded, W = wounded, C = captured
The Army of the Tennessee
MG Ulysses S. Grant
1st Division
MG John A. McClernand
1st Brigade, COL A.M. Hare (W), COL M.M. Crocker (2,214/104/467/9)
(8 IL, 18 IL, 11 IA, 13 IA, D/2 IL)
2d Brigade, COL C.C. Marsh (1,847/80/475/30)
(11 IL, 20 IL, 45 IL, 48 IL)
3d Brigade, COL J. Raith (MW), LTC E.P. Wood (2,153/96/393/46)
(17 IL, 29 IL, 43 IL, 49 IL, Carmichael’s cavalry)
Not brigaded troops (727/5/35/0)
(Cavalry: Stewart’s regiment Artillery: D/1 IL, E/2 IL, 14 OH battery)
2d Division
BG W.H.L. Wallace (MW)
COL James Tuttle
1st Brigade, COL J. Tuttle (1,804/39/143/676)
(2 IA, 7 IA, 12 IA, 14 IA)
2d Brigade, BG J. McArthur (W), COL T. Morton (2,548/99/470/11)
(9 IL, 12 IL, 81 OH, 13 MO, 14 MO)
3d Brigade, COL T. Sweeny (W), COL S. Baldwin (3,571/127/501/619)
(8 IA, 7 IL, 50 IL, 52 IL, 57 IL, 58 IL)
Not brigaded troops (485/5/58/0)
(Cavalry: C/2 US Cav, I/4 US Cav, A&B/2 IL Cav Artillery: A/1 IL,
D/1 MO, H/1 MO, K/1 MO)
3d Division
MG Lewis Wallace
1st Brigade, COL M. Smith (1,998/18/114/0)
(8 MO, 11 IN, 24 IN)
2d Brigade, COL J. Thayer (2,236/20/99/3)
(1 NE, 22 IN, 58 OH, 68 OH)
3d Brigade, COL C. Whittlesey (2,541/2/32/1)
(20 OH, 56 OH, 76 OH, 78 OH)
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Not brigaded troops (789/1/5/0)
(Cavalry: 3/5 OH Cav, 3/11 IL Cav Artillery: L/1 MO, 9 IN Battery)
4th Division
BG Stephen A. Hurlbut
1st Brigade, COL N. Williams (2,407/112/532/43)
(3 IA, 28 IL, 32 IL, 41 IL)
2d Brigade, COL J. Veach (2,722/130/492/8)
(25 IN, 14 IL, 15 IL, 46 IL)
3d Brigade, BG J. Lauman (1,751/70/384/4)
(31 IN, 44 IN, 17 KY, 25 KY)
Not brigaded troops (945/5/33/56)
(Cavalry: 1&2/5 OH Cav Artillery: 13 OH Battery, Mann’s battery, 2
MI Battery)
5th Division
BG William T. Sherman
1st Brigade, COL J. McDowell (1,903/137/444/70)
(6 IA, 46 OH, 40 IL, 6 IN Battery)
2d Brigade, COL D. Stuart (W), COL T. Smith (1,939/80/380/90)
(55 IL, 54 OH, 71 OH)
3d Brigade, COL J. Hildebrand (1,883/70/221/65)
(53 OH, 57 OH, 77 OH)
4th Brigade, COL R. Buckland (2,107/36/203/74)
(48 OH, 70 OH, 72 OH)
Not brigaded troops (771/2/28/0)
(Cavalry: 1&2/4 IL Cav Artillery: B/1 IL, E/1 IL)
6th Division
BG B.M. Prentiss (C)
1st Brigade, COL Peabody (K) (2,790/113/372/236)
(21 MO, 25 MO, 16 WI, 12 MI)
2d Brigade, COL M. Miller (C) (2,509/44/228/178)
(18 MO, 61 IL, 18 IA)
Not brigaded troops (889/78/328/16)
(Infantry: 18 WI, 23 MO, 15 IA Cavalry: 11 IL Cav Artillery: 5 OH
Btry, 1 MN Btry)
Unassigned troops of the Army of the Tennessee (2,031/39/159/17)
(Infantry: 15 MI, 14 WI. Artillery: 8 OH Btry, H/1 IL, L/1 IL, B/2 IL F/2 IL)
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The Army of the Ohio
MG Don Carlos Buell
2d Division
BG Alexander McCook
4th Brigade, BG L. Rousseau (3,207/28/280/3)
(1 BN/15 US, 1 BN/16 US, 1 BN/19 US, 1 OH, 6 IN, 5 KY)
5th Brigade, COL E. Kirk (W) (2,721/34/310/2)
(77 PA, 29 IN, 30 IN, 34 IL)
6th Brigade, COL W. Gibson (3,074/25/220/2)
(15 OH, 49 OH, 32 IN, 39 IN)
H/5th US Battery (116/1/13/0)
4th Division
BG William Nelson
10th Brigade, COL J. Ammen (1,876/16/106/8)
(6 OH, 24 OH, 36 IN)
19th Brigade, COL W. Hazen (1,761/48/357/1)
(6 KY, 9 IN, 41 OH)
22d Brigade, COL S. Bruce (1,898/93/603/20)
(1 KY, 2 KY, 20 KY)
2 IN Cav (87/0/2/0)
5th Division
BG Thomas L. Crittenden
11th Brigade, BG J. Boyle (2,179/33/212/18)
(19 OH, 59 OH, 9 KY, 13 KY)
14th Brigade, COL W. Smith (Unk/25/157/10)
(13 OH, 11 KY, 26 KY)
Not brigaded troops (246/2/6/0)
(Cavalry: 3 KY Cav Artillery: G/1 OH, H&M/4 US)
6th Division
BG T.J. Wood
20th Brigade, BG J. Gareld (not engaged)
(64 OH, 65 OH, 13 MI, 51 IN)
21st Brigade, COL G. Wagner (1,723/0/4/0)
(15 IN, 40 IN, 57 IN, 24 KY)
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Appendix B
Order of Battle, Confederate Forces
Numbers in parentheses: killed/wounded/missing
K = killed, MW = mortally wounded, W = wounded, C = captured
The Army of the Mississippi
General Albert S. Johnston (K)
General Pierre G.T. Beauregard
I Corps
MG Leonidas Polk
1st Division—4,988 men
BG Charles Clark
1st Brigade, COL R. Russell (97/512/0)
(11 LA, 12 TN, 13 TN, 22 TN, Bankhead’s battery)
2d Brigade, BG A. Stewart (93/421/3)
(14 AR, 4 TN, 5 TN, 33 TN, Stanford’s battery)
2d Division—3,032 men
BG Benjamin F. Cheatham
1st Brigade, BG Bushrod Johnson (120/607/13)
(Blythe’s MS, 2 TN, 15 TN, 154 TN, Polk’s battery)
2d Brigade, COL W. Stephens (75/413/3)
(7 KY, 1 TN, 6 TN, 9 TN, Smith’s battery)
Cavalry (0/0/0)
(1 MS, Brewer’s AL&MS)
II Corps
MG Braxton Bragg
1st Division—7,672 men
BG Daniel Ruggles
1st Brigade, COL R. Gibson (97/488/97)
(1 AR, 4 LA, 13 LA, 19 LA, Bain’s battery)
2d Brigade, BG P. Anderson (69/313/52)
(1 FL BN, 17 LA, 20 LA, 9 TX, Confederate Guards Response
Battalion, 5 Co/Washington Artillery)
3d Brigade, COL P. Pond (89/336/169)
(16 LA, 18 LA, Crescent Regiment, Orleans Guard Battalion, 38
TN, Ketchem’s battery)
Jenkin’s Cavalry Bn (2/5/1)
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2d Division—7,783 men
BG Jones M. Withers
1st Brigade, BG A. Gladden (129/597/103)
(21 AL, 22 AL, 25 AL, 26 AL, 1 LA, Robertson’s battery)
2d Brigade, BG J. Chalmers (83/343/19)
(5 MS, 7 MS, 9 MS, 10 MS, 52 TN, Gage’s battery)
3d Brigade, BG J. Jackson (86/364/194)
(17 AL, 18 AL, 19 AL, 2 TX, Girardey’s battery)
1st AL Cav (0/0/0)
III Corps
MG William J. Hardee
1st Brigade, 2,360 men, BG T. Hindman (109/546/38)
(2 AR, 6 AR, 7 AR, 3 Confederate, Swett’s battery, Miller’s bat-
tery)
2d Brigade, 2,789 men, BG P. Cleburne (188/790/65)
(2 TN, 15 AR, 6 MS, 5 TN, 23 TN, 24 TN, Shoup’s artillery bat-
talion, Watson’s battery)
3d Brigade, 2,508 men, BG S. Wood (107/600/38)
(7 AL, 16 AL, 8 AR, 9 AR Battalion, 3 MS Battalion, 27 TN, 44
TN, 55 TN, Harper’s battery)
Reserve Corps
BG John C. Breckinridge
1st Brigade, 2,691 men, COL P. Traubue (151/557/92)
(4 AL Battalion, 31 AL, 15 AR, 3 KY, 4 KY, 5 KY, Crew’s artillery
battalion, Byrne’s battery, Cobb’s battery, Morgan’s cavalry)
2d Brigade, 1,744 men, BG J. Bowen (98/498/28)
(9 AR, 10 AR, 2 Confederate, 1 MO, Hudson’s battery)
3d Brigade, 3,079 men, COL W. Statham (137/627/45)
(15 MS, 22 MS, 19 TN, 20 TN, 28 TN, 45 TN, Forrest’s cavalry,
Rutledge’s battery)
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Appendix C. Biographical Sketches
Union Commanders
Ulysses S. Grant. Grant was born on 27 April 1822 at Point Pleas-
ant, Ohio, given the name Hiram Ulysses Grant (Ulysses Simpson came
from an administrative error while enrolling at ther US Military Academy,
West Point, New York). He entered West Point in 1839 but was not a good
student, graduating 21 of 39 in the class of 1843. Grant joined the infantry
and served in the Mexican War where he served in the 4th Infantry Regi-
ment. He participated in the campaigns of Zachary Taylor and Wineld
Scott and earned two brevets for valor. After the war Grant served in the
Pacic Northwest where he quickly became bored and started to drink.
Such problems caused Grant to resign his commission in 1854.
From 1854 to 1861 Grant tried his hand at farming, real estate, local
politics, and store clerking. When the Civil War broke out, Grant obtained
command of the 21st Illinois Infantry Regiment, receiving the rank of
colonel. As Grant readied his regiment for combat, he was commissioned
a brigadier general on 7 August 1861, in large part because of his connec-
tions with Illinois Representative Elihu B. Washburne. This relationship
would benet Grant throughout the war. Grant’s rst major combat came
when he led the army component of the joint force that seized Fort Henry
and Fort Donelson. These victories brought Grant to the favorable atten-
tion of the US public. Yet Grant’s career faltered after he was surprised and
almost defeated at the Battle of Shiloh. Grant was replaced as commander
of the Army of the Tennessee until MG Henry Halleck, commander of the
western Union forces, was selected to be the General in Chief of the Army
and moved to Washington. Grant again assumed command of the Army of
the Tennessee and spent December 1862-July 1863 attacking Vicksburg.
When he nally succeeded in besieging and capturing that city, he virtu-
ally guaranteed control of the Mississippi River for the Union. After MG
William Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland was defeated at Chickam-
auga and besieged in Chattanooga, Grant led the relief forces and raised
the siege.
Grant’s triumphs impressed President Lincoln, and he was promoted
to Lieutenant General and selected to be General in Chief of the Army.
Grant devised a plan that called for all Union armies to attack the Con-
federacy simultaneously in 1864. Grant’s determination in 1864 and 1865
ensured success for the Union, and Grant accepted the surrender of the
Army of Northern Virginia on 9 April 1865. As a national hero, Grant was
easily elected President of the United States in 1868. Unfortunately, his
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two terms as President were lled with corruption and scandal. Grant died
in 1885. His memoirs remain a classic of military literature.
William T. Sherman. Sherman was born at Lancaster, Ohio, on 8 Feb-
ruary 1820. His father died when Sherman was nine, and young William
was sent to live with Senator Thomas Ewing (Sherman later married Ew-
ing’s daughter). Senator Ewing appointed Sherman to West Point, where
he graduated in 1840, sixth in his class. Sherman spent an uneventful ca-
reer before the war with Mexico where he earned one brevet. He resigned
his commission in 1853 to pursue a banking career in California. When
the bank failed, Sherman moved to Leavenworth, Kansas, and opened a
law rm with two of his brothers-in-law. The law rm failed, so Sherman
accepted the position as superintendent of the Louisiana State Seminary of
Learning Military Academy (now Louisiana State University).
When Louisiana seceded from the Union, Sherman resigned and
moved to St. Louis. Soon he was commissioned the colonel of the newly
formed 13th US Infantry. Sherman was quickly appointed a brigadier
general and commanded a brigade at First Bull Run. Sherman was then
sent to command in Kentucky but was soon relieved by Don Carlos Buell
for being unstable, having possibly suffered a nervous breakdown. After a
period of rest, Sherman took command of a newly formed division under
Grant, which he commanded at Shiloh. Promoted to major general in May
1862, Sherman was a corps commander under Grant during the Vicksburg
Campaign. The Grant-Sherman relationship, initiated before Shiloh, was
cemented at Vicksburg. Sherman moved with Grant to Chattanooga and
fought on Missionary Ridge. When Grant was promoted to general in
chief, Sherman assumed command of all troops in the west.
After seizing Atlanta, Georgia, in September 1864, Sherman left MG
George Thomas’ command to deal with the Confederate forces and led the
rest of his army and marched toward Savannah, Georgia, leaving a swath
of destruction along the way. Once Savannah fell, Sherman and his troops
marched north toward Virginia. He accepted the surrender of Joseph
Johnston’s command near Durham Station, North Carolina, two weeks af-
ter General Robert E. Lee’s surrender. When Grant was elected president,
Sherman was appointed general in chief and promoted to general. Retiring
from the Army in 1884, he spent his retirement years avoiding the numer-
ous people who pestered him to run for president. Sherman died in 1891.
John A. McClernand. McClernand was born in Hardinsburg, Ken-
tucky, on 30 May 1812. His family moved to Illinois when he was young
and he was raised there. He was mainly self-educated, culminating with
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him passing the bar in 1832. McClernand soon entered politics and also
served as a private in the Black Hawk War. When the Civil War started,
President Lincoln commissioned him as a brigadier general of volunteers.
McClernand used his position to further his political career, a stance that
caused friction with Grant. He commanded a division at Shiloh and a
corps at Vicksburg. Grant lacked condence in him at both battles and
relieved him of command during Vicksburg for “leaking” information
to the press. After sitting out one year, McClernand was again appointed
corps commander, this time in Louisiana. He resigned from the Army in
late 1864. After the war McClernand returned to politics in Illinois where
he died in 1890.
William Harvey Lamb Wallace. W.H.L. Wallace was born in Urba-
na, Ohio, on 8 July 1821. His family soon moved to Illinois where Wallace
grew up and was admitted to the bar. He enlisted in an Illinois regiment
during the Mexican War and eventually earned a commission. After the
war, Wallace returned to practice law and entered politics. Soon after the
outbreak of the Civil War, Wallace became colonel of the 11th Illinois In-
fantry. He commanded a brigade during the Fort Henry and Fort Donelson
Campaigns and there earned brigadier general’s stars. At Shiloh Wallace
was leading his men in the Hornet’s Nest when he was mortally wounded.
Evacuated from the eld, Wallace died at Savannah on 10 April 1862.
Lewis Wallace. Lew Wallace was born on 10 April 1827 at Brookville,
Indiana. His father was governor of the state when Wallace was young.
Wallace was a lieutenant in a volunteer regiment during the Mexican War.
After the war he became a lawyer and was elected to the state senate in
1856. At the start of the Civil War, Wallace was placed in command of the
11th Indiana Infantry Regiment. Wallace and the regiment moved to the
Eastern theater, but when he was promoted to brigadier general, he was
returned to the west where he led a brigade during the Fort Henry and Fort
Donelson Campaigns.
Promoted to major general and given command of a division, Wallace
missed the rst day of the Battle of Shiloh, something that tarnished him
forever. He served out the rest of the war in minor posts, performing ad-
mirably in defending Washington in 1864. After the war Wallace was ap-
pointed to the military commission that tried the Lincoln conspirators and
was president of the court-martial that convicted and condemned Henry
Wirz, commander, Andersonville Prison. After leaving the Army Wallace
failed to gain elective ofce, but he received political appointments. A
prolic ction writer after the war, he authored the famous novel Ben-Hur.
Wallace died in 1905.
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Stephen A. Hurlbut. Hurlbut was born in Charleston, South Carolina,
on 29 November 1815. The son of a northern-born minister, Hurlbut spent
his youth in the South. He joined the South Carolina Bar and served with a
volunteer regiment during the Seminole War. In 1845 he moved to Illinois
and entered politics, serving in the state legislature. At the outbreak of the
Civil War he was commissioned brigadier general of volunteers, quickly
rising to major general. He led a division at Shiloh and during the Corinth
Campaign. He commanded a corps after Corinth and eventually com-
manded the Department of the Gulf. While in command of the Gulf area,
he was accused of inappropriate efforts to gain personal prot, but he was
allowed to leave the Army honorably in 1865. After the war he reentered
politics, serving as minister to Colombia under Grant, and was eventually
elected to the US House of Representatives. As minister to Peru, he again
fell under the shadow of corruption. He died there in 1882.
Benjamin M. Prentiss. Prentiss was born in Belleville, Virginia (now
West Virginia), on 23 November 1819. Prentiss spent his youth in Virginia
but moved to Missouri with his family when he was 17. He eventually
settled in Illinois, served in the militia, and commanded a company of
volunteers during the Mexican War. After that conict, he entered the bar
and tried his hand at politics. At the outbreak of the Civil War, Prentiss
was commissioned colonel of the 10th Illinois Infantry Regiment. He was
soon promoted to brigadier general and given command of a division un-
der Grant. During the Battle of Shiloh he was captured after holding the
Hornet’s Nest for 6 hours. Prentiss spent six months as a prisoner before
he was nally exchanged. A participant in the court-martial of Fitz John
Porter, Prentiss was promoted to major general but held only minor com-
mands until he resigned his commission in October 1863. Prentiss returned
to his law practice until President Grant gave him a political appointment
as a pension agent. He died on 8 February 1901.
Don Carlos Buell. Buell was born on 23 March 1818 in Lowell, Ohio.
He spent his youth in Indiana until he entered West Point, graduating in
1841, 32 of 52. Buell joined the 3d Infantry and served with it in Florida
on the frontier and during the Mexican War. Buell was severely wounded
during the war and earned two brevets. After the Mexican War he trans-
ferred to the adjutant general’s department and held staff appointments on
the frontier.
The start of the Civil War found Buell in California. He was promoted
to brigadier general, and after arriving in Washington, he helped train the
new Army of the Potomac. Next Buell was sent to Kentucky to lead troops
to seize east Tennessee. Buell arrived on the second day of the Battle of
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Shiloh, and his troops helped the Union win the victory. After the Corinth
Campaign, Buell returned to Tennessee. When the Confederates invaded
Kentucky in 1862, Buell followed and turned back the invasion by not los-
ing the Battle of Perryville. The Confederates withdrew from Kentucky,
but when Buell did not pursue, he was relieved of command. Buell waited
a year for orders, but when none came, he resigned. After the war Buell ran
an ironworks and coal mine in Kentucky. He died on 19 November 1898.
William Nelson. Nelson was born in Maysville, Kentucky, on 27
September 1824. Trained as a naval ofcer he was appointed midshipman
in 1840 and served with the squadron that supported Wineld Scott dur-
ing the Mexican War. Nelson was a Navy lieutenant when the Civil War
started. President Lincoln commissioned him an Army brigadier general
so he could use his state ties to raise troops in Kentucky. Nelson soon re-
ceived command of a division under Buell, and his troops were the rst re-
inforcements to reach the Shiloh battleeld. After the Corinth Campaign,
Nelson was placed in command of troops in Kentucky where he was badly
defeated at Richmond during the Confederate invasion. A month after this
defeat Nelson was shot to death by fellow Union General Jefferson C.
Davis who believed Nelson had insulted him.
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Confederate Commanders
Albert Sidney Johnston. Johnston was born in Washington, Ken-
tucky, on 2 February 1803. He graduated from West Point in 1826. While
at West Point Johnston became friendly with Jefferson Davis, the future
president of the Confederate States of America. Johnston spent eight
years in the Army and fought in the Black Hawk War. In 1836 he joined
the Texas Army as a private and eventually rose to brigadier general. He
served as Secretary of War for the Republic of Texas from 1838 to 1840.
When Texas joined the United States, Johnston rejoined the US Army and
in 1855 was commander, 2d Cavalry. In 1857 he led the famous expedition
against the Mormons for which he earned promotion to brigadier general.
At the outbreak of the Civil War Johnston was commander, Depart-
ment of the Pacic. He resigned his commission and after a laborious
journey from California was appointed a full general in the Confederate
Army in command of all troops in the west. Criticism of Johnston was
severe after the Confederates in his command failed early in the war, but
Davis, his old friend from West Point, had complete condence in him.
Johnston concentrated all available troops at Corinth in hope of striking a
blow against Grant before Grant’s and Buell’s troops consolidated. In the
resulting Battle of Shiloh Johnston was in the forefront of the ght until he
was shot in the back of the knee. The bullet severed an artery, and Johnston
died from loss of blood before a surgeon could be found.
Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard. P.G.T. Beauregard was born
on 28 May 1818 in St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana. He graduated second
in his class at West Point in 1838 and entered the engineers. During the
Mexican War he served on Wineld Scott’s staff and earned two brevets.
Beauregard resigned his commission in early 1861 after he was relieved as
Superintendent of West Point. He was appointed a brigadier general of the
newly formed Confederate Army and placed in command of the Charles-
ton, South Carolina, defenses. There he supervised the reduction of Fort
Sumter. Beauregard served with distinction at the First Battle of Manassas
under Joseph Johnston. He was promoted to general in July 1861 and sent
to the west.
Although second in command to Albert Sidney Johnston at the Battle
of Shiloh, he played a key role in planning the battle. After Johnston’s
death, Beauregard assumed command and withdrew the Army to Corinth.
Ultimately Beauregard was forced to abandon Corinth, and while on sick
leave, he was relieved of command. Beauregard was subsequently as-
signed to command the defenses of the Georgia and South Carolina coasts.
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149
In June 1864 he joined Lee at Petersburg, and at the close of the war he
was with Joseph Johnston again in North Carolina. After the war Beaure-
gard was the president of a railroad. He died on 20 February 1893.
Leonidas Polk. Polk was born in Raleigh, North Carolina, on 10 April
1806. He entered West Point and graduated in 1827. While at West Point
he became acquainted with Jefferson Davis. Six months after graduation
Polk resigned his commission and entered the Episcopal ministry. He
eventually rose to Missionary Bishop of the Southwest and founded the
University of the South. At the outbreak of the war he was commissioned
a major general in the Confederate Army and served in the west. When
Albert Sidney Johnston concentrated forces for the Battle of Shiloh, Polk
received command of a corps. Polk continued as a corps commander and
fought at Shiloh, Perryville, Murfreesboro, and Chickamauga. On 14 June
1864, during the Atlanta Campaign, Polk was conducting a reconnais-
sance at Pine Mountain, Georgia, when a Federal artillery shell hit and
instantly killed him.
Braxton Bragg. Bragg was born on 22 March 1817 at Warrenton,
North Carolina. He graduated from West Point in 1837 and saw combat
against the Seminole Indians and during the Mexican War. He was a
lieutenant colonel when he resigned his commission in 1856 to become
a plantation owner in Louisiana. Bragg was appointed a brigadier general
of the Confederate Army early in the Civil War and commanded the dis-
trict responsible for defending the coast from Pensacola to Mobile. Bragg
brought 10,000 troops to Corinth and took command of a corps for the
Battle of Shiloh. After Shiloh he was promoted to general and replaced
Beauregard as commander of the renamed Army of the Tennessee.
Bragg invaded Kentucky in late 1862 but was forced to withdraw after
the Battle of Perryville. Bragg defeated William Rosecrans at the Battle of
Chickamauga, but a poor command climate crippled his army. After his
defeat at Chattanooga and the subsequent withdrawal through Georgia,
Bragg asked to be relieved of command. He next became the military
adviser to President Jefferson Davis. At war’s end he was serving under
Joseph Johnston in North Carolina. After the war Bragg lived in Alabama
and Texas until his death on 27 September 1876.
William J. Hardee. Hardee was born in Camden County, Georgia, on
12 October 1815. Hardee graduated from West Point in 1838 and served
in the Mexican War where he was twice breveted for bravery. After the
war he was the commandant of cadets at West Point and wrote Rie and
Light Infantry Tactics, the doctrinal manual both sides would use at the
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151
beginning of the Civil War. Hardee was commissioned a brigadier general
in the new Confederate Army and organized troops in Arkansas. During
the concentration at Corinth before the Battle of Shiloh, Hardee received
command of a corps. After Shiloh Hardee continued as a commander in
the Army of the Tennessee, seeing action at Perryville, Stones River, and
Chattanooga. In 1864 Hardee asked to leave the Army of the Tennessee
because he lacked condence in the newly appointed commander, John
Bell Hood. Hardee attempted to defend Savannah from Sherman, and at
war’s end he was also with Joseph Johnston in North Carolina. After the
war Hardee was a planter. He died on 6 November 1873.
John C. Breckinridge. Breckinridge was born on 15 January 1821
near Lexington, Kentucky. After graduating from Transylvania College,
he started a law practice in Lexington. He entered politics and served rst
as a state representative, then as a member of the US House of Representa-
tives. In 1856, at age 35, he was elected vice president in James Buchan-
an’s administration. Before his term as vice president ended he was elected
a US senator from Kentucky. Despite Kentucky’s refusal to join the Con-
federacy, Breckinridge accepted a brigadier general’s commission in the
Confederate Army. He commanded the Reserve Corps at Shiloh and was
promoted to major general soon thereafter. Breckinridge fought at Vicks-
burg and Chickamauga. He transferred to the Eastern theater in 1864 and
joined in the raid on Washington DC that year. In February 1865 he was
appointed the Confederacy’s last Secretary of War. After the war Breckin-
ridge went to England and Canada. He returned to Kentucky in 1869 and
resumed his law practice, dying there on 17 May 1875.
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Appendix D
Medal of Honor Conferrals for the Battle of Shiloh
The Medal of Honor was a new award at the time of the Battle of
Shiloh. President Abraham Lincoln signed into law the Medal of Honor
for Navy personnel on 21 December 1861. The Army soon followed suit,
and Lincoln signed the law creating the Army Medal of Honor on 12 July
1862. The Confederates did not have a medal for valor at the time of the
Battle of Shiloh, so no Confederate soldiers were formally recognized for
extreme bravery during the Battle of Shiloh. Four Union soldiers earned
the Medal of Honor for actions during the battle.
McDonald, John Wade. Private, Company E, 20th Illinois Infantry.
Born in Lancaster, Ohio, and entered service at Wayneville, Illinois. Cita-
tion: Was severely wounded while endeavoring, at the risk of his own life,
to carry to a place of safety a wounded and helpless comrade.
Orbansky, David. Private, Company B, 58th Ohio Infantry. Born in
Lautenburg, Prussia, and entered service at Columbus, Ohio. Citation:
Gallantry in actions.
Spalding, Edward B. Sergeant, Company E, 52d Illinois Infantry.
Born in Ogle County, Illinois, and entered service at Rockford. Citation:
Although twice wounded and thereby crippled for life, he remained ght-
ing in open ground to the close of the battle.
Williams, Elwood N. Private, Company A, 28th Illinois Infantry.
Born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and entered service at Havanna, Il-
linois. Citation: A box of ammunition having been abandoned between
the lines, this soldier voluntarily went forward with one companion, under
heavy re from both armies, secured the box, and delivered it within the
line of his regiment, his companion being mortally wounded.
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153
Bibliography
While not comprehensive, this bibliography provides a list of publica-
tions that are useful for staff ride preparation.
I. Conducting a Staff Ride.
Robertson, William G. The Staff Ride. Washington DC: US Army Center
of Military History, 1987.
This book is the US Army’s “doctrine” for conducting staff rides. It
offers information on organizing and conducting staff rides.
II. Battle.
Daniel, Larry J. Shiloh. New York: Touchstone, 1997.
This is an excellent one-volume book on the battle. The maps are very
good.
________. The Battle of Shiloh. Fort Washington, PA: Eastern National
Park and Monument Association, 1998.
Available from the National Park Service (on line), this is a short
booklet best used when preparation time is short.
Frank, Joseph Allan and George A. Reaves. ‘Seeing the Elephant’: Raw
Recruits at the Battle of Shiloh. New York: Greenwood Press, 1989.
This book examines the battle from the perspective of the raw, un-
trained soldier. It provides interesting details on weapons and their effect
on tactics.
McDonough, James L. Shiloh—In Hell Before Night. Knoxville: Univer-
sity of Tennessee Press, 1977.
This is a good one-volume book that covers the campaign and battle.
The maps are not very detailed.
Sword, Wiley. Shiloh: Bloody April. New York: William Morrow & Co.,
1974.
This is the “classic” narrative of the battle.
The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Ofcial Records of the
Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 10, parts 1 and 2. Washington DC:
US Government Printing Ofce (GPO), 1886-87, 1899.
Postwar, the US government compiled and published the battle re-
ports and correspondence from both sides. The Ofcial Records (OR) have
appeared in several reprint editions and on commercially available CD
ROM. Volume 10, part 1 contains the battle reports from the commanders
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155
of both sides. Volume 10, part 2 contains the correspondence of both sides.
This work is critical for serious study of the battle.
III. Weapons and Tactics
Coggins, Jack. Arms and Equipment of the Civil War. Wilmington, NC:
Broadfoot Publishing Co., 1987 (1962).
This very useful primer features instructive illustrations and an au-
thoritative text. It provides a solid grounding in weapon capabilities that is
essential to understanding Civil War battles.
Grifth, Paddy. Battle in the Civil War. Nottinghamshire, England: Field-
books, 1986.
This excellent booklet describes and illustrates the fundamentals of
Civil War tactics in a concise, easily comprehensible format. I highly rec-
ommend it.
McWhiney, Grady and Perry D. Jamieson. Attack and Die: Civil War Tac-
tics and the Southern Heritage. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama
Press, 1990 (1982).
This is a controversial analysis of the Confederacy’s propensity for
offensive operations.
Ripley, Warren. Artillery and Ammunition of the Civil War. 4th Edition.
Charleston, SC: Battery Press, 1984.
This comprehensive work provides technical information on artillery
and ammunition.
Thomas, Dean S. Cannons: An Introduction to Civil War Artillery. Get-
tysburg, PA: Thomas Publications, 1985.
This is a very helpful primer on the technical characteristics of stan-
dard Civil War eld artillery weapons.
Witham, George F. Shiloh, Shells, and Artillery Units. Memphis, TN: Riv-
erside Press, 1980.
This is the comprehensive examination of artillery at Shiloh. It re-
views the history, armament, and battle actions of every battery at the
battle. There is also an excellent examination of artillery shells.
IV. Combat Support and Combat Service Support
Brown, J. Willard. The Signal Corps, U.S.A., in the War of the Rebellion.
Boston: US Veteran Signal Corps Association, 1896.
This book provides general background information such as organiza-
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tion, equipment, personnel, and techniques.
Freemon, Frank R. Gangrene and Glory. Chicago: University of Illinois
Press, 2001.
This is an interesting history of medicine, both North and South, dur-
ing the war.
Gillett, Mary C. The Army Medical Department 1818-1865. Army
Historical Series. Center of Military History. Washington, DC: GPO,
1987.
This broad survey provides general background information.
Huston, James A. The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953. Army
Historical Series. Ofce of the Chief of Military History. Washington, DC:
GPO, 1970.
A standard work in the eld, this survey provides helpful background
data on Civil War logistics.
Lord, Francis A. They Fought for the Union. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole,
1960.
A wide-ranging examination of the Civil War experience, this work
details organization, training, weapons, equipment, uniforms, and soldier
life.
Plum, William R. Military Telegraph During the Civil War in the United
States. Chicago: Jansen, McClurg & Co., 1882. Reprinted by Ayer Pub-
lishing Co. in June 1974.
While this may be difcult to obtain, it provides an interesting history
of the telegraph during the Civil War.
V. Biographies (Federal)
Warner, Ezra J. Generals in Blue. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Uni-
versity Press, 1964.
This standard reference work provides biographical sketches and pho-
tographs of Union general ofcers.
Grant
Grant, Ulysses S. Personal Memoirs. 2 vols. New York: Charles L. Web-
ster, 1885-86.
There are many good biographies of Grant, but this work is probably
the best single source for a staff ride.
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157
Sherman
Sherman, William, T. Memoirs of William T. Sherman. New York: Library
of America, 1990 (1885).
Again, there are many ne biographies of Sherman, but this is a good
single-source work. The work cited is a revised edition published 100
years after the initial printing.
McClernand
Kiper, Richard L. Major General John Alexander McClernand: Politician
in Uniform. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1999.
A relatively new work, this book examines McClernand as a general
and explores his relationships with other generals.
Lew Wallace
Wallace, Lew. Lew Wallace, An Autobiography. New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1906.
Written well after the war, Wallace defends his actions at Shiloh, so
read with a critical eye. This is required material for anyone researching
Lew Wallace and Shiloh.
Halleck
Ambrose, Stephen E. Halleck: Lincoln’s Chief of Staff. Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University Press, 1962.
This is a general biography that details the relationship between Hal-
leck and Grant.
VI. Biographies (Confederate)
Warner, Ezra T. Generals in Gray. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State
University Press, 1959.
This standard reference work provides biographical sketches and pho-
tographs of Confederate general ofcers.
Johnston
Roland, Charles P. Albert Sidney Johnston, Soldier of Three Republics.
Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1964.
This is an outstanding biography of Johnston’s colorful life.
Beauregard
Williams, T. Harry. P.G.T. Beauregard: Napoleon in Gray. Baton Rouge,
LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1955.
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157
This is an excellent biography by a distinguished Civil War historian.
Bragg
McWhiney, Grady. Braxton Bragg and Confederate Defeat. 2 vols. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1969.
Arguably, this is the best biography of Bragg by a renowned Civil War
historian.
VII. Vignettes and First-Person Accounts
Logsdon, David R. ed. Eyewitnesses at the Battle of Shiloh. Nashville, TN:
Kettle Mills Press, 1994.
Available from the National Park Service, this short book is a col-
lection of battle accounts from both sides, illuminating “the face of com-
bat.”
VIII. Maps
US Department of the Interior Geological Survey. Maps can be obtained
from <http://ngmsvr.wr.usgs.gov/Other_Resources/rdb_topo.html> or
Distribution Branch, US Geological Survey, Box 25286, Federal Center
Building 41, Denver, CO 80225.
1:24,000.
Pittsburg Landing TTN0541
Counce, Tennessee TTN0159
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About the Author
Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey J. “Benny” Gudmens was born in Cincinnati,
Ohio. He received a B.A. in history from the University of Dayton and
an M.A. in Civil War studies from American Military University. His
assignments include platoon leader and company executive ofcer, 82d
Airborne Division; airborne company command, 6th Division; assistant
G3 air, XVIII Airborne Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD/
DESERT STORM; observer/controller, Joint Readiness Training Center;
battalion operations ofcer, 5-20 Infantry, Fort Lewis, Washington;
operations ofcer, Battle Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas; and operations adviser to the Royal Saudi Land Forces. He is
currently an associate professor at the Combat Studies Institute, US Army
Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth.
